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Abstract 
 
Recent decades have witnessed an understanding of management accounting as a 
social practice with alternative social theory explanations about its practice 
varieties but transfer pricing issues therein have inadvertently been neglected. 
Based on 7-month fieldwork in a Chinese privately-owned group enterprise, this 
thesis attempts at understanding transfer pricing practices differently vis-a-vis 
power relations in that organisation. I have focused on interrelationships between 
dominant and dominated social groups in this organisation to examine how 
transfer pricing has become a political phenomenon. The theoretical framework 
based on the Gramscian hegemony captures these interrelationships. The findings 
illustrate that the political development in China conditioned the hegemonic 
relationship in Chinese organisations while the ideology of Confucianism 
determined certain control practice. As business owners are most powerful, 
mundane controls are rather informal while formal controls are largely de-coupled 
from operation. Consequently, transfer pricing practice is determined by 
hegemonic interests and ideologies of the dominant leading to a situation where 
managers, who perform transfer pricing calculation, rely on a “common sense”. 
However, agreement is still possible as Confucianism provided good sense of 
harmony and concern-of-others. This study contributes to transfer pricing 
literature by highlighting the social complexity of transfer pricing, while 
contributes to hegemony theory by showing the dynamic nature of hegemony. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
No longer seen as a mere assembly of calculative routines, it 
[accounting] now functions as a cohesive and influential mechanism for 
economic and social management. But why should this be the case? Why 
should accounting have grown in complexity and significance? What 
have been the underlying pressures for its growth and development? 
Just what roles has it come to serve in organizations and societies? And 
Why? All too unfortunately such questions very easily take one into 
uncharted terrain. For although there has been an enormous 
investment of effort in improving the accounting craft and even in 
charting its technical development, very few attempts have been made 
to probe into the rationales for the existence and development of 
accounting itself. (Burchell et al., 1980 p. 6) 
 
1.1 Background 
Burchell et al.’s (1980) questions above developed an intellectual curiosity in me 
towards studying a topic in management accounting in relation to a context in 
which it operates. When the field of accounting research embraced the 
functional imperatives of accounting development, researchers asked important 
questions of ‘how’ and ‘why’ accounting was developed in relation to its 
context, which led to their argument for studying accounting as an 
organisational and social phenomenon in its context. Inspired by them, the 
decade of 1980s witnessed a rapid growth in the discussion of sociological and 
political analysis of accounting. Mostly published in Accounting, Organisation 
and Society, scholars made a significant contribution by discussing promising 
theoretical insights (Burchell, Clubb & Hopwood, 1985; Hopper, Storey & 
Willmott, 1987), rich empirical stories (Hopwood, 1983; Berry et al., 1985) as 
well as essential philosophical lessons (Chua, 1986).  
 
It is this inspiration which led me to consider the role of management accounting 
in the Chinese context. While prior studies have discussed the obstacles 
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encountered in adapting management accounting in this context (e.g., Liu 2006; 
O’Connor et al. 2004; Wu et al. 2007), few studies have examined the actuality 
of management accounting practices in Chinese organisation. I started to ask 
questions such as ‘Why is management accounting being developed in Chinese 
organisation?’ ‘How is it being developed?’ and ‘What is its role in the 
organisational context?’. This motivated me to conduct an ethnographical 
fieldwork in a Chinese private organisation (anonymous as PLT) to explore 
management accounting’s socio-political interactions with its context.  
 
I entered the field with a plan to study management control practices, but an 
interesting issue attracted me: How is transfer-pricing implicated in the context? 
Unlike other management control practices, such as performance measurements 
and costing in the organisation, transfer pricing was complexly implicated in a 
changing organisational structure, the nature of the tax regime, and profitability 
issues. This means the financial criteria did not necessarily guarantee financially 
efficient transfer pricing. Rather, market-based and cost-based transfer pricing 
practices co-existed in different divisions with some ambiguous rules and 
procedures. For instance, while external purchases/sales were permitted in 
principle, managers found it difficult to do this in practice because of the 
system of transfer pricing. Although complaints and contradiction prevailed, a 
particular form of transfer pricing persisted and senior managers did not want to 
change it. 
 
This phenomenon contradicts the conventional understanding of transfer pricing 
as a profit-making device (e.g. Göx and Schiller, 2006; Luft and Libby, 1997; 
Cools, Emmanuel & Jorissen, 2008). As the view of management accounting as a 
social-political practice has already been established in prior work (Scapens, 
1990), this thesis builds on these works and delineates the way in which transfer 
pricing implicated in the functioning of an organisation within its broader social 
3 
 
context. Drawn on a detailed field data gathered over 7 months, i argue that 
transfer pricing is conditioned by its cultural-political context and influenced by 
dynamic hegemonic social relations while its mundane practice is realised 
through contradictory sense-making processes.  
 
1.2 On transfer pricing research  
Although the analysis of accounting has reached a new era with the rise of 
interpretive and critical perspectives, knowledge on transfer pricing has 
surprisingly remained in a ‘pre-social’ era. This practice has traditionally been 
presumed as a technical device providing financial benefits for organisations. 
Influenced by neo-classical economic theories, it has been linked to the ultimate 
goal of profit maximisation (Simons, 2000; Pfeiffer et al. 2011; Baldenius et al. 
1999; Drury, 2012). The conventional introduction of this accounting technique 
has been largely dominated by technical illustrations of calculation methods and 
their useful scenarios (Simons, 2000), which highlights the contingent nature of 
transfer pricing. 
 
This emphasis has been carried forward by transfer pricing researchers. The 
theme of concerning the question of ‘how transfer pricing can be efficient’ has 
been predominant in the transfer pricing literature. Based on assumptions of 
neo-classical economics, scholars have regarded transfer pricing as neutral and 
independent of ‘broader and social issues’ (Hopper & Powell, 1985 p.455). The 
focus has been on the debates regarding the choice of calculation methods 
(Hirshleifer 1956; Göx & Schiller, 2006; Pfeiffer et al. 2011), and contingent 
factors influencing the performance of transfer pricing such as tax compliance 
(Oyelere & Emmanuel, 1998) and concerns about fairness (Luft & Libby, 1997). 
Such a focus led to the employment of a positivist approach to studying transfer 
pricing such as analytical modelling (Göx & Schiller, 2006), statistical analysis 
(Bouwens & Steens, 2016), and experiment (Luft & Libby 1997) as the core 
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methodology. Consequently, studies have examined transfer pricing only in 
simulated conditions, and little is known about transfer pricing in action. 
 
This domination by the neo-classical economic perspective reminds me of a 
similar status of management accounting research in the 1970s (Scapens, 2006). 
As I discussed at the outset, some scholars, having realised the limitations of 
such a perspective, moved on to consider the socio-political aspect of 
management accounting. They began to study management accounting practices 
in action (Scapens, 1994), which provided a rich theoretical explanation of why 
organisations have particular management accounting practices and how such 
practices emerged and developed. Thus, a more extensive view of management 
accounting, emphasising its link with broader economic, social, and political 
contexts, has been established. 
 
While the development of management accounting research signifies a need to 
apply social analysis to transfer pricing research, Mcaulay, Scrace, and Tomkins 
(2001) provided a brief overview of the potential contributions it can offer. They 
explored how transfer pricing practice can be theorised as a tool of sustaining 
custom and habit, establishing identity and image, or even as a tool for personal 
needs and agenda. Their early study on transfer pricing as a social-political 
practice echoes many findings observed in similar management accounting 
research (Lounsbury, 2007; Scott et al , 2000; Thornton, 2002). Within their 
multiple theoretical readings of the story, their interpretation of transfer pricing 
as a political practice for personal agenda motivated me to explore the 
implication of transfer pricing in the organisational politics. 
 
Recognising crises and contradictions in society, socio-political studies in 
management accounting can put power relations into the foreground and 
explore how management accounting is engaged through class struggles and 
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political games (Hopper & Armstrong, 1991; Uddin & Hopper 2001; 
Wickramasinghe et al., 2004; Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2005; Ashraf & Uddin 
2015). With a focus on the labour process and political intervention, studies 
mostly discuss a top-down relationship between the dominant class and the 
dominated class. Less attention has been paid to accounting beyond such an 
enclosure. Thus, this gap in socio-political accounting studies, combined with my 
initial understanding of the field, inspired me to explore transfer pricing 
practice in relation to dynamic political relations. 
 
1.3 Towards my research questions 
A hegemonic theoretical framework was developed to explore the political form 
of transfer pricing. The theory of hegemony was developed by Antonio Gramsci 
during his time in prison between 1929 and 1935. Concerning the reproduction of 
class relations and exercise of power through a focus on ‘intellectual and moral 
leadership’, it was Gramsci’s attempt to enhance Marxist thought on politics. 
The use of hegemony in accounting studies has illustrated the active role of 
accounting in maintaining the prevailing hegemony and potentially changing it 
(Cooper 1995; Richardson, 1989; Goddard, 2002; Spence 2009). The political 
nature of management accounting in an organisational context is also captured 
by studying how management accounting has been used as the representation of 
the political hegemony (Alawattage & Wickramasinghe (2008), and how 
management accounting has been shaped through conflicted hegemonic 
compromises by different dominant groups (Ashraf & Uddin, 2015). While the 
theory of hegemony provides significant insights into the political nature of 
accounting, certain gaps can be identified. The current hegemonic analyses all 
emphasise state politics in developing accounting systems. In addition, dynamic 
hegemonic relations are less frequently explored. Studies concentrate upon 
either relations between the dominant class and dominated class or relations 
among the dominant classes. As a result, the interplay between different 
relations is not embraced.  
6 
 
 
Considering the gaps in the transfer pricing research and debates on hegemonic 
accounting research, this study seeks to answer three research questions:  
 
1) How are transfer pricing practices located in a broader cultural-political 
context?  
2) Do hegemonic relations shape transfer pricing practice? If so, how? 
3) How do people make sense of mundane practices of transfer pricing in 
conjunction with such hegemonic relations? 
 
These questions are related to 1) the structural level analysis which focuses on 
the broader cultural-political context in which the organisation is located, 2) the 
organizational analysis which concerns the development of transfer pricing 
practice within an organisational setting, and 3) the mundane level analysis 
which concentrates on the daily practice of transfer pricing. Thus, the analysis 
covers three levels of hegemonic relations in forming transfer pricing. The first 
one is the relation between structural and local hegemony, the second one is the 
relations among dominant groups and dominated groups, while the third one is 
the relation between dominated groups. Together, these three relations 
construct a hegemonic form of transfer pricing practice. 
 
Bringing together the Gramscian initial conceptualisation of hegemony and its 
later interpretations, a theoretical framework concentrating on different 
dimensions of hegemony was developed. First, Joseph’s (2002) concepts of 
structural hegemony and surface hegemony were adopted to understand the 
broader hegemonic conditions in relation to organisations. Second, inspired by 
Ashraf and Uddin's (2015) focus on horizontal hegemonic relations, the concept 
of dynamic hegemonic relations, including vertical and horizontal hegemony, was 
developed to understand how transfer pricing is shaped by their interrelations. 
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Third, the Gramscian dialectical concepts of common sense and good sense are 
used to unpack the sense-making process of transfer pricing. These theoretical 
inspirations will be elaborated upon in Chapter 3. 
 
1.4 Methodological choice 
This study adopted ethnography as methodological approach. The empirical data 
were collected through a case study in a Chinese private sector organisation. It 
was selected primarily because of its excellent access. Two main divisions were 
visited as my research site due to their close relations and frequent transfer 
pricing discussions. During a seven-month period, I interviewed personnel from 
different managerial levels, from business owners and senior managers, to 
middle-level managers and low-level staff, as well as holding countless informal 
conservations with them during lunch breaks. I spent hundreds of hours with 
them, sitting at the same table with the business owners and managers to 
observe their daily practice of transfer pricing. Furthermore, I witnessed inter-
divisional meetings where managers openly discussed the transfer pricing issue 
and negotiated the transfer price in real time. Documents were also reviewed to 
gain initial knowledge of each research site. 
 
The data were analysed in relation to the organisation’s managerial and social 
processes. During the fieldwork, I reflected upon my data with the theoretical 
framework through the writing of weekly summaries to identify common themes, 
summarise theoretical reflections, and update my storyline. Throughout the data 
collection period, the data were clustered and re-clustered to see how different 
theoretical insights could be used to make sense of the story. 
 
 
 
8 
 
1.5 Key contributions  
This study begins with the aim to explore transfer pricing as a socio-political 
practice with a focus on hegemonic relations. The intention is to contribute to 
the existing knowledge on transfer pricing and the literature on hegemony in 
various ways. 
 
This study aims to criticise the conventional neo-classical economic 
understanding of transfer pricing by showing transfer pricing as a social 
phenomenon. Following McAulay Scrace, and Tomkins' (2001) call for the 
adoption of a critical perspective in studying transfer pricing, this thesis provides 
such an empirical study. A hegemonic analysis on transfer pricing will 
demonstrate that transfer pricing cannot be conceived as a purely financial 
device, however. While arising out of structural and local hegemonic conditions, 
it is determined by the complex social relations, different interests, ideologies 
existing in an organisation.  
 
The use of a theoretical framework based on the Gramscian hegemony aims to 
contribute to the development of hegemonic theory by highlighting its dynamic 
dimensions. While the current literature often focuses on a single dimension of 
hegemony, i.e., vertical hegemony (Richardson, 1989; Cooper, 1995; Goddard, 
2002; Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2008) and horizontal hegemony (Ashraf & 
Uddin, 2015), this study offers insight into the dynamic interplay between 
different hegemonic dimensions. Thus, I will show the linkage between 
structural and local hegemony by exploring the conditional role of structural 
hegemony. I will also show how hegemony includes not only the hegemonic 
strategies that dominant groups implement with regard to dominated groups but 
also the horizontal political struggles between dominant groups.  
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Relating to this, this study will also bring insights on hegemony from the 
dominated perspective. Prior literature has focused solely on hegemony from a 
dominant perspective to explore the strategies of domination and moral 
leadership. Few studies have explored how dominated groups live in a 
hegemony, and little is known about either their sense-making process and the 
potential for resistance (see Mantzari & Georgiou, 2019 for exceptions). Thus, 
this study fills this gap by examining the sense-making process of dominated 
groups in their hegemonic context. It will reveal their contradictory thinking in 
understanding hegemonic practices such as transfer pricing. In addition, this 
study illustrates how managers can be regarded as dominated groups in certain 
contexts, which has been less explored in the prior literature.  
 
1.6 Organisation of the thesis 
The chapters of this thesis are divided into three categories. The next three 
preparatory chapters develop the research questions, introduce the theoretical 
framework, and present my methodological choices. Chapter 2 identifies the 
research gaps for the study by reviewing the development of transfer pricing 
research and management accounting literature. The literature review suggests 
that transfer pricing is regarded merely as a contingent practice while other 
management accounting research has entered the ‘social era’. This opens up 
possibilities for insights through social theorisation. In addition, the cultural-
political research in management accounting has mainly discussed only the top-
down relationship. The dynamic nature of transfer pricing then opens up 
opportunities to study the dynamic political relationship in organisations. Based 
on the identified knowledge gap, Chapter 3 further situates the research 
questions and develops the theoretical framework to explore it in more detail. 
The framework is developed around Gramsci’s political thoughts on ‘hegemony’. 
Based on his original book ‘Selections from the Prison Notebooks’ and the 
theoretical interpretations of others, this framework concerns the dynamic 
dimensions of hegemony. The relations between structure and local hegemony 
10 
 
are explored by the notion of structural hegemony; the relations between 
different social groups are explored based on theoretical insights into how 
hegemony is maintained including notions such as consent, common sense, and 
good sense. Chapter 4 presents the methodological choices made in undertaking 
this research. It presents my philosophical and methodological position, which 
explains my choice of ethnography as a methodological design. In addition, it 
elaborates upon my field journey by explaining how I gained access, obtained an 
initial understanding of the field, conducted my data collection, and, finally, 
analysed the outcomes of my fieldwork. 
 
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 provide an analysis of my empirical findings. Chapter 5 
analyses the structural hegemony within which the organisation is situated. It 
analyses the cultural-political development in China and analyses how this has 
influenced Chinese organisations in terms of the emergence of power relations 
and preferred management control practices. Although it does not directly 
relate to the internal dynamics of organisations, this macro analysis sets the 
necessary scene for further analysis. Based on this macro analysis, Chapter 6 
analyses the development and practice of transfer pricing at PLT, exploring the 
role of dynamic hegemonic relations in its development. By analysing the 
empirical findings of transfer pricing practice at PLT, especially its origin, 
development, and current status, I show how transfer pricing at PLT is 
characterised by different forms of hegemonic relations in different stages. 
While this analysis focuses on the horizontal hegemonic relations between 
dominant groups and their influence on transfer pricing, Chapter 7 moves on to 
the analysis of hegemony from the dominated perspective by examining the 
mundane practice of transfer pricing and how managers make sense of it. It 
analyses the ‘common sense’ staff relied on when understanding transfer pricing 
and how it is related to each shareholder’s ideology. It also analyses the 
appearance of good sense as a way of resisting common sense and considers its 
role in sustaining the hegemony. 
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The last two chapters critically discuss the findings presented and illustrate the 
contributions of this study. Chapter 8 summarises the findings and discusses how 
the research questions have been addressed. It critically engages empirical 
analysis with the literature on transfer pricing and management control to relate 
the present study to the existing research and theory. Chapter 9 concludes the 
thesis by summarising the thesis, presenting its contributions to the transfer 
pricing and management control literature, and discussing possible directions for 
further research. 
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Chapter 2˖Transfer pricing as a social practice 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter situated this study in the domain of transfer pricing and 
management accounting research but also outlined the research gaps, research 
questions and the theoretical framework adopted herein. This chapter 
elaborates on these by analysing debates in transfer pricing and management 
accounting literature. In doing so, it problematises the conventional knowledge 
of transfer pricing, explores the need for an alternative perspective of transfer 
pricing and discusses cultural-political research on transfer pricing as a 
promising research opportunity. 
 
The chapter proceeds by briefly elaborating the debate on ideological bias in 
accounting textbooks and how transfer pricing is understood in this context. 
Based on this, section 2.3 critically analyse the conventional research on 
transfer pricing, problematises theoretical foundation of neo-classical economic 
perspective, and reveals a narrow theme of transfer pricing as contingent 
practice. Section 2.4 highlights the need to conduct transfer pricing research 
differently by looking at similar debates on management accounting. By 
critically evaluating the relevance of cultural-political issue to transfer pricing, 
this chapter identifies the gaps in the current literature but also addresses them 
by exploring cultural-political aspect of transfer pricing 
 
2.2 The textualisation of transfer pricing 
The textualisation of management accounting knowledge has been debated for 
decades. Conventional understanding in mainstream texts and some leading 
journals has been heavily criticised by interpretive and critical researchers in 
various ways – for example, for the theoretical and methodological approaches 
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of conventional management accounting research being narrow and problematic 
(Hopper et al, 1987; Chua, 1986). Thus, many researchers (E.g. Burchell, Clubb, 
& Hopwood, 1985; Chua, 1988; Hopper & Powell, 1985) have advocated 
alternative perspectives towards management accounting based on interpretive 
and critical thinking. Research on management accounting change and 
management control has occasionally adopted such perspectives and 
consequently provided fresh insights into it, such as on the social aspects to and 
implications of management accounting. Inroads have therefore been made, but 
transfer pricing research shows few signs of developing such an alternative 
perspective accordingly despite previously demonstrating connections between 
transfer pricing and social interactions (Mcaulay, Scrace and Tomkins, 2001).  
 
Before exploring this need for an alternative perspective on transfer pricing, this 
chapter analyses how and why transfer pricing research largely remains locked 
within its neo-classical economics tradition. It begins by critically appraising 
conventional depictions of transfer pricing in mainstream texts to explain how a 
certain worldview of transfer pricing has been inculcated, texted and 
institutionalised.  
 
2.2.1 Textbook as a form of ideology 
The textbook is arguably an essential element of education, being used to 
explain concepts, show examples and provide a foundation for understanding 
knowledge, amongst other things. While its use has largely been taken-for-
granted, some researchers criticise the textbook and its usage for diffusing 
certain worldviews while neglecting others. For example, Crawford (2003) calls 
the textbook a ‘cultural artefact’, adding that its production and use ‘confront a 
range of issues to do with ideology, politics and values which in themselves 
function at a variety of different levels of power, status and influence Crawford 
(2003 P.5)’. Thus, instead of being a mere teaching instrument, a textbook can 
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be viewed as a means of constructing particular meanings, beliefs and values. 
Given this, it is no wonder that its production, content and use are influenced by 
powerful groups in society (Ferguson et al, 2009; Crawford, 2003). Such political 
understanding of a textbook commonly concerns history books evaluating how 
nations represent themselves and ‘the other’ (Pingel, 2009), but similar concerns 
also exist regarding the ideological character in accounting textbooks. In 
particular, many researchers have problematised the dominance of the neo-
classical economics worldview in accounting textbooks (Ferguson et al, 2009; 
Crawford, 2003; Boyce, 2004; Ferguson et al 2004; Kelly & Pratt, 1994; Scapens, 
1984; Cuganesan, Gibson, & Petty, 1997).  
 
While this worldview should not be deemed ‘wrong’ or ‘evil’, it should not be 
taken-for-granted either. Neo-classical economics do highlight profit 
maximisation and economical rationality as its fundamental assumption, but 
accounting textbooks almost invariably promote these concepts and usually 
neglect, relatively speaking, others that are arguably equally relevant within this 
field (e.g. social implication of accounting). Also, different labels are given to 
different ‘types’ of accounting by textbooks. For example, the interests of 
shareholders are predominant in financial accounting textbooks while 
management accounting is assumed to have a more managerial orientation and a 
focus on internal decision-making. Consequently, a critical discussion on the neo-
classical economics assumption underpinning texts is generally absent (Kelly & 
Pratt, 1994). In textbooks, then, knowledge is inculcated without addressing or 
even conveying any awareness of their implicit assumptions about society, 
human and value.  
 
This domination of neo-classical economics ideology in accounting textbooks is 
not naturally developed. Interviews with accounting textbook authors and 
editors by Ferguson et al, (2006) discovered that these ideologies are actually 
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the product of social and cultural relations. While knowledge is legitimated by 
professional bodies, businesses and the state, accounting textbooks reflect the 
ideological and political interests of particular groups in society regarding the 
types of students they want to produce and the ideologies they want them to 
carry. Despite textbook authors sometimes holding different worldviews, market 
pressure forces them to produce ‘publishable’ content in the service of power 
(Ferguson et al, 2006). Therefore, accounting textbooks actually help establish 
hegemony in society through their unquestioned reproduction of contestable 
values and beliefs (Ferguson et al., 2005; Ferguson et al., 2009; Mir, 2003). 
 
The ideology implicated in accounting text is institutionalised in different ways 
to generate consent. Central to this is how mainstream management accounting 
texts inculcate students with certain norms of behaviour and practice while 
excluding awareness of their social and organisational effects. Specifically, 
management accounting is presented as a mere technical tool while its role in 
constituting social and political connections is not acknowledged (Ferguson et 
al., 2009). In addition, the sources of individual motivation are limited because 
of narrowly framed assumptions of human behaviours. Management accounting 
textbook regards self-interest as the sole human motives and ignores the 
possibility of other social concerns (Cuganesan, Gibson and Petty, 1997). Using 
introductory financial accounting textbook as an example, Ferguson et al. (2009) 
found that the particular ways textbooks institutionalise their ideology involve 
various approaches, such as implicitly prioritising shareholders as key users, 
neglecting historical changes of context, excluding political issues, frequently 
using certain terms and naturalising the neo-classical economic assumption. 
Through these and other methods, textbooks thus articulate certain cognitive 
interpretations of accounting that legitimise the social order of certain power 
relationships by reflecting the ideological position of certain groups (Mir, 2003). 
As they do not provide alternative perspectives for understanding accounting, 
textbooks can be viewed as hegemonic discourses (Mir, 2003). 
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The emergence of these criticisms highlights how the production and content of 
accounting textbooks present and institutionalise a neo-classical economic 
worldview to promote ideologies that represent certain power groups in society. 
Despite studies in accounting education having called for the introduction of 
alternative perspective into textbooks to consider social-political dimensions of 
accounting, texting of accounting still adheres to its neo-classical economic 
tradition, likely because of the development of corporate university (Boyce, 
2004) and the demands of power groups such as professional bodies, businesses 
and government (Ferguson et al, 2006). Inevitably, the introduction of transfer 
pricing into mainstream textbooks (e.g. Drury, 2012; Simons, 2000; Kaplan & 
Atkinson, 1998˗Bhimani et al. 2015) has also been based on such a predominant 
worldview. Next section discusses how transfer pricing is textualised in this 
social-political context and how attentions are derived from alternative ways of 
understanding transfer pricing. 
 
2.2.2 Transfer pricing as a profit-making device 
Transfer pricing is deemed a profit-making device in conventional understanding 
of transfer pricing, and neo-classical economic ideology is embedded in the 
conventional textualisation of transfer pricing – including its definition, purpose 
and calculation methods. Simons (2000 p. 160) definition of transfer pricing 
illustrates a dominant economic understanding of the term as ‘an internally set 
transaction price to account for the transfer of goods or service between 
divisions of the same firm’. Thus, transfer pricing, as above, is an internal 
pricing system that creates revenue for one division and a cost for another 
division in equal amounts. The message this conveys is that transfer pricing is a 
neutral calculative device where price is the core element of this technique. It 
also shows how an economic-based understanding of transfer pricing is 
established at the outset. Likewise, the legitimacy of transfer pricing is 
17 
 
illustrated by highlighting its influence on the financial performance of different 
organisational divisions, leading to the ultimate goal of profit maximisation 
(Kaplan & Atkinson, 1998; Drury, 2012). This priority hence illustrates a neo-
classical economic assumption underlying transfer pricing.  
 
The intra-organisation purposes of transfer pricing are discussed based on this 
assumption, with two aspects usually dominant: motivation and performance 
measurement. That is, transfer pricing system should motivate local decision-
making in the organisation's best interests, while transfer price and divisional 
profit should serve as performance indicators for senior management to evaluate 
each profit/investment centre (Drury, 2012; Kaplan & Atkinson, 1998). Evidently, 
these two purposes are somewhat conflicting. Theoretically, while a transfer 
pricing system involves performance measurement, agent problems may occur 
and these affect motivational purpose. Although this conflict is recognised in 
most textbooks, authors usually naturalise them. For instance: 
 
“Unfortunately, no single transfer price is likely to perfectly serve all of 
the specified purposes. They often conflict and managers are forced to 
make trade-offs.” (Drury, 2012 p.510) 
 
“Transfer pricing, as a response to the creation of artificial markets within 
firms, is inevitably a compromise.” (Simons, 2000 p.170) 
 
As these examples demonstrate, authors tend to locate the source of conflict in 
the transfer pricing system itself rather than the legitimacy of the purposes, 
perhaps because of their assumptions regarding rational economic human 
behaviour. While authors tend to assume that all individuals behave rationally 
when making economic decisions, issues concerning subjectivity are overlooked. 
Thus, instead of raising attention to the social complexity in firms, authors 
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generally neglect these concerns by assuming that such problems are easily 
resolvable. As Simons (2000 p.170) summarises: 
 
 “As long as managers are aware of the potential distortions and 
incentive effects, profit plans can be adjusted ex ante and ex post to 
reflect internal transfers, and negotiations can easily be conducted 
between divisions so that no one is unfairly burdened by internal 
transfers of goods and services.”  
 
However, some authors do allude to subjectivity concerns. For instance, as 
Bhimani et al. (2015 p.628) state: 
 
“[when negotiating final price] The answer depends on the bargaining 
strengths of the two divisions … The price negotiated by the two divisions, 
will, in general, have no specific relationship to either costs or market 
prices.”  
 
It addresses practical issues of transfer pricing negotiations such as bargaining 
strengths and non-market driven transfer price. As such issues cannot be 
explained by a neo-classical economic perspective, the above authors intimate 
at how values, beliefs and social relations influence transfer price. Despite this, 
these authors did not further elaborate on the argument and instead discussed 
different transfer-pricing situations using the contingency approach, which fits 
the dominant assumption. 
 
Indeed, authors continue to institutionalise the economic significance of transfer 
pricing particularly through technical illustrations of different calculation 
methods in transfer pricing. The possible financial outcomes of these in various 
situations are likewise demonstrated with detailed examples. These methods 
include market-based, cost-based and negotiation-based transfer pricing in light 
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of contingency theory. The principal argument of contingency theory is that 
different organisational practices are appropriate under different external 
environmental circumstance and in different parts of the organisation. This, 
however, makes it impossible to develop a general applicable management 
system (Hopper and Powell, 1985). Applying contingency theory's assumptions, 
authors discuss the usefulness of different methods under various internal and 
external conditions. For example, the market-based transfer pricing method has 
been identified as optimal for intermediate products in perfectly competitive 
market conditions (Drury, 2012), but the negotiation-based transfer pricing 
method is described as ‘perhaps the most practical method’ for an imperfect 
competitive market and under cost-based pricing rules (Kaplan and Atkinson, 
1998). The complexity of different conditions is reflected in the table developed 
by Simons (2000) that shows major trade-offs when choosing transfer pricing 
methods. 
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Table 2-1: Major trade-offs in transfer pricing methods 
 TRANSFER PRICING METHOD 
OBJECTIVE VARIABLE 
COST 
FULL 
COST 
FULL COST 
PLUS 
PROFIT 
ACITIVITY-
BASED 
MARKET 
PRICE 
Promotes rational 
decision making in 
Selling Division 
Poor Moderate Better Better Better 
Promotes rational 
decision making in 
Purchasing 
division 
Poor Better Better Better Moderate 
Provides accurate 
product 
contribution 
measures 
Poor Moderate Better Better Best 
Easy to 
understand 
Best Better Moderate Worst Best 
Easy to apply Better Moderate Difficult Difficult Varies 
Source: Simons (2000, p. 17)  
The table above illustrates an attempt to reinforce transfer pricing's contingent 
complexity by showing how different methods have their own advantages and 
disadvantages under different circumstances. Such understanding treats the 
various transfer pricing practices as inanimate objects. Through such an 
ideology, contingent selection of different methods has become pervasive for 
practitioners. What contingent selection lacks, though, is a theoretical 
explanation of how different calculation methods can satisfy or dissatisfy 
different purposes.  
 
As noted earlier, the dominant neo-classical economics ideology of transfer 
pricing as presented in conventional textualisation inculcates particular 
knowledge. Consequently, transfer pricing is commonly deemed a profit-making 
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device and discussions of it are overwhelmingly concerned with its economic 
benefit, efficiency matters and contingent nature. This reciprocally reflects the 
perspective of transfer pricing that dominant social groups want to produce and 
re-produce. While transfer pricing has been labelled a neutral device (Simons, 
2000), it has actually been carefully developed in the form of neo-classical 
economic ideology from the beginning. However, we saw an uncritical adoption 
of neo-classical economic principles in transfer pricing. Although relevant social 
issues were hinted (Bhimani et al., 2015), authors tend to neglect its 
significance. This will cause transfer pricing to become increasingly irrelevant to 
organisations operating under complex social contexts (Kelly & Pratt, 1994). This 
will be developed further in the section 2.4.2. 
 
2.3 Re-textualising transfer pricing 
This work proposes that the conventional textualisation of transfer pricing in 
textbooks is largely about indoctrinating readers in the ideology of the neo-
classical economic perspective and that the re-textualising of transfer pricing in 
conventional research reinforces this ideology by developing contingent-based 
research and positivistic empirical studies. This section elaborates on this 
argument by analysing various debates within transfer pricing research. First, it 
discusses the ongoing debates on transfer pricing calculation methods (2.3.1). 
Secondly, it explores the issue of fairness of transfer price in negotiation (2.3.2). 
Thirdly, it looks into research on tax compliance and its relation to management 
control in transfer pricing (2.3.3). Overall, to crystallize the research issues the 
current study addresses, this section focuses on the management control issues 
associated with transfer pricing instead of those to do with taxation.  
 
2.3.1 Debates on the choice of calculation methods 
Research development on transfer pricing is driven by the analysis of different 
calculation methods and, often consequently, different analytical results. As 
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with textbooks, debates on different calculation methods persist and they do so 
on both theoretical and empirical levels. Despite various focuses within these 
debates, a recurring theme concerns an economical question: 'Which transfer 
pricing method is the best?’  
 
The standard transfer pricing model proposed by Hirshleifer (1956) introduces a 
basic model in an organisation with one Headquarter (HQ) and two divisions, and 
it explores how transfer pricing can perform for the best level of output in 
different market scenarios. However, this fundamental model of how transfer 
pricing should be set in a given organisational and market environment does not 
explain ‘how decentralisation is essential?’, given that centralised price 
instructions from HQ to divisions can be efficient enough (Göx and Schiller, 
2006). Studies adopting the asymmetric information principle seek to answer this 
question by arguing that information specialisation is one of the main reasons for 
decentralisation (Kaplan & Atkinson, 1998). Under the setting of asymmetric 
information, where divisional managers have greater local knowledge than top 
management, early studies argued that delegating transfer pricing decision-
making based on either a cost-based or a negotiation-based method can help 
firms maintain an optimal financial output (Vaysman, 1996, 1998). A little later, 
Dikolli and Vaysman (2006) considered the influence of information technology 
on the economic efficiency of the negotiated transfer pricing and cost-based 
methods. Their results indicate that the negotiated transfer pricing is financially 
superior under the condition of coarse information technology because of its 
information advantage, but with information technology developments this 
information advantage diminishes, and cost-based methods are able to generate 
higher profits. 
 
Other studies adopt an incomplete contracting model when analysing the 
usefulness of different transfer pricing methods. This model assumes that 
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divisional managers make specific upfront investments because these can be 
valuable for internal trade while having little value for external trades. 
Therefore, comparisons of different methods are about their capacity not only to 
guide intracompany transfers but also to motivate managers' investment 
incentives (Göx and Schiller, 2006). Similar to studies adopting the asymmetric 
information principle, incomplete contracting model reports mixed results 
because of the complexity of different scenarios and assumptions. For example, 
a Baldenius et al.'s (1999) comparison between negotiated and cost-based 
transfer pricing suggests that both methods can be a superior choice under 
certain circumstances. Although negotiation-based transfer pricing generally 
performs better, it can lead to insufficient investment incentives from managers; 
however, cost-based transfer pricing avoids such problems but they do suffer 
from distortions in intracompany transfer. Pfeiffer et al.’s (2011) results also 
indicate that three different methods (centralised standard-cost method, actual-
cost method and reported standard-cost method) can dominate others under 
different levels of cost uncertainties faced by HQ and divisions.  
 
Analytical work discussed above generally suggests that transfer pricing performs 
differently in different markets and organisational simulations. Different models 
and assumptions by their very nature are difficult to compare, leaving gaps 
between theory and practice. The recent appearance of empirical studies on 
transfer pricing sought to fill such gap and explore reasons for using certain 
calculation methods in practice. Interestingly, their results tend to conflict with 
what theory suggests. For example, theoretical work suggests that full-cost 
transfer pricing may trigger a self-perpetuating cycle of price increases and 
volume decreases, which leads to an efficiency distortion known as ‘dead spiral’ 
(Göx and Schiller, 2006). Nevertheless, Bouwens and Steens (2016) argue that 
the theoretical economic consequence of cost-based transfer pricing system can 
be prevented by systematic improvements such as cost-related performance 
measurement systems to encourage cost-reduction actions from managers 
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worked in practice. Believing rational assumption to individuals, they argue that 
proper system design can help managers make the best decisions for the 
organisation's financial benefit and to prevent the ‘dead spiral’ (Bouwens & 
Steens, 2016). 
 
2.3.2 What is fair? 
The debate about ‘fairness’ in transfer price negotiations opens another layer of 
complexity to transfer pricing by adding a subjective factor to it, as ‘fairness’ 
can mean different things to different people, despite also possibly having some 
objective measures, so it has a significant subjective strand. Across various 
contexts people can consider fairness in terms of salaries, promotion 
opportunities, human rights, bargaining strength, workload, authority, etc. In 
the transfer pricing literature, Luft and Libby (1997) set an early benchmark for 
understanding ‘fairness’ in research. For them, ‘fairness’ concerns equal profit 
for both divisions in transfer pricing negotiations. While conventional economic 
arguments deem market price a important benchmark for transfer price, Luft 
and Libby's (1997) experiment with experienced managers indicates that the 
existence of an external market does not necessarily simplify the transfer pricing 
negotiation process. They argue that the ‘fairness’ of market price is an 
influential factor in managers' decisions regarding the appropriateness of the 
transfer price. For instance, an unfair market price may not be accepted by 
managers because of their concerns of aversion to unequal price from other 
division. To further complicate the situation, the authors also found that self-
serving bias can lead to different constitutions of a ‘fair price’ among managers 
whereby they tend to view an outcome more favourable to them as being fair 
(Luft and Libby, 1997).  
 
Motivated by Luft and Libby's (1997) work, further studies started investigating 
the influence of different organisational factors on understandings of ‘fairness’ 
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in negotiation processes. Kachelmeier and Towry (2002) were concerned about 
the influence of internal organisational mechanisms on the ‘fairness’ of 
negotiation outcomes and found that the negotiation mechanism (e.g. face-to-
face or computerised negotiation) influences the fairness of transfer price. They 
discovered that the expectation of ‘fairness’ would not be materialised under 
computerised conditions where no direct communication is made other than 
actions such as bids, asks and acceptances. Kachelmeier and Towry (2002) then 
argue that the ‘fairness effect’ exercised in face-to-face negotiations may be 
attributed to the nature of humanised negotiation. Similarly, Ghosh (2000) 
argues that a complementary arrangement of sourcing and compensation 
structures facilitates fairness in transfer price negotiations due to negotiating 
managers’ singular motive (i.e. either cooperative or competitive’). Some 
studies argue that a manager’s values and cultural background may influence 
their own understanding of ‘fairness’. For instance, Chang, Cheng and Trotman 
(2008) argue that a manager’s degree of concern for others (so-called 'social 
concerns') can influence the transfer price negotiation process. Specifically, 
when working with partners who have a high concern-for-others, managers are 
more willing to give up their own profit and accept a less favourable transfer 
price. In a recent study, Hussein et al. (2017) argue that the ‘fairness effect’ 
noted by Luft and Libby (1997) is cultural dependent because understandings of 
‘fair’ may differ because of different power distance (Hofstede, 1984) across 
different cultures.  
 
The development of this research stream reveals the social complexity in 
transfer pricing and shows that it cannot be studied as a mere technique without 
considering the managers operating it. Managers' attitudes, cultural values and 
social relations can influence the outcome of transfer pricing, but alas previous 
research has graced only the surface of such complexity or at least touched only 
certain aspects of it. While growing evidence suggests that social relations can 
play a key part in transfer pricing negotiations (e.g. Chang, Cheng & Trotman, 
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2008; Hussein et al. 2017), how such social relations influence managerial 
behaviour remains unanswered. Although studies illustrate that fairness of price 
may be influenced by certain contingent factors such as the negotiation 
mechanism, managers' attitude and operators' social status, research has 
hitherto failed to provide any theoretical reason for such influences. For 
example, Luft and Libby's (1997) work suggests that managers may avoid the 
unfair transfer price indicated by the market price because of their concerns of 
aversion, but it is unclear why this happens in the first place. Is it because 
managers are doing others a favour because of their personal relationship? Is it 
because of pressure from HQ? Or are there other explanations for this? Similarly, 
when explaining the appearance of the fairness effect in face-to face 
negotiations, Kachelmeier and Towry (2002, p. 588) concluded that ‘face-to-face 
contact affords a more humanized negotiation and provides opportunities for 
persuasive communication, making it more difficult for the advantaged party to 
exercise the full economic bargaining power of an outside market price option’. 
However, this claim clearly lacks any theoretical explanation of how a humanised 
negotiation creates such conditions. These questions cannot be answered 
without empirical studies that consider the social-political context where 
transfer pricing practices occur.  
 
Furthermore, the functionalism characteristic of conventional research gives it a 
sole focus of profit maximisation. The motivation behind trying to identify 
influential factors usually concerns improving the economic efficiency of the 
transfer pricing procedure. For example, on the purpose of their research Chang, 
Cheng and Trotman (2008, p. 706) say they 'attempt to obtain a more unified 
understanding of how the negotiation process works and, eventually, how to 
overcome barriers to effective negotiation'. Similarly, Luft and Libby (1997, p. 
219) also admit that they are motivated by the need for cost reductions as noted 
by practising managers and management accountants. Because of such 
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characteristic, research misses the opportunity to embrace the complexity of 
context and explore the real-world practice of transfer pricing negotiation.  
 
2.3.3 Tax compliance as a contingent factor 
The above studies note how the internal managerial functions of transfer pricing 
contain many complexities with numerous contingent factors to consider, and 
the tax issue further complicates the issue. Although hardly mentioned in 
textbooks, transfer pricing associated with international taxation is an important 
topic for many researchers (E.g. Jacob, 1996; Sikka & Willmott, 2010; Cools, 
Emmanuel & Jorissen, 2008). These authors view it as a significant challenge for 
many countries and even researchers because of its implications for the 
distribution of wealth and public goods in a global context (Sikka and Willmott, 
2010).  
 
The prevalence of tax-motivated income shifting (so-called ‘international 
transfer pricing’) in MNEs means enterprises can maximise their after-tax income 
through creative inter-organisational transfer pricing (Jacob, 1996; Oyelere & 
Emmanuel, 1998; Emmanuel, 1999; Clausing, 2003; Dharmapala & Riedel, 2013), 
and tax-motivated transfer pricing happens in both developing and developed 
countries. Thus, transfer pricing is not only an accounting technique for internal 
management but also a method of resource allocation that affects the 
distribution of income, wealth, risks and quality of life (Sikka and Willmott, 
2010). To avoid loss of tax revenue, most countries have rules or regulations to 
assess the appropriateness of transfer prices by MNEs (Yao, 2013). For instance, 
the arm’s-length principle, whereby organisations have to operate transactions 
as neither party is subject to the other’s control or dominant influence, is 
commonly introduced by many regulators to limit conscious profit shifting by 
international organisations. 
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Although the taxation issue regarding transfer pricing is not the main concern of 
this study, many studies found that regulatory control over ‘international 
transfer pricing’ can influence the management control implications of transfer 
pricing in many organisations. A contingency framework has been to investigate 
such effects (Cools, Emmanuel & Jorissen, 2008; Cools & Slagmulder, 2009; 
Rossing, 2013). Case studies found that companies often use one set of transfer 
pricing systems for both tax and management control purposes to justify their 
transfer pricing choice as being internal and more specfically managerial 
motivated. This means that transfer pricing decisions involve performance 
evaluation but also currency and tax considerations (Smith, 2002). Interestingly, 
tax compliance seemingly dominates the entire transfer pricing system in many 
cases (e.g. Cools, Emmanuel & Jorissen, 2008; Cools & Slagmulder, 2009; 
Rossing, 2013). The functions of transfer pricing as a management control system 
are usually sacrificed as a contingent response to tax regulation. Negotiation in 
transfer pricing was eliminated as it may provide signs of profit manipulation 
(Cools & Slagmulder, 2009). In the case of Rossing (2013), an additional 
management control system was even deployed to reinforce the importance of 
tax compliance. These empirical findings were commonly justified from a 
contingent perspective, authors generally argue that the arm’s-length principle 
required by tax regulators seems an environmental pressure on the organisation; 
hence, sacrificing the management control function in transfer pricing becomes 
necessary for the organisation's survival. This research stream also highlight their 
methodological contribution by using case studies to explain how a company’s 
MCS is designed and used under the environmental pressures from the arm’s 
length principle (Cools & Slagmulder, 2009). Nevertheless, their methodology is 
underpinned by functionalism. Instead of involving themselves in the field and 
constructing psychological realities from the perspective of participants in the 
field, researchers generally examine formal mechanisms as objects. Thus, the 
role of transfer pricing is, for them, predetermined and taken-for-granted even 
before entering the field.  
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2.3.4 Reflection on transfer pricing texts 
This literature review demonstrates how transfer pricing is textualised and re-
textualised by reviewing textbooks and engaging in various academic debates. It 
reveals how textbooks introduced neo-classical economic ideology into transfer 
pricing and shows how this ideology, although not explicitly mentioned, is 
embedded throughout the texts including in aspects such as transfer pricing's 
definition and legitimacy but also discussions of calculation methods. The 
development of transfer pricing research further reinforced this ideology 
through the consistent focus on the economic consequences of different 
contingent factors and transfer pricing methods. This narrative contains diverse 
debates on transfer pricing issues such as calculation methods, fairness and tax 
compliance. At first glance, the development of transfer pricing research 
seemingly demonstrates a rich diversity of research topics, but on closer 
inspection these topics indeed ultimately share similar themes as demonstrated 
in figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2-1: Transfer pricing as a contingent practice 
 
As demonstrated in Figure 2-1, conventional research on transfer pricing mostly 
deem it a contingent practice. New contingent factors evaluating the influence 
of different environmental factors on different transfer pricing methods are 
constantly being introduced. Although contingency theory is not interpreted and 
mentioned in some literature (e.g. Bouwens & Steens, 2016; Hussein et al., 
2017), its theoretical insights are implicitly embedded in most studies to justify 
common contradictory findings. Furthermore, the dominance of the neo-classical 
economic ideology brings about an exclusive research focus on the economic 
performance of transfer pricing. While some factors such as managers' social 
concerns (Chang, Cheng & Trotman, 2008) are viewed as obstacles to the 
economic success of transfer pricing, other factors such as an appropriate level 
of cost uncertainty (Pfeiffer et al. 2011), information technology (Dikolli & 
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Vaysman 2006) and complementary arrangements (Ghosh, 2000) are regarded as 
key elements for the success of certain transfer pricing methods.  
 
A closer look at the theoretical explanations and ideological assumptions in prior 
literature suggests that there is actually little difference in terms of their results 
and research focus among various debates on transfer pricing. Although an 
increasing number of factors are continually added into the transfer pricing 
discussion, research has not critiqued its dominant neo-classical economic 
assumptions. This is quite problematic because it can lead to predictive results 
given that any contradictory findings can be justified by introducing new 
contingent factors. However, researchers seem unaware of such a problem and 
take the economic worldview for granted. Although research such as Cools and 
Slagmulder (2009) criticises the insufficient attention on the processual nature 
of transfer pricing, they themselves still maintain an uncritical view of the 
underlying theories. Such a lack of attention to the underlying theoretical 
premise of the discipline and this pervasive uncritical assumption of neo-
classical economic ideology means that transfer pricing research is reaching a 
‘dead circle’. This point will be further elaborated on in the next section 
through a critical review of contingency theory and neo-classical economic 
assumptions. 
 
2.4 Moving beyond the ‘dead circle’ 
As problematised in the previous section, most research in transfer pricing has 
been developed based on a neo-classical economic assumption and contingency 
theory. In order to further identify the research gap, the long-going criticism of 
these two aspects is discussed first, followed by the discussion on social 
theocratisation as a way forward. 
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2.4.1 The economic and contingency trap 
The domination of economic and contingency approaches is not unique to 
transfer pricing research as the development of management accounting 
research has experienced similar. Scapens (2006) provided a vivid story 
documenting the evolvement of management accounting studies in the 
preceding decades, which also gives insights into the current status of transfer 
pricing research. In the 1970s, management accounting research was dominated 
by economic approaches employed mathematical models. The intention of such 
approach was that all relevant theory the practitioners should be using had been 
developed and what academia should do is communicate it to practitioners and 
students. Thus, academia believed that management accounting practitioners 
would eventually learn to use these optimal management accounting models, 
but academies soon realised realise that practitioners never adopted them. In 
the 1980s, in response to the huge gap between theory and practice, researchers 
undertook research to explain the nature of management accounting in practice. 
A movement from the normative approach to the contingency approach 
developed to explain contradictory empirical observations and the use of 
‘unideal’ practice in some companies (Otley, 1980). Contingency theory 
underpinned by economic modelling became widely adopted to understand why 
diverse management accounting practices exists and to provide theoretical 
explanations accordingly. Concepts such as technology, organisational structure 
and environment were commonly used as explanatory variables to justify such 
diverse management accounting practices (Otley, 1980). 
 
The development of management accounting research up to the 1980s 
represents the current status of transfer pricing research. Transfer pricing 
research has widely adopted mathematical models to understand how transfer 
pricing should be, and contingency theory is used to explain the diversity of 
transfer pricing practice. Researchers studied transfer pricing with the intention 
to improve its efficiency as long as practitioners discovered and considered more 
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variables. However, where the two areas differ is that management accounting 
research moved on to a ‘social era’ while transfer pricing research remains 
trapped in a focus of contingent approach (Scapens, 2006). 
 
Although the adoption of contingency theory helps justify contradictory 
observations in management accounting practices, some researchers discovered 
the inconsistent correlation despite solid theoretical foundation (Scapens & Sale, 
1985; Otley, 1980; Hopper & Powell, 1985). Scholars started to realise that 
management accounting practice is usually not ‘ideal’ and that its development 
is dynamic and difficult to generalise into different contexts (E.g. Burchell et al, 
1980; Scapens & Sale, 1985; Scapens, 1994). Consequently, researchers became 
sceptical about contingency and economic theories, and they called for studies 
of management accounting in its context (Hopwood, 1983). For instance, Hopper 
and Powell (1985, p. 455) heavily criticised neo-classical economic 
methodological and theoretical assumptions: 
 
The failure of accounting research to question its methodological 
assumptions or to examine related broader and social issues is puzzling, 
given that so much relevant work in other disciplines impinges on topics 
normally considered within the accounting domain. Accounting researchers 
often defend the current position in terms of an academic division of 
labour. Accounting research is assumed to be concerned with developing 
managerial techniques and technologies. Abstract theorizing and societal 
issues are seen as the province of others. However, any such distinction is 
artificial and self-defeating. Not only can it lead to an impoverishment of 
understanding about accounting, its social science assumptions and its 
societal context, but it can have repercussions upon the relevance and 
usefulness of accounting research within management. 
 
Others echoed this strong statement and sentiment. That same year, Roberts and 
Scapens (1985) noted that understanding accounting practices in the 
organisational context requires not merely a technical description of an 
accounting system but insights into the ways it is embodied in its societal 
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context. Similarly, Scapens (1990) argues that although the neo-classical 
economic assumption may be useful when predicting general patterns of 
economic behaviour, it does not explain the process of individual behaviour. 
Later, Scapens (1994) argued that scholars should study management accounting 
practice per se instead of comparing them to theoretical models. This suggests 
that broader economic, social and political contexts likely influencing how 
management accounting practice emerges. Considering all helps understand 
management accounting in its particular and broader senses. Nevertheless, this 
is often sacrificed for a particular focus in transfer pricing research. 
                                                                                                                                                           
The arguments criticising economic management accounting approaches can 
easily apply to conventional transfer pricing research. Despite continued calls 
for recognising broader social contexts when studying management accounting, 
transfer pricing research still does not show any interest in this and continues its 
uncritical adoption of neo-classical economic methodological and theoretical 
standings. In doing this, it considers transfer pricing outside its own and others' 
(e.g. contexts) realities. Adopting an experimental approach also creates an 
unrealistic context for transfer pricing and therefore provides only very limited 
understanding of transfer pricing in practice. Although case studies are adopted 
in some studies, they tend to separate transfer pricing mechanism from its 
context and the focus is on one independent variable – tax compliance. 
Excessive attention on the economic role of transfer pricing limits opportunities 
to discover the way social contexts influence the emergence of transfer pricing. 
Although social factors such as bargain strength (Bhimani et al., 2015) and social 
concern (Chang, Cheng & Trotman, 2008) are recognised in some studies, they 
are considered barriers to effective transfer pricing. This is ironic given that 
transfer pricing is traditionally categorised as part of management accounting. 
To enhance the understanding of transfer pricing practice, a study must thus 
define transfer pricing as a broader concept that includes not only its technical 
mechanism but also the interplay of different inter-related factors such as 
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human relations and broader economic, social, cultural and political contexts. 
This is what this study does. Through social theorisation, this study could 
possibly provide important insights on transfer pricing issues. 
 
2.4.2 Social theorisation as an essential step 
The previous section showed how current transfer pricing research has been 
trapped within its own ‘dead circle’ of an economic and contingency approach 
while other management accounting research (e.g. Roberts and Scapens, 1985; 
Hopper and Powell, 1985) has identified the gap of theory and practice and 
moved towards a broader understanding of management accounting as a social 
practice. This section thus discusses how social theorisation is an essential step 
for transfer pricing research to make a similar move.  
 
Following the demand for broader understanding of management accounting, a 
rapid development of alternative theoretical perspectives has emerged in recent 
decades. Various theories and different methodological approaches developed to 
study management accounting practice have sought to extend the theoretical 
domain from economic into social theory (Scapens 2006). The core premise of 
using social theory starts from the belief that management accounting practices 
are not natural phenomenon; instead, they are socially-constructed practices 
(Scapens, 1990). Therefore, social theory enriches explanations and 
understandings of transfer pricing practice not only by viewing this through 
different theoretical angles but also, importantly, by taking hitherto neglected 
approaches more suitable to transfer pricing as a social phenomenon.  
 
Social theories have been implicated in management accounting research to 
offer alternative explanations for the emergence of different management 
accounting practices other than environmental pressures or technical needs. In 
36 
 
recent decades, institutional theory, for example, has been rapidly developed 
and implicated in management accounting research to understand how 
management accounting change is emerged and changed in organisations. Burns 
& Scapens’s (2000) institutional framework allows them to explain management 
accounting practices by viewing it as organisational rules and routines and by 
emphasising their historical-processual nature (Burns & Scapens 2000). 
Empirically, researchers using this framework found that the change of certain 
management accounting practices can be explained as deriving from a complex 
dynamic between formal rules and day-to-day routines such as their loose 
connections (Lukka, 2007) and the interaction between historical reproduced 
routines and formal rules (Steen 2011). Alternatively, an institutional logics 
perspective provides explanations on the emergence of certain practices with a 
different emphasis. Instead of focusing on the interactions between rules and 
routines, this institutional framework analysing actors’ logics – the organizing 
principles that drive the meaning actors give to their social reality (Friedland 
and Alford, 1991). Therefore, management accounting can emerge due to the 
materialisation of actors’ value beliefs and assumptions instead of technological 
development or desires for profitability (Lounsbury 2007). Similarly, the change 
of management practice can be explained as resulting from conflict between 
competing logics in organisation and society (Ezzamel, Willmott and 
Worthington, 2008). 
 
The adoption of institutional theories illustrates how management accounting 
can be studied by viewing it as an ongoing social process. The key arguments are 
that social theory can provide theoretical explanations for ‘why organisations 
have their particular management accounting practices?’, and that transfer 
pricing can benefit from the social perspective. While prior transfer pricing 
literature can provide only rational explanations for adopting certain transfer 
pricing mechanisms, social theorisation has the potential to provide broader 
explanations on transfer pricing in the real world. Transfer pricing, at its core, is 
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a practice heavily involved in constant discussion, argument, conflict and 
negotiation between people from different divisions. While people may have 
different logics, identities and different images to others, the transfer pricing 
will be emerged accordingly. 
 
The relevance of the social perspective was actually raised almost two decades 
ago. Mcaulay, Scrace and Tomkins (2001) provided an initial insight into how 
transfer pricing practice can be established for non-technical use. 
Acknowledging some neo-classical economic explanations on the emergence of 
certain transfer pricing practices in Trustco (their case organisation), they 
highlighted how transfer pricing practice can be used as a tool for sustaining 
custom and habit, establishing identity and image, or even as means of catering 
for personal needs and agenda. These observations actually echo those on the 
management accounting practices discussed above. For instance, Mcaulay, 
Scrace and Tomkins (2001) argue that the reason for introducing transfer pricing 
may simply be to comply with the custom of adopting transfer pricing in the 
industry. This observation relates to institutional studies, where logics at the 
professional level is able to influence organisational evolution (Lounsbury, 2007; 
Scott et al , 2000; Thornton, 2002). Thus, attempts at critically theorising 
transfer pricing can be a positive step towards better understanding of the non-
technical role of transfer pricing in practice. The necessity for this is well 
articulated near the end of Mcaulay, Scrace & Tomkins' (2001, p. 107) insightful 
research: ‘A critical perspective begins to offer an affirmative stance, which is 
potentially more fulfilling than the constraining rationality of custom and fashion 
flooding from the quasi-economic and commercial mindscape of Trustco.’ 
 
Knowing this, it would be interesting to extend this critique further. Although 
their study carries various theoretical insights, it did not adopt any theoretical 
lens during data analysis. The authors eschewed the commitment to a particular 
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theoretical framework to instead illustrate the mutual interest of theory and 
practice and highlight multiple readings of the story. Therefore, further studies 
with a particular theoretical framework can possibly provide a more solid 
theoretical understanding of transfer pricing. 
 
2.4.3 The cultural-political issue  
As discussed above, Mcaulay, Scrace and Tomkins (2001) offer various lines of 
reasoning for understanding transfer pricing practice. One of their arguments is 
that transfer pricing might support the personal agenda of the Chief Executive 
Officer, through which particular stakeholders benefit at the expense of others, 
including the employees. This observation is significant for this study because it 
illustrates an example of transfer pricing as a political practice. 
 
Although not discussed in the transfer pricing literature, arguments regarding 
political and cultural influences on management control are well developed. 
Power, an inevitable topic for this stream of research, involves capacity for 
action, command and control, and it mobilises through relations and creates 
politics (Wickramansinghe, 2006). This is well documented in the various 
privatisation projects within less developing countries (e.g. Uddin & Hopper 
2001; Wickramasinghe et al., 2004; Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2005; Ashraf & 
Uddin 2015). Overall, their results suggest that management control practice is 
usually influenced by the power of state politics instead of local economic 
decisions. For example, in the study of a Sri Lanka Telecommunications company, 
Wickramasinghe et al. (2004) noted how attempts at introducing Japanese cost 
management during privatisation faced heavy resistance from local politician 
through regulations. In other words, when a neoliberal force tries to mobilise 
local power the local powerful players resist to maintain existing power 
relations. Consequently, any ‘new’ management accounting practice gets 
marginalised and the traditional political-based control approach remains. Thus, 
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the inclusion of political elements such as political intervention and state 
control into management accounting research extends our understanding of how 
management accounting is emerged and changed. 
 
Another important power relation is the classic capital-labour relationship. 
Hopper and Armstrong (1991) note its relevance to management accounting 
systems in light of labour process theory. They argue that the development of 
management accounting reflects the evolution of capitalist control. For them, 
then, management accounting practice is not a mechanism for improving 
production efficienty; instead, is a political means through which the capitalist 
class secures surplus value (Hopper & Armstrong, 1991; Alawattage & 
Wickramasinghe 2008). This perspective therefore stresses ‘contradiction rather 
than internal consistency; social and political conflict rather than harmony; the 
monopoly power of corporations rather than self-equilibrating competitive 
markets, patterns of class formation in specific economies rather than an 
atomised view of the individual; and human agency in its cultural and 
institutional setting rather than economistic reductionism’. (Hopper & 
Armstrong, 1991, p. 406). 
 
The labour relationship embraces crisis and contradictions in society and 
unpacks different and more broader forms of controls than the economic 
perspective, but the significance of accounting within this relationship is 
debatable. For instance, Bryer (2006) argues that accounting is the core control 
system for capitalists because it provides objective measures of generating and 
realising surplus value. Many other scholars, however, believe that accounting 
serves only a supplemental role for other forms of labour control such as 
physical modes of control (Hopper, et al, 1986). Though the above studies focus 
on the capitalist control in Western contexts, studies situated in developing 
countries argue that management accounting can be detached from labour 
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control. Alawattage and Wickramasinghe (2008), for instance, argue that the 
role of accounting in the labour control domain depends on its broader structural 
conditions. In the case of a Sri Lankan tea plantation, these authors found that 
political hegemonic control dominated the overall control mechanism while 
accounting helped reproduce the status quo. Under this, Cultural practice is a 
main strategy for political control other than direct political intervention. For 
instance, ‘paternalistic relations’, as a cultural practice, was central when 
forming local political control (Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2008). Similarly, 
Efferin and Hopper (2007) noted a culture-driven control mechanism in a 
Chinese-Indonesian business, finding that accounting for this Chinese-owned 
organisation is used only to prescribe behaviour. In this, accounting's disciplinary 
function had been replaced by a cultural-based control based on the Chinese 
values of loyalty and obedience rather than efficiency or financial result. 
 
While the neo-classical economic perspective is silent on the complex cultural-
political environment in which transfer pricing is situated, studies in 
management control have given some prominence to the power relations in the 
labour process. In this domain, hints at the relevance of cultural-political 
influences on transfer pricing offer exciting possibilities for such studies. The 
potential of the transfer pricing system as a political practice has already been 
alluded to by Mcaulay, Scrace and Tomkins (2001), and the cultural dependence 
of transfer pricing has also been discussed in a recent paper by Hussein et al. 
(2017). Adopting Hofstede's (1984) theory of cultural dimensions, the latter 
authors argue that decisions on the transfer price are culture-specific. 
Specifically, they found that collectivist cultures tend to consider unequal profit 
distribution as fair while individualist cultures tend to consider similar profit 
distribution as unfair. Although  their research demonstrates that transfer 
pricing practice may differ according to different context, their attribution of 
this to cultural contingency theory lacks an explanation of ‘what [people’s] 
values are, why and how they emerged, why they matter, and how they 
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influence control’ (Efferin and Hopper, 2007). Hence, the role of politics and 
culture in transfer pricing needs further exploration. 
 
Studying transfer pricing more broadly can enhance our understanding on 
cultural-political influences in management accounting. Despite growing 
engagement with political debates, the current research focus seems to be 
narrowed to the top-down relationship between the dominant and dominated 
classes – for example, state control over organisation and capitalists' control 
over workers. However, few studies explores the horizontal relationships and 
interplays between different relations. One exception is a recent study by Ashraf 
and Uddin (2015), who addressed the presence of a horizontal dynamic of 
politics when it is shaping management control practice. In their case on 
Pakistan Airport, the political conflict between military and commercial 
managers in the organisation has created ambiguous management accounting 
without a consistent ideological foundation. Consequently, the management 
control mechanism became unstable, which led to resistance from the 
employees later on. These authors' research therefore highlights that the 
internal relationship among social groups is also crucial in shaping management 
control practice. Nevertheless, horizontal political relations are largely absent 
from current political accounting studies. 
 
In addition, there is little focus on the dominated classes. Although most studies 
do emphasise how labour control can be achieved with or without management 
control, hardly any documentation specifically explores the influenced group. 
Nevertheless, the actions of the influenced group are important for the 
reproduction of labour control. For instance, the workers’ resistance to the 
capitalist mode of production eventually leads to the restoration of the old 
control system (Wickramasinghe, Hopper and Rathnasiri, 2004; Wickramasinghe 
and Hopper, 2005). Though this is so, this also suggests that the political 
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relationship among the dominant group will also be influenced because of the 
restoration of control system. This dynamic political relationship is therefore 
important to draw a more comprehensive picture of management accounting in 
relation to political control. 
 
A cultural-political study on transfer pricing such as this study can fill this gap. 
Transfer pricing essentially contains two types of practices – management 
control and internal communication. Transfer pricing can be regarded as a 
management control practice because of its function of performance 
measurement, it involves the relationship between the dominant and dominated 
groups. At the same time, transfer pricing practice is also an information sharing 
system through which staff in different divisions can communicate. The dual role 
of transfer pricing in organisation then has the potential to analyse the dynamic 
political relationship in organisations. 
 
2.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has articulated the need for a political study in transfer pricing 
through my reviews on transfer pricing, and management accounting literature. 
The review noted that the development of transfer pricing research is largely 
underpinned but also dominated by neo-classical economic ideology and 
contingency theory. Textbooks set the benchmark of ideological assumption for 
studying transfer pricing, and the development of transfer pricing research 
reinforces the understanding of transfer pricing as a profit-making device. 
Inevitably, various research is undertaken based on the functional desire to 
provide suggestions for practitioners. A closer look of research results suggests 
that transfer pricing is largely regarded as a contingent practice. Although 
contingency theory is not interpreted and evaluated in some literature, its 
theoretical insight is employed in most studies to justify otherwise contradictory 
findings. The review then concluded that transfer pricing research has reached a 
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‘dead circle’ because of the uncritical attitude toward its theoretical ideology 
and predictive results. 
 
While this is so, a trace of theoretical development in management accounting 
research discovered that it has moved into a ‘social era’. While economic and 
contingent perspectives of management accounting are criticised for being too 
narrow and unrealistic, a call for understanding management accounting in its 
broader economic, social and political contexts has led to the adoption of 
various social theories. This has provided opportunities for exploring transfer 
pricing issues through the lens of social theory, particularly as the effect of 
social factors has already been hinted at in conventional research.   
 
The review of cultural-political research in management accounting further 
encourages the current study of transfer pricing through a political lens. Political 
research offers an emphasis on power relations and labour control aspects in 
understanding transfer pricing. Since some transfer pricing research implicitly 
suggests transfer pricing as a cultural and political practice, this opens 
possibilities for exploring transfer pricing issues from this angle. In addition, 
political studies on management accounting mostly discuss the political control 
mechanisms exercised by controllers, but they give inadequate attention to the 
dimension of horizontal political relations and the ‘controlled’. These gaps can 
be addressed through a study on transfer pricing considering its dual role of 
management control and internal communication in organisation.  
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Chapter 3: A hegemonic theoretical framework 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter criticised the neo-classical economic and contingent 
standing of transfer pricing research. It also identified cultural-political research 
on transfer pricing as a means of enhancing transfer-pricing research and 
debates by opening up an critical perspective to arguably limited preceding 
ones. This chapter articulates a framework from that perspective. Specifically, it 
shows how the Gramscian hegemony can offer a framework that helps capture 
underlying political and cultural issues vis-à-vis transfer pricing practices.  
To do so, section two of this chapter firstly summarises the identified gaps in the 
literature then justifies the Gramscian hegemony as a suitable theory for 
addressing them. It next addresses the current research gap in hegemonic 
accounting studies. Based on these, the research questions are developed and 
articulated in this section. Section 3 introduces the Gramscian hegemony as a 
raw analytical tool and provides a fundamental interpretation of hegemony. 
Section 4 shows how various interpretations to develop its own hegemonic 
framework concerning dynamic hegemonic relations for analysing transfer 
pricing practice consequently addressing the research questions raised. This 
framework consists of a few key dual concepts including structural hegemony 
and surface hegemony, horizontal and vertical hegemony, as well as common 
sense and good sense. The final section summarises and concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2 Gaps to be considered 
Chapter two (Section 2.4) identified two areas of research in current transfer 
pricing that need further attention. First is the issue of theorising transfer 
pricing, where I argue that the domination of neo-classical economic and 
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contingency theories limits understandings of transfer pricing. In particular, 
social theorising questions if such dominant perspectives can capture related 
broader and social issues in accounting (Hopper & Powell, 1985; Roberts & 
Scapens, 1985; Scapens, 1994) given their exclusive focus on economic 
performance. As social and political issues in transfer pricing have been 
explicitly raised (McAULAY, Scrace & Tomkins, 2001), demands for exploring 
transfer pricing issues through social theoretical lens have emerged. 
 
The second area concerns the possible cultural-political implications on transfer 
pricing, as a cultural-political agenda in management accounting is well 
developed. Concerning power relations between different social groups, this 
stream of research explores different forms of management control in a political 
sense. However, similar analysis is largely absent from transfer pricing literature. 
Although this has already hinted at in literature (McAULAY, Scrace & Tomkins, 
2001; Hussein et al., 2017), transfer pricing research shows limited engagement 
in cultural-political debates. Consequently, it constrains the analysis of dynamic 
political relationships among social classes – an analysis currently lacking in the 
literature. Consequently, we know little about interplay between different social 
relations and the dominated perspective. Thus, the motivation for this research 
is to explore transfer pricing through a cultural-political dimension. 
 
3.2.1 Hegemony as a lens 
Hegemony is a concept coined in 1924 by Antonio Gramsci, the General 
Secretary of the Italian Communist Party. Most of his concepts on the theory of 
hegemony however, were developed during his prison life (1929–1934) after the 
Fascist State arrested him. Documenting it in his prison notebooks, Gramsci 
developed his theory of hegemony in an attempt to enhance Marxist thought on 
politics. 
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Gramscian hegemony fundamentally concerns the reproduction of class relations 
and the exercise of power. He proposes that a class and its alliances exercise 
power over the dominated classes via a combination of coercion and consensual 
ways (Simon, 2015). However, this does not mean that hegemony is the means of 
domination and force; instead, it is a relation of consent conducted through 
means of political and ideological leadership (Simon, 2015). It hereby 
distinguishes itself from Classical Marxism as the latter emphasises economic 
structure and materialism in the shaping of society. In Classical Marxism the 
objective material conditions are prioritised over consciousness, and the latter is 
conceptualised as an ‘automatic reflection of economic and social processes’ 
(Femia, 1986a, p.3). In contrast, Gramsci prioritises the domain of ideological 
superstructures in which he constructs his theory of social domination through 
‘intellectual and moral leadership’ in contrast with the direct domination of 
coercive force alone (Femia 1986a P.13; Pellicani 1981). Gramsci’s hegemony 
therefore presents an alternative way of understanding the supremacy of a 
social group in a particular historical and social context by foregrounding the 
problem of consciousness and exploring its relations to the material world 
(Femia 1986a).  
 
As with labour process theory, a hegemony perspective highlights the power 
relations between the dominant classes and the dominated classes. For 
accounting, it brings the notion of interest to the forefront. Although Lehman 
and Tinker (1987) recognised contributions that showed accounting as socially 
specific (e.g. Berry et al., 1985), they also argued that the notion of interest had 
not been elucidated in previous social research. They refer to Gramsci’s theory 
of hegemony to highlight this aspect in the development of accounting. Studying 
the development of arguments in accounting journals from 1960 to 1973, they 
argued that accounting practices should be regarded as ideological weapons for 
participating conflictions over social interests.  
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Although hegemony theory shares some common concerns with other political 
theories (e.g. labour process theory, Classical Marxism), its particular ideological 
focus differentiates itself from others. For example, labour process theory 
(Hopper & Armstrong, 1991; Uddin & Hopper, 2001) generally focuses on the 
control mechanism itself and how control generates surplus value. As Hopper and 
Armstrong (1991) note, management accounting is a political tool through which 
capitalists secure surplus value. Similarly, Uddin and Hopper's (2001) use of 
labour process theory also concern how transformations of regimes of control 
that shapes accounting into different practices. In contrast, Gramsci sought to 
understand why such a relational structure is reproduced and how ideological 
leadership secures voluntarily support of such a structure (Richardson, 1989). 
Hegemonic accounting studies have shown that accounting plays a signicant role 
in maintaining hegemony by reproducing political ideologies and generating 
consent. This is captured through the emerge of two research themes: first, the 
development of the accounting profession as part of state hegemony; secondly, 
the reproduction of political hegemonic control through management accounting 
practices in organisations. 
 
On the first, hegemony provided a theoretical explanation of the non-technical 
historical development of the accounting profession in the UK (Goddard, 2002), 
Canada (Richardson, 1989) and China (Yee, 2009; Xu, et al, 2014). In this, 
researchers discovered that the interactive relationship between the accounting 
profession and state hegemony provides rich understandings of how accounting 
has been used as a political tool in co-ordination with state actions (Goddard, 
2002; Lehman & Tinker, 1987) and that the shift of hegemonic state ideology 
interacts with the development of accounting practice (Goddard, 2002; Yee, 
2009). For example, drawing on Gramsci’s analysis on the functioning of the 
state and ‘organic crisis’, Goddard found that hegemonic changes in different 
historical periods (e.g. from Fordist hegemony to neoliberal economic 
hegemony) were always soon followed by a change of practice in the accounting 
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profession but also that, reciprocally, the accounting profession plays a 
constitutive role in hegemony by influencing policies and individuals’ ideological 
outlooks. Similarly, Yee's (2009) analysis of Chinese political development (from 
Maoism to Dengism) shows that the development of the accounting profession in 
had been fully directed and supported by state hegemony so that the 
government could materialise the ideology imposed by Deng. Further back, from 
1949 to 1957, Xu, Cortese, & Zhang, (2014) reinforced this view by arguing that 
the rise of Maoist hegemony intentionally mobilised accounting as a tool for 
diffusing its ideology.  
 
While the above literature mainly focuses on the conclusive influence of 
hegemonic crisis on changes to accounting practices, other studies demonstrate 
the active role accounting plays in maintaining and even potentially changing 
prevailing hegemony. For instance, Cooper (1995) uses Gramsci’s hegemony as 
the theoretical foundation for analysing accounting's role in maintaining 
advanced capitalism. Cooper’s work used the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) 
as the field to study this an active political function of accounting. She argues 
that accounting is involved in both consensual and coercive hegemonic control. 
She adds that accounting is part of the civil society that serves as a discourse for 
the ‘financial consciousness’ deriving from capitalist ideology but is also part of 
the political society that implementis authoritative requirements to trade 
unions. Thus, accounting is an essential part of capitalism's state hegemony, 
which explains why trade unions failed in the fight of position using accounting 
rhetoric as rationales. While trade unions are trapped in a spontaneous 
mythological financial consciousness, alternative ways of seeing cannot be 
achieved. Despite this, Spence (2009) argues that accounting can still be a 
potential emancipatory practice for critiquing prevailing hegemony. 
Acknowledging the use of corporate social accounting as a shield to prevent 
criticism, he stresses that social accounting in civil society such as in academia 
can potentially unleash accounting’s emancipatory potential if dominated social 
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groups can construct and disseminate new ideologies that diverge from the 
interest of economic base. 
 
Despite having different empirical focuses, the above literature arguably all 
discuss a similar issue: the relationship between accounting and state hegemony. 
Their analyses therefore take place on a structural level at the inevitable 
expense of understanding daily accounting practices. Hegemonic management 
control studies attempt to address this shortcoming by focusing on hegemonic 
control in an organisational context. Alawattage and Wickramasinghe's (2008) 
study on hegemonic control in a Sri Lankan tea plantation, for example, reveals 
the relationship between structural hegemony and local control practices. 
Adopting Joseph's (2002) interpretation of Gramsci from a critical realist 
perspective, they emphasise the dynamic interaction between structural and 
agential dimensions of political hegemony. They also show how ritualised 
practices and beliefs are manifested in daily accounting practices, which 
constructs management accounting as the representation of political hegemony 
instead of a calculative practice for rational managerial purposes. Similarly, 
Ashraf and Uddin (2015) also noted the influence of structural hegemony on 
management control practices in their airport case study. They further extend 
the analysis by focusing on the horizontal relationship between dominant social 
groups, including their respective interests, political strategies and influence on 
management accounting practices. Empirically, they demonstrated how an 
incoherent management accounting framework has been developed because of a 
‘weak’ hegemonic arrangement resulting from conflicting ideologies and 
constant compromises among the dominant classes (in his case, military officers 
and corporate managers). The went on and argue that the nature of compromise 
between the dominant groups and their vested interests is very important when 
understanding management accounting practice because it may influence how 
management control practice is implemented. 
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Overall, hegemonic analyses of accounting have provided much insight into the 
political nature of accounting. Unlike other political theories, a hegemonic 
perspective highlights the ideological influence of accounting in forming 
hegemonic control. At a structural level, the ideological influence of accounting 
on society is apparent as research has demonstrated active and reflective roles 
of accounting in maintaining prevailing hegemonic ideology in society as civil 
society (Goddard, 2002; Cooper 1995; Yee, 2009; Xu, et al, 2014). Adopting 
hegemony in the studying of labour control opens possibilities for linking labour 
control to broader political contexts. It demonstrates how political ideologies 
reproduce labour control practices such as accounting (Alawattage & 
Wickramasinghe, 2008). The focus on the horizontal dimension of hegemony 
further extends our understanding of accounting's political nature by showing 
how diverse interest existed in dominant groups influence how management 
control practices are formed (Ashraf & Uddin, 2015). Therefore, Gramsci’s 
theory of hegemony captures cultural-political issues from the viewpoint of the 
ideology it carries and the hegemony it preserves. It locates the issues into a 
broader class struggle and recognises the importance of dynamic relations 
between social groups. Thus, a hegemonic perspective can provide insights into 
theorising transfer pricing issues that the neo-classical economic and 
contingency theories have not even discussed.  
 
Although insightful contributions have been made by hegemonic accounting 
studies, certain gaps in studying hegemony still remain. First, prior accounting 
work tends to emphasise the role of state politics in the development of 
hegemony and accounting systems. Under this, the theoretical concepts related 
to the functioning of the state such as ‘Civil Society’ and ‘Political Society’ were 
regularly used (Goddard, 2002; Cooper 1995; Yee, 2009; Xu, et al, 2014). Despite 
Ashraf and Uddin's (2015) and Alawattage and Wickramasinghe's (2008) focus on 
organisational practice, the political representatives of military and manager 
and of politician in their respective works still play decisive roles in constructing 
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political hegemony and management accounting practices in organisations. 
Therefore, such analysis focuses on the structural hegemonic influence on local 
practices. Joseph (2002) does argue that local hegemonic projects have their 
own dynamics associated with particular social groups involved, but there is a 
need to explore internal hegemonic dynamics within the structural condition. 
 
Secondly, prior literature oversimplified hegemonic relationships by solely 
concentrating either on the relationship between the dominant classes and 
dominated classes (Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2008) or relationships among 
the dominant classes (Ashraf & Uddin, 2015). Despite recognising both different 
dimensions of hegemony, the exploration of complex interactive dynamics 
between these social groups remains absent. Ashraf & Uddin’s (2015) study 
already hints that the relationship among dominant groups in the organisation 
has implications on dominated groups, which eventually influence the 
relationship between dominant and dominated groups. Thus, such interactive 
dynamics need to be explored. 
 
Furthermore, as with other political accounting studies, analysis of the daily life 
of influenced groups is still scarce. Ashraf and Uddin (2015) discussed the 
influence of coercive control on workers, noting how this ultimately resulted in 
resistance. Resistance is a significant element in labour control that needs 
further exploration. As Uddin and Hopper (2001) demonstrated, labour resistance 
can interact with state politics to change labour control practices in an 
organisation. Thus, there is a demand for hegemonic analysis that considers the 
perspective of dominated social groups to understand more fully the operation 
of hegemony in organisations.  
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The empirical access of this study provides an opportunity to make several 
theoretical contributions. By undertaking the research in a Chinese private 
organisation, this study can explore the dynamic relationship between the 
dominant and dominated classes. Due to the characteristic of the case 
organisation, a study on transfer pricing has the potential to unpack not only the 
relationship between dominant and dominated groups, but also the relationships 
among dominant groups and dominated groups. This will be explored in a stable 
and less state-politics influenced setting. Although China experienced a dramatic 
social-economical change from the 1950s to the 1980s, this case organisation has 
been established since the 1990s after the country's economic reconstruction 
stabilised. In addition, this organisation was established by Chinese 
entrepreneurs who have no political background, which provides a relatively 
‘state-politics free’ setting so that the internal political dynamics can be 
emphasised. Also, a hegemonic analysis on transfer pricing potentially offers 
much insight from the perspective of the ‘influenced’. As transfer pricing is a 
communication and management control system, it involves relationships 
between people from similar social classes (e.g. between managers) and 
relationships between different social groups (e.g. managers and staff). It could 
therefore identify the role of transfer pricing in materialising hegemonic 
ideologies while giving understandings of its influence on the daily 
communications between different social groups but also within the same group.  
 
3.3 On hegemony 
Although regarded as one of the most influential contributors to post-Marxism, 
Gramsci did not establish a single set of principles that guided his entire work; 
hence, his work has subsequently been interpreted differently based on 
individual theoretical positions and purposes. Despite such interpretational 
variance and inconsistencies, Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, this work argues, is 
an important analytical tool for understanding cultural-political issues regarding 
social relations between groups in organisations.  
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3.3.1 Hegemony as an analytical tool 
Gramsci’s emphasis on ideological and intellectual leadership underlies his 
theory of hegemony, but the abovementioned lack of overarching principles had 
effects (given the fragmented nature of his prison notebooks, it is little wonder 
that no such single set of principles in Gramsci’s writing of hegemony resulted). 
Despite efforts to unpack Gramsci’s thoughts on hegemony, the literature still 
holds different and sometimes contradictory views on his understanding of 
hegemony. Femia (1986) nevertheless observes this is not always to do with the 
work itself, as interpretations vary depending on different writers' theoretical 
positions and objectives, but the  point is that the nature of the work does 
facilitate this. As an example, Palmiro Togliatti, the Italian Communist leader 
after Gramsci, argued that Gramsci is nothing more than a ‘staunch Leninist’ 
(Femia 1986a), but later writers noted the enhancement of Gramscian over 
Leninism by arguing that Gramsci developed a revolutionary strategy for use in 
Western European societies while Lenin considered only Russian Revolution 
(Bocock, 1986, p. 27).  
 
Indeed, Femia said that Gramsci’s writing produced texts that support diverse 
interpretations, with the reason being that notebooks constituting working notes 
and jottings on Gramsci’s personal reflections were instead used for publications 
(Femia 1986a). Gramsci thereby provided only a collection of raw materials and 
reflections that were never intended to be fused into an organic totality. 
Consequently, different interpretations are possible also simply from 
constructing the notes in different ways, which makes it extremely difficult to 
determine the ‘truth’ of Gramsci’s hegemony. So, instead of unfolding the 
thought of Gramsci from a historian's perspective, it is more practical to view 
Gramsci’s hegemony as a raw analytical tool for researchers to explain various 
political and cultural issues. Once realising this, a researcher must focus on 
his/her own interpretation and use of Gramsci when constructing a hegemonic 
theoretical framework instead of being trapped in the debates on alternative 
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interpretations of hegemony. As such, the next section defines hegemony in light 
of the my interpretation of Gramsci’s work based on his original writing and 
other interpretations of hegemony. 
 
3.3.2 Defining hegemony 
As briefly discussed in Section 3.2.1, Gramsci proposes that the hegemony of a 
social group is exercised in two ways: through ‘domination’, or influencing 
behaviour externally through punishments and rewards; and through 
‘intellectual and moral leadership’, or influencing behaviour internally by 
diffusing prevailing norms. Such ‘internal control’ composes hegemony (Femia 
1986a). Hence, hegemony essentially expresses the idea that the rule of one 
class over others does not depend on coercive material power alone. Instead, 
establishing the ruling class’s values as the conventional values is essential 
(Femia 1986a; Bates 1975; Pellicani, 1981).   
 
Notably, the focus on ideological control does not mean the exclusion of its 
economic base. Gramsci’s interpretation on the economic base is not as decisive 
as classical Marxism suggests. Gramsci believes that the economic base provides 
only a range of possible outcomes and that he believes political and ideological 
activities are decisive in determining the prevailing alternatives (Femia, 1986b 
P.38). In other words, economic base determines not the form of consciousness 
but only the possible forms. This demonstrates that ‘intellectual and moral 
leadership’ is not pre-determined. Instead, it results from the continuous 
hegemonic activities that secure consent over other classes. Therefore, the 
struggles of different classes for domination equate to the struggles between 
different hegemonies, and whichever class determines the prevailing social 
order achieves overall hegemony. 
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Acknowledging the importance of ideological activities in establishing hegemony, 
various authors provide definitions of hegemony that commonly highlight consent 
as the foundation of ‘internal control’. As Bates (1975) states, hegemony is the 
‘political leadership based on the consent of the led, a consent which is secured 
by diffusion and popularisation of the world view of the ruling class (Bates, 1975, 
p. 352). Similarly, Pellicani (1981) says that ‘the form of command based on the 
consent of the subordinate classes is precisely what Gramsci called hegemony' 
(Pellicani, 1981 p. 32). Joseph (2002) also read hegemony as ‘the way in which 
dominant social groups achieve rulership or leadership on the basis of attaining 
social cohesion and consensus (Joseph, 2002, p.1)’.  
 
These interpretations of Gramscian tend to equate hegemony to political 
leadership based on the consent of the led while coercion is excluded from this 
concept. Nevertheless, the role of coercive force is still apparent when reading 
Gramsci's original writing on hegemony: 
 
The ‘normal’ exercise of hegemony on the now classical terrain of the 
parliamentary regime is characterised by the combination of force 
and consent, which balance each other reciprocally, without force 
predominating excessively over consent. Indeed, the attempt is 
always made to ensure that force will appear to be based on the 
consent of the majority, expressed by the so-called organs of public 
opinion – newspapers and associations – which, therefore, in certain 
situations, are artificially multiplied.  
                                      (Gramsci, 1971, p. 80) 
 
This statement confirms that hegemony itself combines both force and consent 
and that balancing interactive relations between two are crucial for the ‘normal’ 
exercise of hegemony. Therefore, instead of narrowing the scope of hegemony 
into consent only, one should recognise hegemony as political leadership based 
on the combination of consent and coercion. 
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Such an understanding of hegemony fills gaps in political studies. Recognising the 
relationship between the economic base and hegemonic activities opens up 
possibilities for multiple competing hegemonies. Instead of assuming the 
existence of a certain hegemony, this perspective questions how a certain 
hegemony is emerged out from the economic base. For instance, the broader 
economic base only creates foundations for possible forms of hegemony in an 
organisation and a particular organisational hegemony can be formed by 
continuous hegemonic work based on consent and coercion. As previous 
literature suggests, an organisation may potentially be controlled through 
calculative practices such as accounting (Bryer, 2006) or cultural practices such 
as hierarchical traditions (Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2008). Given this, 
the local political struggle between different social groups in securing ‘moral 
and intellectual leadership’ becomes relevant as it is an important aspect in 
forming hegemony, and dynamic political relations can be highlighted. Based on 
this, the next section develops a theoretical framework containing different 
concepts under Gramscian to explore transfer pricing practice. 
 
3.4 Constructing a hegemonic framework 
The initial intention of Gramsci’s work is to understand how a political hegemony 
emerges, maintains and reorganises in a nation. Adopting his concept of 
hegemony into an organisational analysis requires an understanding of hegemony 
as a multi-dimensional analysis, which is what this section does.  
 
3.4.1 Structural hegemony and surface hegemony 
Joseph's (2002) understanding of hegemony provides a useful framework for 
understanding how local hegemonic activities connect to their social conditions. 
He criticised that the concept of hegemony has been usually reduced to an 
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agential process, which only concerns the actions of social agents, groups and 
individuals in diffusing the ruling class ideologies, and neglects the conditions 
under which the hegemony operates. However, a hegemonic analysis informed by 
critical realism can argue that hegemony is both the pre-exist structural 
condition and the reproduced outcome of human agency1. Joseph's (2002) 
development on hegemony rests on the idea of ‘the transformational model of 
society activity’ developed by Bhasker (1989 p34-35), who argues that ‘society is 
both the ever-present condition and the continually reproduced outcome of 
human agency. And praxis is both work, that is conscious production, and 
reproduction of the conditions of production, that is society’. Thus, it highlights 
the primacy of structures over agents without turning agents into passive bearers 
of the structures. Although the structures pre-exist and beyond the control of 
agents, the agents still have the potential to engage in transformative practice 
within definite limits (Joseph, 2002).  
 
As such, hegemony should not be understood as merely the description of the 
relationship between different human agents (e.g. that between dominant and 
subordinated groups). Instead, it is also about the relationship between these 
agents and the social structures in which they are living (Joseph, 2002). For 
instance, the analysis of class struggle in capitalism cannot simply refer to the 
struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie because it is the objective 
structures of capitalist society that determines the relation between both social 
groups (Joseph, 2002). It is therefore necessary to look beyond the actions of 
different social groups and examine the social structure and objective conditions 
that give rise to these different groups and their interests.  
 
 
1 As the study is not mainly drawn on critical realism, the discussion on the debate of critical realism is avoided.  
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Two concepts of hegemony emerged as a result: 'structural hegemony', or the 
unintended consequence of social activities by human agents; and 'surface 
hegemony', or the conscious hegemonic projects in practice. This distinction of 
structural and surface hegemony provides an analytical method of focusing on 
analysing organisational hegemonic activities and the connection to their 
historical, political and social conditions. 
 
Joseph (2002) summarises this duality of hegemony in a simple understandable 
table, as shown below. 
 
Table 3-1: Duality of Hegemony 
Structural hegemony Surface hegemony 
Deep Actual 
Functional Manifest/realised 
Structural Agential 
Secures unity of social formation Hegemonic activities, projects and 
practices 
Reproduction of social structures and 
structural ensembles 
Emergent from underlying structures 
(but with their own powers and 
dynamics) 
Underlying condition Struggle 
Social cement Coercion and consent 
Largely unconscious structural 
reproduction 
Conscious transformation, 
conservation or political 
advancement 
Source: Joseph (2002 p. 131)  
  
This table demonstrates the distinction between two dimensions of hegemony, 
which is useful when distinguishing the hegemonic projects and their social 
conditions. Structural hegemony secures the unity and cohesion of the social 
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system while ensuring the reproduction of prevailing structural processes and 
relations. It helps groups develop hegemonic projects that express their own 
interests. In contrast, surface hegemony concerns conscious hegemonic projects 
that have emerged from structural hegemony (Joseph, 2002). It is where human 
agents exercise their moral and intellectual leadership and deploy manifold 
hegemonic activities to create consent and legitimise coercion. Accounting, as 
demonstrated in previous literature, plays an important part in surface 
hegemonic projects.  
 
This theorisation of hegemony reflects the relationship between the economic 
base and hegemonic activities, as discussed in the previous section. Economic 
base is part of structural hegemony so it helps different social groups develop 
their own hegemonic activities to achieve ‘moral and intellectual leadership’. 
However, the concepts of structural and surface hegemony are clearly linked and 
they are sometimes difficult to distinguish from each other (Joseph, 2002). In 
fact, they are very closely linked given that the deeper structural form of 
hegemony is expressed through various surface hegemonic projects while surface 
hegemony is determined by underlying broader structural hegemonic conditions. 
As this point shows, structural hegemony is the pre-existing cause for hegemonic 
projects, and these projects are important manifestations of the cause. Joseph 
(2002) thus argues that their distinction is between hegemony’s basic material 
necessity and forms of its actualisation through concrete projects.  
 
Although surface hegemonic projects and struggles are determined by their 
deeper structural hegemony, they are not reducible to this. Surface hegemony 
has its own irreducible dynamic associated with particular social groups 
involved, the interests they represents, the values they hold and the political 
blocs they constructed (Joseph, 2002). While structural hegemony is a basic 
material base that secures unity of social formation, surface hegemony contains 
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more social layers and different relations, and these need to be analysed in their 
specificity. For instance, a dominant hegemonic process may be undercut by 
other hegemonic processes, or there may be a sub-hegemony under the 
dominant hegemony (Joseph, 2002). Therefore, it is possible that hegemonic 
projects pursued by ruling groups do not best suit the needs of structural 
hegemony in terms of securing cohesion of the social relations. 
 
Despite surface hegemony has its own dynamic, the interrelated nature of 
structural and surface hegemony needs addressing. Social structure is argued to 
be the material cause of surface hegemonic projects. While reproducing social 
structure agents may act to preserve and transform existing conditions (Joseph, 
2002). This may occur in a politically unstable context. For instance, Alawattage 
and Wickramasinghe (2008) documented how the transformation of structural 
hegemony can create social space for agents to transform and preserve existing 
conditions in Sri Lanka by intentionally using various political strategies to 
transform the status quo. Nevertheless, for normal reproduction such agential 
activities are usually non-political and reflect only the wider hegemony across 
society (Joseph, 2002). Social structures are generally taken-for-granted and 
unchallenged. As a result, surface hegemonic activities are confined within these 
structures. Overall, interrelated nature of these two-dimensional aspects of 
hegemony depends on the stability of the structural context.  
 
Combining the structural and surface aspects of hegemony provides a useful 
framework for understanding the relationship between structure and local. On 
the one hand, it highlights the relevance of the broader political structure when 
understanding local practices. With a stabilised hegemonic structure exists in 
society, local hegemonic practices are conditioned to this. This has important 
implications for the emergence of power relations between groups because the 
hegemonic structure can create incentives for dominant groups to win the 
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consent of others (Joseph, 2002). The notion of structural hegemony then 
provides theoretical explanations for the emergence of dominant and dominated 
groups. On the other hand, although local hegemonic activities are conditioned 
by the broader structure in which they reside, their internal dynamics allow 
focuses on the organisation's dynamic social relations. Organisational activities 
involve different consensual and coercive strategies of social groups within 
different interests. Reciprocally, the relations between different groups, their 
respective interests and their hegemonic strategies can be examined to 
understand how social relations shape the organisation. This then captures the 
internal politics of an organisation, as discovered in Ashraf and Uddin (2015). 
Accordingly, this work will trace the cultural-political history of China to theorise 
the structural condition of Chinese organisations in Chapter 5 and will analyse 
the organisational activities in a Chinese organisation to understand the role of 
social relations in shaping transfer pricing in Chapter 6. 
 
3.4.2 Maintaining hegemony 
The previous section presented two dimensions of hegemony. One, structural 
hegemony, concerns the role of historical, social and political conditions in 
shaping hegemony. The other, surface hegemony, concerns the complex networks 
of social practices and relations in local contexts. While this is so, hegemony is 
fundamentally about how dominant groups maintain their hegemony despite the 
existence of groups with different interests (Cooper, 1995). With this in mind, 
this section explores how hegemony can be maintained through consent, 
coercion, compromise and reform. 
 
The notions of consent and coercion are the core concepts in Gramsci’s 
understanding of hegemony. Table 2-1 above shows that these concepts are 
particularly relevant to surface hegemony. For surface hegemonic projects, the 
dialectical concepts of consent and coercion are important for understanding 
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how surface hegemony is exercised. Although the concept of consent itself is 
somewhat vague as Gramsci never explicitly explained it, it involves accepting 
the social-political order (or certain vital aspects of that order) in a 
psychological sense (Femia, 1986a) as a precursor to or even a driver of 
desirable action. ‘Consent’ is then ultimately manifested by people enacting 
conforming behaviours, and conformity is thus an expression of different 
attitudes. Basic explanations for conforming behaviour include the fear of non-
conformity or an unconscious habit of doing things in a certain way. However, 
Gramsci understands ‘consent’ in a different way. He believes that consent 
arises from a degree of conscious attachment to certain core elements of society 
(Femia, 1986a), which means that individuals do consciously value certain 
patterns of behaviour and conform to it. Thus, the agreement in relations to 
certain objects such as beliefs, values, ideologies become important when 
studying consent. 
 
Although a certain social class may achieve hegemony, consensual agreement 
among other classes is not always stable and will never be taken for granted 
(Simon, 2015). Persistent activities are needed to strengthen and thus maintain 
the ruling class's hegemony within changing conditions (Goddard, 2002). 
Recognising hegemony as a continuous project is therefore crucial in research. 
An important activity for ruling social groups to maintain consent is maintaining 
prestige. As Femia (1986b, p. 32) states: ‘Consent [is] historically caused by 
prestige (and therefore by the trust) accruing to the dominant group because of 
its position and function in the world of production.' 
 
What seems apparent from Femia’s argument is that hegemony does not equate 
to the maximisation of the ruling-class's interests, and it cannot be achieved 
without the concern of others. Instead, the ruling classes are also restricted in 
the sense that they must behave in certain ways to gain trust and maintain their 
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prestige from other dominated social groups. As Gramsci argues, a certain 
compromise equilibrium needs forming to manage the unstable imbalance 
between the interests of hegemonic social groups and those of subordinated 
groups. As he states: 
 
Undoubtedly the fact of hegemony presupposes that account be 
taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which 
hegemony is to be exercised, and that a certain compromise 
equilibrium should be formed. – in other words, that the leading 
group should make sacrifices of an economic-corporate kind. But 
there is also no doubt that such sacrifices and such a compromise 
cannot touch the essential; for through hegemony is ethical-
political, it must also be economic, must necessarily based on the 
decisive function exercised by the leading group in the decisive 
nucleus of economic activity. 
                                           (Gramsci, 1971, p. 161) 
 
The political base of hegemony is rooted in a continuous effort to balance the 
compromise required for sustaining consent and the maintenance of the 
essential ethical, political and economic cores of hegemony. Later, Gramsci 
summarised his arguments in his discussion about the state: 
 
It is true that the state is seen as the organ of one particular group, 
destined to create favourable conditions for the latter’s maximum 
expansion. But the development and expansion of the particular 
group are conceived of, and presented, as being the motor force of a 
universal expansion, of a development of all the ‘national’ energies. 
In other words, the dominant group is coordinated concretely with 
the general interests of the subordinate groups, and the life of the 
state is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and 
superseding of unstable equilibria (on the juridical plane) between 
the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate 
groups – equilibria in which the interests of the dominant group 
prevail, but only up to a certain point, i.e. stopping short of narrowly 
corporate economic interest.  
                                           (Gramsci, 1971, p. 182) 
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For Gramsci, then, hegemony will never be obvious as it is usually presented as 
'the motor force of a universal expansion', and the interests of the dominant 
group will be limited because the hegemonic compromise is carried out in 
cultural, ideological, political and economic forms. Translating Gramsci’s 
discussion of the state to an organisational context, this work proposes that s 
taken-for-granted organisational practices under neoliberal context can be 
understood politically. In this sense, organisations occupy a social space in which 
capitalists create favourable conditions for interests namely surplus value, but 
they may presented this as a common interest among other social groups. 
Organisational goals such as profit maximisation and efficiency improvement can 
serve as an example. As such economical value is deeply rooted in neoliberal 
hegemony, it is taken-for-granted, so people tend to agree with the goal. 
Consequently, consent can be generated. Despite this, some compromises are 
necessary to stabilise this consensual agreement. These political compromise 
could be one reason why employees may resist the introduction of new 
accounting systems and bypass rules in practice (Lukka, 2007; Steen, 2011). 
Other examples can be the economic compromise of offering better material 
conditions such as promotions, an improved working environment and welfare. 
Nevertheless, compromise can  come with political intention, as demonstrated 
by the promotion of certain managers giving opportunities for the ruling social 
group to consolidate their own hegemony by introducing a new ideology. For 
instance, Yang and Modell (2013) documented how the early retirement of a 
director and the appointment of a new deputy director by party committee in a 
Chinese state-owned organisation triggered an organisational reformation 
process whereby hegemony was reconstituted to suit changing conditions. 
 
Periodically, a ‘hegemonic crisis’ may develop wherein the hegemony of the 
ruling political forces begins to disintegrate. This also reflects on the internal 
dynamics of surface hegemony, as it may result in prolonged instability and 
transition of hegemony. Despite efforts at defending the existing system through 
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compromise equilibrium, at some point this may not be enough to gain prestige. 
Consequently, a new balance of political forces is required to reshape the 
hegemony and form new sets of ideologies (Simon, 2015). Notably, crisis here 
does not means collapse, which happens only if the opposing force shifts the 
balance of power into its own favour during that period. If it fails, the prevailing 
force has succeeded in building a new power bloc that re-establishes its own 
hegemony (Simon, 2015). For instance, if the dominated group fails to reshape 
the deep ideological base of a hegemony during an organic crisis then it may be 
unable to transform its own institutional situation. Cooper (1995) details such a 
failure, noting how a trade union did not alter the rationale of accounting from 
the prevailing understanding so failed their resistance over state hegemony. 
 
Although sustaining consent is essential for hegemony, coercive control is still 
important for reinforcing consensual agreement. Indeed, when Gramsci 
describes the function of the state, he highlighted how hegemony is protected 
by the ‘armor of coercion’: 
 
It should be remarked that the general notion of State includes 
elements which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society 
(in the sense that one might say that State = political society + civil 
society, in other words hegemony protected by the armor of coercion. 
                                           (Gramsci, 1971, p. 263) 
 
As previously noted when defining hegemony, coercion needs to be presented 
based on the consent of the majority (Gramsci, 1971). As such, coercion is not 
always apparent and visible, which suggests ‘coercion’ is an indirect force. 
Analysing the concept of coercion, Filippini (2016, p. 74) proposes two 
interpretations of coercion – direct coercion and indirect coercion. Direct 
coercion makes people conform via their fear of the consequences of non-
conformity (Femia, 1986a), while indirect coercion is an environmental force 
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that imposes itself indirectly. The source of this coercive power is historically 
produced through the dynamics of society as a whole, such as historically 
constructed common sense and values. It is thus more social than political, but 
Gramsci believes that indirect coercion is not neutral and is instead always an 
expression of the power of dominant groups (Filippini, 2016). As discussed in the 
previous section, historically constructed values are the social cement for 
securing social unity, so it can be argued that the sources of ‘indirect coercion’ 
emerged from the structural hegemonic level. 
 
Efferin and Hopper (2007) provide an example of such ‘indirect coercion’ in 
accounting through their study of management control in a Chinese Indonesians 
business, where the business owners only use accounting to prescribe behaviour 
instead of to evaluate performance. Employees are valued and regulated 
subjectively through Chinese cultural values such as loyalty and obedience 
rather than efficiency or results. This case demonstrates culture as a primary 
way for the dominant group to exercise hegemonic control over dominated 
classes. As Efferin an Hopper (2007 p. 255) argue in their conclusion, ‘national 
culture is an abstract concept that can dehumanise, deny free will, and 
rationalise dominant groups’ discrimination against minorities.’ As this case 
demonstrates, although culture is historically produced and commonly regarded 
as shared norms, values and assumptions, it actually exercises ‘indirect 
coercion’ by forcing people to perform in a certain manner to meet cultural 
expectations.  
 
The discussion demonstrates how the internal dynamics in surface hegemony can 
be analysed and observed. First, while surface hegemony contains interests from 
different social groups, it is important for certain social groups to generate 
consent to establish its ideology and help it prevails. The conscious agreement 
on values and beliefs is the key evidence of consensual agreement. Therefore, 
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how actors understand and value certain practices will be explored empirically 
in this work to analyse consent between social groups. Meanwhile, the 
appearance of coercion will be examined through the relationship between 
structural hegemony and ‘indirect coercion’. Secondly, consensual agreement is 
unstable and needs continuous hegemonic activities to maintain such consent. 
For this, certain economic/social compromises are necessary. As mentioned, 
some organisational practices such as promotions and welfare improvement are 
examples of such compromises so should be viewed politically. Unstable 
hegemony may also lead to a hegemonic crisis where hegemony tends to 
disintegrate. It involves reshaping structures, forming new ideologies and 
building new consent to re-establish the hegemony. As such a process creates 
social space for actors to exercise hegemonic strategies to promote their own 
interests, the internal dynamics of organisational hegemony can be explored by 
identifying a ‘crisis’ and observing what strategies have been used by different 
actors to restore hegemony. 
 
3.4.4 Hegemony and practices: ways of sense-making  
The previous section discussed the internal dynamics of surface hegemony. It 
focused on the dominant classes' political strategies and how hegemony can be 
achieved and maintained from their perspective. From another perspective, the 
influence of hegemony on the influenced groups and how they make sense of the 
practice under hegemony has not yet been theorised. This section elaborates the 
dialectical concepts of common sense and good sense to theorise the struggles of 
influenced groups in their attempts to make sense of mundane practice of 
hegemony. 
 
Gramsci’s theorisation of ‘common sense’ and ‘good sense’ start from his 
thinking on ‘philosophy’. He argues that a single philosophy does not exist. 
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Instead, various philosophies exist, and one always makes a choice between 
them. For him, though, this raised many questions for him: 
 
How is this choice made? Is it merely an intellectual event, or is it 
something more complex? And is it not frequently the case that there 
is a contradiction between one’s intellectual choice and one’s mode 
of conduct? Which therefore would be the real conception of the 
word: that logically affirmed as an intellectual choice? Or that which 
emerges from the real activity of each man, which is implicit in his 
mode of action?  
                                            (Gramsci 1971, p. 326) 
 
His observation of contrast between people’s thoughts and actions leads to his 
argument about the contradictory consciousness of individuals. He proposes that 
people conduct their practical activities with no clear theoretical consciousness, 
or even historically opposite consciousness: 
 
One might almost say that he has two theoretical consciousnesses (or 
one contradictory consciousness): One which is implicit in his activity 
and which in reality unites him with all his fellow-workers in the 
practical transformation of the real world; and one, superficially 
explicit or verbal, which he has inherited from the past and 
uncritically absorbed. 
                                           (Gramsci, 1971, p. 333) 
 
In this context, then, two conflicting concepts of the world exist: one drawn on 
the dominant group’s hegemonic ideology, and the other derived from people’s 
historically reproduced practical experiences of social reality (Cooper, 1995). 
The first constitutes common sense, or ‘the uncritical and largely unconscious 
way of perceiving and understanding the world that has become "common" in any 
given epoch' (Gramsci, 1971, p. 322). Common sense thus comprises widely 
accepted, taken-for-granted ‘common’ values and ideas that are held and 
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disseminated by hegemonic social groups in shaping the ways people 
conceptualise the world. Derived from hegemonic ideology, common sense is 
essential in bolstering consent among dominated groups. At a structural level, 
common sense such as modernisation, globalisation and neo-liberalism plays a 
central part in establishing hegemonic practices in society (Alawattage and 
Wickramasinghe, 2008). For instance,  Smyth and Whitfield (2017) documented 
how market principles as a common-sense govern government auditors practices 
in prevailing the hegemony of neoliberalism. Similarly, Mantzari and Georgiou 
(2019) recently argued that neoliberal common sense plays a key ideological role 
in legitimising and reproducing IFRS hegemony. In the case of IFRS adoption in 
Greece, the appropriateness of IFRS was largely justified by practitioners’ 
common sense of international comparability and marketisation.  
 
Although common sense is largely discussed in a structural sense, Gramsci argues 
that a philosophical consciousness that features intellectual elaboration of 
thought is possible to become the common sense in a fairly limited environment: 
 
Every philosophy has a tendency to become the common sense of a 
fairly limited environment (that of all the intellectuals). It is a 
matter therefore of starting with a philosophy which already enjoys, 
or could enjoy, a certain diffusion, because it is connected to, and 
implicit in practical life, and elaborating it so that it becomes a 
renewed common sense possessing the coherence and the sinew of 
individual philosophies.                  
                                      (Gramsci, 1971 p. 330) 
 
This indicates that as long as an individual’s philosophical consciousness connects 
to the practical life of the dominated group, it is possible that individuals 
construct their consciousness as a hegemonic common sense in a small 
environment. It signifies the observation of common sense in organisational 
context. As an organisation is a fairly limited environment, the common sense 
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may not directly link to the common sense in broader society. Instead, the 
ideologies of these in the organisations may be able to diffuse his or her 
ideologies into common sense. Therefore, in an organisational study the 
relationship between the common sense of the dominated group, the ideologies 
of the local dominant group, and how ideologies are diffused as common sense is 
important to examine. 
 
The contradictory consciousness of an individual also enables the potential for 
change and resistance. Good sense is developed to reflect that, and it 
constitutes contradictory views to the ‘common sense’. In short, it means ‘the 
practical, but not necessarily rational or scientific attitude' (Gramsci, 1971 p. 
322). Although it this concept seemingly opposes the concept of common sense, 
they are actually interrelated. Gramsci (1971) himself argues that good sense is 
based on common sense: 
 
These popular turns of a popular stamp – examples being drawn from 
a large dictionary – which contain the terms ‘philosophy’ or 
‘philosophically’. One can see from these examples that the terms 
have a quite precise a conception of necessity which gives a 
conscious direction to one’s activity. This is the healthy nucleus that 
exists in "common sense", the part of it which can be called "good 
sense" and which deserves to be made more unitary and coherent.  
                                            (Gramsci, 1971 p. 328) 
 
While common sense can be fragmentary and inconsistent, good sense 
represents the elaboration of a coherent form of thought that is superior to 
common sense. It is not about replacing the existing mode of thinking, though: it 
is about challenging the activities that are already taken-for-granted. The co-
existence of common sense and good sense means that an individual can do 
certain activities based on the common sense even though it conflicts with his or 
her theoretical consciousness, which is fed by good sense. This clash of sense is 
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the essence of an individual's contradictory consciousness, and it enables 
resistance to the hegemony and changes to practice. This is evidential by the 
case of Greece's IFRS adoption (Mantzari & Georgiou, 2019), although neoliberal 
common sense is predominant among practitioners, some of them are still able 
to construct critical views by referring to their local context and experience 
instead of sole rely on neoliberal common sense.  
 
3.4.5 Hegemony in transfer pricing 
I have so far engaged the notion of hegemony to develop an analytical 
framework. This section demonstrates the connection between different 
concepts of hegemony but also articulates the theoretical framework developed 
for this work to explore the three research questions. As outlined in chapter 1, 
three research questions have emerged considering the gaps in transfer pricing 
research and debates on hegemonic accounting research: 
 
1) How are transfer pricing practices located in a broader cultural-political 
context? 
2) Do hegemonic relations shape transfer pricing practice? If so, how? 
3) How do people make sense of mundane practices of transfer pricing in 
conjunction with such hegemonic relations? 
 
These questions relate to the following areas (respectively explored below): (1) 
the embedded cultural-political context of transfer pricing; (2) dynamic 
hegemonic relations; (3) and the sense-making process of daily transfer pricing 
practice. 
 
 
72 
 
The embedded cultural-political context of transfer pricing 
Hegemony is historically and contextually dependent, and different forms of 
hegemony shape accounting practice in different ways. When studying relations 
between hegemony and transfer pricing, then, the broader cultural-political 
context should always be explored first. This is theorised by the dialectical 
concepts of structural hegemony and surface hegemony (Section 3.4.1). The 
structural dimension of hegemony concerns the broader unspecified structure 
that is historically reproduced and usually exercised in an unconscious manner 
(Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2008). The surface dimension of hegemony 
represents the continuous organisational activities that seek to maintain the 
prevailing hegemony through consensual and coercive approaches. These two 
aspects mean one can identify the emergence of power relations within an 
organisation by considering how the structural conditions helped a certain group 
become and remain dominant. Transfer pricing is one of the hegemonic projects, 
and it is one that enables the theorisation of the relationship between transfer 
pricing and its broader cultural-political context. In this work, transfer pricing is 
no longer assumed as a mere profit-seeking instrument; instead, it is a 
hegemonic practice that is conditioned by its broader hegemonic structure. 
 
Dynamic hegemonic relations 
Although surface hegemonic projects are largely determined by structural 
hegemony, surface hegemony still has its own internal dynamics (Joseph, 2002). 
These involve different social groups, the interests they represent and the values 
they hold. The hegemonic activities within the organisation therefore also occur 
in two dimensions, conceptualised here as vertical hegemony and horizontal 
hegemony.  
 
Vertical hegemony describes a classic hegemonic relationship between the 
dominant and dominated groups, particularly the strategies dominant groups 
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utilise to exercise their hegemony. Understanding vertical hegemony requires 
identifying the strategies dominant groups use to generate consent and exercise 
coercive force. As consent involves a conscious attachment to certain values, the 
consent on certain value, ideology or belief is important to observe. For 
instance, how the dominant group refers to certain core ideologies and values in 
society when justifying their actions as universal interest is important to 
explore. This study also recognises hegemony as a continuous process and 
understandably so given that hegemony is unstable and never be taken-for-
granted. Consequently, different forms of compromises are necessary for 
maintaining vertical hegemony. Practices such as promotions, bonuses and other 
social compromises will be viewed politically in terms of how these practices 
relate to the manufacturing of consent within an organisation.  
 
Horizontal hegemony describes the process of forming a ‘power bloc’ between 
dominant social groups through constant compromises and political struggles 
(e.g. Ashraf & Uddin, 2015), or, basically, the relationship between dominant 
groups. It includes the struggles between two hegemonies where different 
dominant social groups try to secure their own hegemony as the prevailing 
ideology. Once again, understanding their interests, ideologies and strategies 
becomes important. Empirically, this dimension of hegemony is most apparent 
during hegemonic crisis when a prevailing hegemony is disintegrating. This 
instability means that a new balance of political forces needs constructing to 
defend the hegemony. In this context, different social groups with different 
interests can become more visible. The understanding of horizontal hegemony 
can therefore begin by identifying ‘crisis’ and observing strategies used by 
different actors to restore hegemony. 
 
The dynamic hegemonic relation is reflected in the interrelation between 
vertical and horizontal hegemony. As discussed above, horizontal hegemonic 
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relations may contain different interests, ideologies and strategies, which may 
have serious implications on the exercise of vertical hegemony. For instance, 
while two dominant groups in an organisation are struggling to ensure their own 
hegemony prevails, they both expend effort on generating consent among 
dominated groups. This leads to the inconsistent ideologies among dominated 
groups whereby some may agree on a particular value but disagree on another. 
Consequently, the struggle between dominant groups may be carried to 
dominated groups as well.  
 
Transfer pricing is in a very interesting position when exploring dynamic 
hegemonic relations in an organisation. On the one hand, it is a management 
control practice so involves vertical hegemony. On the other hand, it involves 
horizontal hegemony because of its power to shift cash/profit allocation. 
Therefore, this work will analyse the development of transfer pricing practice to 
understand how it participates in the dynamic hegemonic relations within 
organisations. 
 
The sense-making process of transfer pricing 
As discussed above, organisational systems such as transfer pricing, are 
important instruments for maintaining hegemony as they diffuse certain 
ideologies and generate consent among dominated groups. Furthermore, 
focusing on internal dynamics further complicates the hegemonic process in 
organisations. Especially as the existence of competing hegemonies, competing 
ideologies may co-exist in transfer pricing. To fully understand how hegemony 
works in transfer pricing, this work will explore mundane practice of transfer 
pricing with a focus on the ways people make sense of the practice and social 
relations in which they live. 
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The dialectical concepts of ‘common sense’ and ‘good sense’ are used here to 
theorise this mundane practice. Common sense theorises the uncritical ways of 
understanding transfer pricing. It is used here to understand what prevailing 
ideologies people refer to when making sense of their daily practice. It also 
captures the potential inconsistent ideological foundations of dominated groups, 
which is helpful when unpacking the horizontal hegemony discussed above. 
Notably, individuals' good sense is able to constitutes contradictory views to 
‘common sense’. Thus, individuals can reproduce hegemonic activities based on 
the common-sense in their environment while engaging in internal struggles with 
practice based on their own philosophical and practical attitudes (good sense). 
This explains the appearance of resistance to hegemony in organisations. It is 
through the notion of ‘common sense’ and ‘good sense’ the mundane practice of 
transfer pricing as a manifestation of particular hegemonic configuration is 
explored. 
 
3.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter started by developing the research questions based on the gaps in 
transfer pricing research identified in the previous chapter and theoretical 
debate on hegemony. Gramsci’s political theory of hegemony was justified as a 
promising theoretical base for political transfer pricing research. It also revealed 
possible contributions a transfer pricing research can make to the understanding 
of hegemony in the organisational context. The research questions have 
therefore been framed to make contributions to both transfer pricing and 
hegemonic accounting research. 
 
Based on historical interpretations of the Gramscian hegemony, this chapter 
argued that Gramsci’s idea of hegemony should be viewed as a raw analytical 
tool instead of a pre-constructed theoretical framework. The intention in this 
work, then, has always been to construct a theoretical framework based on my 
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own interpretation of Gramsci’s work. Guided by this, I developed a hegemonic 
theoretical framework which theorises hegemonic complexity from its structural 
level to its mundane practice. First, the relationship between structural 
hegemony and surface hegemony was identified as being a useful tool for 
exploring the context of transfer pricing in organisations. While this is so, the 
internal dynamics of surface hegemony were highlighted, indicating that 
interrelations of vertical hegemony and horizontal hegemony offer ways to 
explore the internal dynamic relations associated with transfer pricing. Finally, 
this chapter showed how common sense and good sense will be used here to 
explore the mundane practice and potential resistance to hegemonic activities. 
Connecting these together, this theoretical framework is not only able to analyse 
the operation of transfer pricing as a hegemonic practice but also has the 
potential to be used as a hegemonic analytical tool for various organisational 
studies. 
 
The theoretical framework developed herein organises the analysis of the 
empirical data in this study. To give an overview of this analysis, Chapter 5 
analyses the broader context of transfer pricing in China, where organisational 
hegemony is conditioned and determined. Chapter 6 analyses the transfer 
pricing principles and practices in organisations and explores how hegemony is 
embedded in practice. Chapter 7 analyses the mundane practice of transfer 
pricing through the lens of influenced groups of people, and it explores the 
consequences of transfer pricing practice and people’s sense-making processes. 
Before these, the next chapter will discuss the methodology and research 
method deployed in this study. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology and methods 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter developed the research questions for this study and a 
theoretical framework in relation to these. Although the methodological choices 
made here are seemingly a linear outcome of the arguments that emerged from 
the literature review and the identified research questions, it is a rather 
iterative process, as with most qualitative research. While this work's fieldwork 
was designed based on the initial readings of various social theories, the study 
intends to explore the field liberally without preconceived focuses. In other 
words, while being influenced by certain theories and grounded in my 
philosophical position, this work adopted an ethnographical methodology.  This 
chapter thus explains the methodological choices that emerged from such an 
approach, and it presents the ways this fieldwork was conducted. 
 
The chapter therefore proceeds (4.2) by clarifying my epistemological and 
ontological position adopted herein, which falls into the paradigm of the critical 
perspective. With this philosophical position, section 4.3 articulates and 
elaborates on the choice of ethnography as an appropriate methodological 
approach for this study. This is followed by section 4.4 which introduce the 
fieldwork including access to the field, early reflections in it and the methods 
developed for collecting the data. Section 4.5 introduces the research site by 
presenting its history, group structure and managerial hierarchy. Section 4.6 
shows how the empirical findings has been analysed. The final section (4.7) 
summarises and concludes the chapter. 
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4.2 Epistemological and ontological position 
Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. x) argue that ‘all theories of organisation are based 
upon a philosophy of science and a theory of society’, indicating all 
organisational studies to be deeply rooted in philosophical assumptions on 
society. The authors (ibid.) add that most accounting studies do not explicitly 
address these despite certain assumptions having clearly been made on the 
nature of the social world and the way it might be studied. This work wants to 
avoid such a shortcoming and instead openly sharing my philosophical 
assumptions to clarify the philosophical position of the research. 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that conceptualising social science concerns 
four fundamental assumptions: ontology, epistemology, human nature and 
methodology. Ontology is about a researcher’s understanding of reality. It can 
vary from reality being independent or external to individuals to it being the 
product of individual consciousness (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Associated with 
researchers' ontological choices, epistemology determines how one obtains 
knowledge from the world and communicates it to others. Epistemological 
assumptions determine whether the researcher believes knowledge can be 
acquired externally or if knowledge has to be personally experienced to 
understand it (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Human nature describes the 
relationship between human beings and their environment. At one extreme, 
human beings and their experience can be conditioned by their external 
circumstances; at another, humans can be viewed as the creators of their 
environment (Burrell and Morgan, 1979). Different philosophical standings 
influence the choice of methodological approaches when studying a particular 
phenomenon, and research methods will be used differently depending on the 
notion of reality a researcher supposes to explore (Ahrens and Chapman, 2006). 
This is apparent in the transfer pricing literature. Researchers of it mostly 
believe transfer pricing to be independent and external to individuals, but the 
point here is that whatever their chosen research methods these reflect their 
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philosophical standing and the latter thus influences the former. In this field, 
analytical modelling, regression analysis and experiments dominate (e.g. Göx & 
Schiller, 2006; Dikolli and Vaysman, 2006). Case study has also been used 
occasionally (e.g. Oyelere & Emmanuel, 1998; Clausing, 2003; Dharmapala & 
Riedel, 2013), but many researchers approach the case company with an 
extensive focus on the system itself and not the individuals operating the 
system. A notable exception to this is Mcaulay, Scrace and Tomkins (2001), who 
also used a case study to explore transfer pricing practice. Their predominant 
focus on the actors surrounding transfer pricing instead of the system itself 
derives from their assumption that transfer pricing is the product of individual 
consciousness. 
 
Considering the debates on different philosophical assumptions, Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) categorise four paradigms of social analysis (ibid., p. 21–35): 
functionalist (assumes the objectivity of social facts); interpretive (sees the 
social world as being created by the individuals concerned); radical humanist 
(believes that humans are dominated by ideological superstructures, and it seeks 
to critique the status quo); and radical structuralist (views society as being 
characterised by fundamental conflicts and that these generate radical change 
through political and economic crises). Based on these, Chua (1986) categorises 
accounting research into different streams based on their different philosophical 
paradigms and table 4-1 summarises her assumptions. 
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Table 4-1: Streams of accounting research 
 Mainstream 
accounting 
Interpretive 
perspective 
Critical perspective 
Beliefs 
about 
knowledge 
Theory is 
separate from 
observations that 
may be used to 
verify or falsify a 
theory. 
Scientific 
explanations of 
human intention 
sought. Their 
adequacy is 
assessed via the 
criteria of logical 
consistency, 
subjective 
interpretation and 
agreement with 
actor’s common-
sense 
interpretation. 
Criteria for judging 
theories are temporal and 
context-bound. Historical, 
ethnographic research and 
case studies more 
commonly used. 
Beliefs 
about 
physical 
and social 
reality 
Empirical reality 
is objective and 
external to the 
subject. Human 
beings are also 
characterised as 
passive objects, 
not seen as 
makers of social 
reality. Single 
goal of utility-
maximization 
assumed for 
individuals and 
firms; societies 
and organizations 
are essentially 
stable……. 
Social reality is 
emergent, 
subjectively 
created and 
objectified 
through human 
interaction.  
 
All actions have 
meaning and 
intention that are 
retrospectively 
endowed and that 
are grounded in 
social and 
historical 
practices. Social 
order assumed. 
Conflict mediated 
through common 
schemes of social 
meanings. 
Human beings have inner 
potentialities which are 
alienated through 
restrictive mechanisms. 
Objects can be understood 
only through studying 
their historical 
development and change 
within the totality of 
relations.  
 
Fundamental conflict is 
endemic to society. 
Conflicts arises because of 
injustice and ideology in 
the social, economic, and 
political domains which 
obscure the creative 
dimension in people. 
Relationship 
between 
Accounting 
specifies means, 
not ends. 
Acceptance of 
Theory seeks only 
to explain action 
and to understand 
how social order is 
Theory has a critical 
imperative: the 
identification and removal 
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theory and 
practice 
extant 
institutional 
structures. 
produced and 
reproduced. 
of domination and 
ideological practices. 
Source: Adapted from Chua (1986, p. 611, 615, 622) 
 
Conventional transfer pricing research discussed in chapter 2 can be categorised 
as a functionalist analysis of mainstream accounting research. Such research 
objectivises transfer pricing and the individual while focusing on hypothesis 
testing to verify or falsify a theory. Chapter 2 highly criticised this perspective 
for being too narrow and predictable. It even called this research tradition a 
‘dead circle’ that avoids the social potential of transfer pricing. Such a 
viewpoint implicitly reflects my philosophical standings on how transfer pricing 
should be understood and should be studied. The present study is conducted 
from the ontological position that social reality is subjectively created and 
objectified through human interactions (Chua, 1986). It therefore emphasises 
the subjective nature of the social world in its quest to analyse how a social 
reality is being socially constructed and negotiated (Hopper and Powell, 1985). 
Its perspective, then, is that there is no independent ‘reality’ – only people’s 
perceptions on reality (Hopper and Powell, 1985). On meaning and norms, these 
are objectivised through continuous social interactions (Chua, 1986). Although 
they can be changed, they can also become stable and structural social activities 
(Ryan, Scapens and Theobald, 2002). Grounded by such a belief, this work does 
not see transfer pricing as a neutral technical activity that is separated from 
social relations, or as mainstream literature does. Instead, it understands 
transfer pricing as being socially constructed, so it deems social interaction to 
play an important part. As action is instrumental to such interaction, transfer 
pricing practice must be understood through insights into motivations of actions, 
how actions are embedded in practice and how people make sense of the actions 
(Chua, 1986). This perspective goes beyond objective understandings of transfer 
pricing to investigates its meaning for people in their daily lives and such 
everyday life itself. 
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This philosophical standing criticises mainstream transfer pricing research, and it 
positions this research within an interpretive/critical agenda. While the 
philosophical distinction between mainstream accounting research and 
alternative perspectives is quite clear, the difference between interpretive and 
critical perspectives can be blurry as they indeed share certain common 
characteristics in terms of their understanding of reality as being socially 
constructed, but an important distinction between the two is their 
understanding of society. Hopper and Powell (1985 p. 450) state that ‘radical 
[critical] theorists view society as being composed of contradictory elements and 
pervaded by systems of power that lead to inequalities and alienation in all 
aspects of life; they are concerned with developing an understanding of the 
social and economic world that also forms a critique of the status quo.’ A critical 
perspective therefore carries a critical imperative with an intention to promote 
change, and it goes beyond the pure interpretation of reality (Gioia and Pitre, 
1990). 
 
Compared with the interpretive perspective, the critical perspective critically 
evaluates the forms of life they observe in order to analyse ‘false consciousness’ 
and dominations (Chua, 1986). As such, analysing conflicting interests between 
classes in society is a core element of the latter. Adopting Gramsci’s theory of 
hegemony as the theoretical framework brings this research into the critical 
perspective. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony is essentially a critical theory. While 
it concerns the social control of and conflictions between different classes of 
people, it always has a critical imperative. Gramsci developed hegemony not 
merely to explain how society works: he developed the theory with 
emancipative desires. As Simon (2015) puts it, it is a tool for understanding 
society in order to change it. Following this, this study recognises the 
contradictory nature of society and the presentation of power. It thus does not 
see transfer pricing as a neutral technical activity that is separate from social 
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relations. Instead, it sees it as characterised by conflict of interest among 
different classes (e.g. capitalists and the working class).  
 
4.3 Ethnography as the chosen approach 
The adoption of Gramscian hegemony brings this research into the position of a 
critical perspective. While this is so, Gramsci did not provide any methodological 
implications of using his theories. Rooted in my ontological and epistemological 
positions, ethnography was chosen as the most appropriate methodology for this 
study. Although the research questions have not been concentrated to transfer 
pricing when I entered the field, a motivation for this work is a genuine desire to 
contribute to Gramscian research in accounting by exploring the operation of 
management control systems in an organisation and the details of mundane 
practice about internal dynamics. The focus is therefore on people’s experience 
of management control practices, their different understandings on management 
accounting and how the relationship between actors is influenced as a result. A 
deep immersion into everyday life in the organisation, its control system and the 
relationships among different actors is required. Consequently, this work 
adopted an ethnographic approach as the most appropriate research approach 
for this study. 
 
Ethnography is concerned with sociality, including how people live their lives and 
make meanings together during interactions and through written text, talk, 
behaviour, etc. (Cunliffe, 2010). Traditionally it has been used primarily by 
anthropologists and sociologists but have been gradually incorporated into 
accounting research in recent decades. Given the gap between theory and 
management accounting practice (as explored in Chapter 2), debates on suitable 
methodologies for empirically exploring issues continued. Surveys were initially 
used but it was soon realised that they offer only a superficial view (Scapens, 
1990). Consequently, research increasingly started adopting a case study 
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approach to provide more comprehensive views on management accounting 
practices in organisations. These case studies have also been adopted by both 
positivist researchers and interpretive/critical researchers, but the use of this 
approach by social theorists is quite different. In the former, case studies are 
part of the process of developing positive theories for positivist researchers such 
as Kaplan, but case studies informed by social theory are about providing 
detailed investigation of accounting in practice in order to understand the 
complex inter-relationships within a single system. This is why Scapens (1990) 
argues that case studies are far more central to research processes for 
interpretive/critical researchers. Given all these aspects, it is unsurprising that 
demands for deeper understandings of the field have resulted and for the 
adoption of ethnography in pursuit of these (e.g. Power, 1991). Unlike previous 
transfer pricing research, the current research focuses are on people's 
experiences of transfer pricing within an organisation, the relations between 
actors and how actors react to transfer pricing practice.  
 
Ethnography involves ‘the study of people in naturally occurring settings or 
"fields" by means of methods which capture their social meanings and ordinary 
activities, involving the researcher participating directly in the setting, if not 
also the activities, in order to collect data in a systematic manner but without 
meaning being imposed on them externally’ (Bryman, 2000, p. 10). This study's 
approach accordingly embraces such researcher involvement and hence collects 
data internally. In ethnography researchers must physically present in and even 
immerse themselves in the field for an extended period of time and also closely 
work with actors – interact with them, build relationships with them and 
participate in their daily lives – to collect rich data (Cunliffe, 2010). Different 
from the linear model of analysis usually found in natural science, ethnography 
is about capturing people’s ordinary activities in their natural form, which 
requires unstructured and flexible methods of data collection that provide ‘thick 
description of people’s daily lives (Cunliffe 2010; Bryman, 2000). All in all, 
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ethnographers ‘do what it takes to understand meaning-making’ (Cunliffe 2010, 
p. 231).  
 
Ethnography is clearly about researchers engaging with and in the research field, 
but different interpretations of sociality will influence their reflections on 
ethnographical data (Cunliffe, 2010). For instance, while realist ethnographers 
are concerned with true meaning by ‘telling it like it is’, interpretive 
ethnographers view sociality as intersubjective, and critical ethnographers 
conceptualise sociality as discursive, contested and hegemonic. What results is 
that understandings of observed and experienced phenomena differ depending 
on how ethnographers interpret social reality. Realist ethnographers search only 
for one ‘true’ meaning, while interpretive ethnographers seek the existence of 
‘multiple’ meanings. For critical ethnographers, the authority of ethnographical 
texts is usually questioned through deconstruction and multiple readings of 
ethnographical data. As this research adopts the critical theory of hegemony, it 
positions itself as a critical ethnography, so participants’ expressions are not 
taken-for-granted. For instance, the interviewee’s descriptions on transfer 
pricing will not be regarded as 'fact'. Instead, these will be questioned and 
compared with other discourse to critically evaluate all the ethnographical data. 
In this way, the field is understood through the constant deconstruction of 
different readings of the social meaning provided by actors from different levels.  
 
The design of this fieldwork was catered towards collecting the ‘quality data’ 
required for this ethnographical study. The research focus is on a private Chinese 
group organisation (anonymous as ‘PLT’), and this organisation was selected for 
several reasons. First, it offered good access. I was allowed to visit their main 
divisions (discussed later) and able to engage with personnel at all levels of the 
managerial hierarchy from the business owners and senior managers to middle-
level managers and employees in different departments. This is crucial for an 
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ethnographical study because such a degree of access enabled me to become 
significantly involved in the setting, spend time with different people and 
collect rich data about their daily lives. Secondly, the organisation is in my 
hometown. Hence, there is great familiarity with the local language and culture, 
which facilitates all kinds of understandings from the emotions of different 
people to similar cultural experiences, which more deeply involves myself in the 
field and interpersonal relationships in particular. On a practical level, the 
locations of the main divisions are relatively close to my parents' house so there 
was suitable local residence during the fieldwork. Two divisions involved in this 
research are located in Shanghai and Suzhou, which are both 40-minute drives 
from this residence. This allows easy access to both divisions. For researcher 
embeddedness into the field, six months were spent with the people being 
studied, talking with them on a daily basis in the office, restaurant, corridor, 
workshop, etc. I attended meetings, discussed various issues and shared views 
with people as they share theirs. More details of the fieldwork, from gaining 
access to conducting the fieldwork through different ethnographical methods, 
are given in the next section. 
 
4.4 Fieldwork 
This chapter's preceding sections presented my philosophical position, the 
approach to this research and the methodological approach of ethnography as 
adopted herein. Guided by this, I conducted fieldwork in a Chinese private group 
organisation with a focus on its management accounting practice. This section 
gives further details of the fieldwork – from gaining initial access to the field to 
the research methods employed. It also presents several challenges encountered 
during the fieldwork. 
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4.4.1 Access and ethical clearance 
As noted in the last section, there are various reasons for choosing PLT as the 
research site for this ethnographic fieldwork, particularly because of the 
company itself and the great access offered compared with other potential sites. 
After committing to an ethnographic study not long after commencing the PhD 
programme, I started utilising family connections to search for suitable research 
sites. Different organisations were approached, and eventually the Chief 
Financial Officer (CFO) of PLT was contacted. Several informal discussions about 
the nature and aspects of the study and about the organisation took place, 
including possible approaches to conducting the fieldwork, the duration of visit 
and desired access. This was all very promising, especially regarding access. The 
gatekeeper generously not only offered informal permission to access the field 
but also promised unconditional support to ensure that interviews could be 
conducted with people at all levels, that observations of all departments could 
take place, and that access to most of the internal accounts and reports would 
be granted. These promises therefore helped confirm the choice of PLT as the 
research site. 
 
The ethics committee approval application commenced two months before 
departure to the field. As part of the procedure, a formal approval of access was 
necessary, so the CFO was approached again to obtain a formal access letter. The 
rights of participants are also important for research ethics, and the initial part 
of this was to ensure that participant recruitment was totally voluntary. The CFO 
was asked to tell all staff in advance that a researcher from the University of 
Glasgow would be visiting and to inform them of their rights as participants of 
this study. The initial plan for obtaining consent was to provide consent letters 
to participants during every interview and observation, but on commencing the 
fieldwork I soon realised that such an approach was impractical due to the 
amount of casual conversations and observations involved. Such an approach was 
even harmful to the ethnographical study because participants would be 
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distanced from me, which is against the philosophy of ethnography. Instead, 
during introductions I informed each participant of the purpose of the research 
project, the policy of confidentiality and their rights. Considering the 
confidentiality of participants’ information, all participants were made aware 
that their information will be confidential and anonymised. To do so, the field 
data was stored safely in a password-secured hardware and pseudonyms were 
used for each participant when writing transcripts and the thesis. Specifically, 
participants' names were replaced by codes such as ‘sale staff 1’ and ‘sale staff 
2’ to ensure the anonymity of participants’ identities. I was granted ethic 
approval in January 2017, and the fieldwork started the same month. 
 
4.4.2 Entering the field 
The fieldwork started in January 2017, shortly after the granting of the ethics 
approval from the University of Glasgow. The fieldwork plan was to observe and 
interview participants from various divisions with a relatively even allocation of 
time for each to explore different people's different experiences, the influence 
of management accounting practice in people’s daily lives and opinions of 
management accounting practice from different perspectives. The first visit was 
to the organisation's trading division in Shanghai because it was where the CFO 
was located at the time (a 40-minute drive away). The fieldwork specifically 
started on 3 January, just after the New Year holiday. Although the CFO was not 
available on the first day, he assigned the operational manager to welcome and 
introduce me to all the staff. As the national holidays for the Chinese New Year 
would be starting from the end of January, the atmosphere was quite relaxing as 
less work was assigned before the holiday. A short visit then provided a good 
chance to gain familiarity with the participants without heavily intervening in 
their daily tasks. 
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The most striking first impression of the office concerned its arrangement. 
Instead of allocating departments into different rooms, all departments except 
the accounting department shared a single open space, though a spare office 
room was left for one of the shareholders who was mostly located in the US. The 
assigned operational manager allocated a vacant table for me, from which most 
departments could be observed, people in most departments were heard, the 
working atmosphere was felt and reflective notes were made. After greeting all 
the staff, I had an informal conversation with this operational manager wherein 
the latter introduced the history of the group, its structure, the functions of 
different divisions, the duties of different staff and the internal management 
mode. 
 
A brief history of PLT 
The group was initially established from a merger between two organisations – 
the formal sales division and the main factory. In 2004, one of the founders – 
Shareholder A – went back to China from the US after an unsuccessful business 
venture there. He had a trading company that sold medical supplies but felt that 
it was difficult for a pure trading company to survive. He then started searching 
for business partners to establish a group with both manufactory and trading 
components. Eventually, he found Shareholder B, who at the time had a small 
factory that was manufacturing rubber. Later, they established an HK-registered 
company and created a joint venture organisation in China. By framing the group 
structure this way, the group enjoyed a more controllable profit allocation, tax 
reductions and product development, which allowed them to expand very 
quickly in subsequent years. The organisation pursued international trading 
business and tried to access international market even before Chinese 
government opening up of international trading to private organisations. During 
that period, an export trading licence authorised by the government was 
required to trade with foreign companies, so the group made contact with a 
public company and ‘borrowed’ their licence in order to export their products. 
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Group structure 
Besides giving an overview of the group's brief history, the operational manager 
also introduced basic information about the organisation, including its products, 
group structure and basic business procedures. PLT is in the wound care and 
personal care industry, mainly manufacturing and selling daily medical supplies 
such as bandages, first-aid kits and other daily care products. It acts as a 
supplier for international retailers and organisations that need medical supplies.  
The group has two manufacturing divisions and three sales divisions in both 
China and the US, employing over 400 people. Figure 4-1 visualises the structure 
of it 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-1: The main structure of PLT 
 
The group's structure can be divided into two parts: manufactory and sales. The 
former has three manufacturing factories. the main factory is responsible for 
manufacturing, assembling and packaging the products. Approximately 90% of 
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the products are manufactured in the factory, so about 10% are externally 
supplied but these are also packaged in the factory. The other two support this 
main factory: the raw material factory's function is to manufacture raw 
materials for bandages and tapes; the machinery factory is about designing and 
producing machinery exclusively for the group. This internal supply chain is one 
of the group's core competitive advantages. Although the main factory has 
external sale capabilities, most of the products it produces and develops are 
sold internally to sales divisions in the group, who subsequently sell the products 
to external customers. The main sales division of the organisation is located in 
Shanghai and is responsible for most of the group's trading tasks, including 
international trade and customer service. Despite the group having a trading 
company registered in HK, its actual operation is held in Shanghai. The HK 
division exists because of the historical tax benefits and different customer 
preferences. Also, the organisation recently established a US trading division 
that provides an online retail business in the US market. 
 
Divisions within the group have close relationships with each other, especially 
between the main factory and the Shanghai sales division. The process of one 
trade contract usually involves work from both divisions. The Shanghai sales 
division usually receives customer requests and sends them to the main factory 
for price quotes. Considering the cost and own profit margin, the factory gives 
its internal price to the sales division. If the sales division is not satisfied with 
the price, they will re-negotiate the price with the manufacturing division until 
the final price is agreed. These two divisions are thus identified as the core 
divisions for this group. 
 
Their importance in the group is also proved by the review of their recent 
accounting statements. It is found that most profits in the group are generated 
from these two divisions. With over 10 years of development, these two divisions 
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have currently holding over 70,000,000 RMB (around, 7,100,000 GBP) of assets 
which includes properties, machines, inventories, receivables etc. In 2016, two 
divisions were able to generate annual revenue of 2,800,000 USD, within which 
Shanghai sale divisions contributed 1,500,000 USD and Suzhou factory generated 
1,300,000 USD. Annually, Shanghai sale division earns net income of 200,000 USD 
while Suzhou factory earns 500,000 USD. Given all this, these two divisions were 
selected as the main research sites. 
 
Managerial hierarchy and people 
Discussions with operational manager gave a good understanding of the research 
sites. She was also interested in this study's work plan, including the research 
aim, planned duration of my visit and possible data collection approaches. She 
kindly suggested several people to interview.  The Human Resource manager 
(HRM) also gave insights into the group's managerial hierarchy, even providing an 
image that depicts the hierarchical relationship between staff members. 
Knowing the significance of the Shanghai sales division and the main factory, I 
asked more details about the managerial hierarchy in these two divisions in 
particular to plan future interviews and observations accordingly. 
 
The managerial hierarchy of the organisation consists of three groups: 
shareholder, senior management and staff. The group has three shareholders: 
the two founders and an investing shareholder. The two founders hold over 75% 
of shares in the whole group, which obviously makes them the major owners. 
These two are actively involved in senior management as they act as chairmen 
and vice-chairmen for different divisions, but the investing shareholder acts only 
as an investor. Each division usually has several senior managers who perform 
certain managerial roles and play important parts in their division. Most 
individuals in senior management are usually promoted to these positions from 
staff level. They are generally originally recruited as university graduates and 
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work in the organisation for more than ten years, which allows them to establish 
good experience on working procedures. A perk for senior managers is that 
shareholders sometimes allow them to invest in their own division as a 
motivation for better performance. For instance, the former Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) of the Shanghai sales division held about 10% of shares in the 
division. In terms of decision-making and reporting, senior managers are usually 
responsible for daily decision-making, though they do have to report the 
circumstances of the division to the founders regularly and answer any questions 
they may have. Compensations for senior managers depends on the division's 
performance, and the annual bonus is negotiated directly with two founders on 
an individual basis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Managerial hierarchy of PLT 
 
Figure 4-2 shows that the managerial hierarchy of PLT consists of two main 
shareholders at the top, with several senior managers responsible for different 
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divisions in the middle level and staff in the bottom hierarchy. Each level will be 
discussed to explain their role and relationship with others. 
 
Shareholders 
The two owner-shareholders assigned themselves to monitor two divisions based 
on their experience and expertise. Shareholder A monitors the activities in the 
sales division because of his experience of running a trading company. 
Shareholder B is involved in managing the main factory because of his expertise 
on material and manufactory processes.  Holding over 75% of shares in both 
divisions, the two shareholders have significant power over not only staff but 
also senior managers. Most operational processes were designed mostly by these 
two shareholders themselves and practised by senior managers.  Senior 
managers in both divisions have to report to shareholders, and the annual bonus 
of these senior managers was directly negotiated with shareholders. The power 
of shareholders is also reflected in their ability to overwrite managers' decisions. 
For instance, shareholders can determine the sale price without discussions with 
senior managers. 
 
Senior management  
As mentioned above, shareholders assign specific managerial duties to different 
senior managers. These managers make daily managerial decisions and are 
accountable for the performance of each division. In Shanghai sales division, the 
sale manager is responsible for client development and after-sale customer 
service. She leads the team with sale staff and purchasing staff members. The 
operating manager takes charge of the general operational processes in the 
organisation, including allocating work, handling contract processes, etc. The 
operation of the main factory is led by two senior managers: the factory 
manager and the production manager. The factory manager is very respected in 
the factory. With his previous experience as a secretary of Shareholder B, he 
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particularly monitors costing procedures, including checking price quotes and 
monitoring manufacturing costs. He also leads the quality control team in its 
quest to ensure manufactory procedures meet the requirements of various 
regulations such as those of the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The 
production manager, along with his production staff, monitors the production 
process. With expert knowledge on the production process and relevant 
materials, he reviews the external supply contracts made by the purchasing 
staff.  
 
While different managers all ‘belong’ to respective divisions, the position of the 
CFO is unique in the group. Instead of monitoring one division, he is assigned to 
overview the financial performance and accounts in the entire group. He is also 
responsible for developing accounting statements and giving shareholders 
financial advice. Notably, he belongs to neither division. Instead, he travels 
across different divisions regularly to provide information and advice to senior 
managers and shareholders. He also produces internal annual auditing reports 
for all divisions and prepares statistics for shareholders to evaluate each 
division's annual performance.  
 
Staff 
The next level of hierarchy is the staff, who can be categorised based on their 
specialisation and responsibilities in the different divisions. In the sales division, 
staff consists of the sales staff, purchasing staff, operating staff, licensing staff 
and accountants. They all report to their senior managers respectively. Sale and 
purchasing staff usually report to the sale manager, operating and licensing staff 
report to the operation manager, and accountants report directly to the CFO. 
Residing in the bottom of the hierarchy, these staff are relatively passive. Most 
do not work overtime and enjoy relatively stable but fixed compensation and 
bonuses. One exception is the sale staff, whose bonus depends on the profit they 
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make from the contracts for which they are responsible: for every contract they 
successfully secure, they get around 1% of the sum as a bonus. In the 
manufacturing division, the office staff includes purchasing staff, costing staff 
and quality control staff. Purchasing staff report to the production managers, 
and the costing staff’s daily task is to prepare price quotes for different products 
based on the requests. Compared with others, cost staff has more engagement 
with staff in Shanghai sales division. Nevertheless, as with their counterparts in 
the sales divisions, most staff are quite passive because of the nature of the 
performance measurement system.   
 
4.4.3 Field journey 
Initial discussions with the operational manager and HR manager gave a good 
understanding of the history, structure and people working within this group. 
With all this in mind, I interacted more with the staff and managers in the sales 
division to establish a good relationship with participants and learn even more. 
The next few weeks involved conversations and interviews with people from 
different departments on various subjects (e.g. accountants, sale staff, sale 
manager, purchasing manager). The first interview was undertaken with the 
accountants mainly to hear their opinions on the management accounting system 
and its change, though through the first interview with two staff members in the 
accounting department it soon became clear that this department plays a rather 
passive role. Instead of actively being involved in management practice, its 
function is limited to only book-keeping and account preparations. On this 
realisation, interviews were arranged with managers from all departments 
including sales, documentary, operation and purchasing departments to gain 
further understanding of the organisation’s operation mode. The first round of 
interviews suggested that the sales department was the core of this 
organisation. A request was consequently made to interview and observe closely 
staff from the sales department. I also sometimes engaged in additional 
activities such as occasionally helping participants to complete forms, 
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translating English letters from clients and packing demos for delivery. Lunch 
was also had with participants every day, which involved frequent casual 
conversations discussing various topics (e.g. their daily practice, their opinions 
on transfer pricing). After a month of fieldwork, such an overall approach had 
proven an efficient and effective way of obtaining data.  Despite topics 
discussed sometimes being irrelevant to the work, this approach helped me 
gather data in a natural manner. To improve the outcome, a routine was 
developed in which I consider topics and questions for lunch discussions during 
the morning and tried to lead the conservation towards these during the lunch.  
 
After two months of fieldwork in the sales division, the important role of 
transfer pricing for the group had become clear in the sense that it can directly 
influence the sell price quoted to customers.  Notably, the transfer pricing 
observed was not the typical transfer pricing evident in textbooks at university 
or that appeared in the literature. Instead of being very efficient and 
processual, transfer pricing at PLT is quite ambiguous with constant controversy 
during the negotiation of the transfer price between the trading and 
manufactory divisions.  
 
The scope of the fieldwork quickly narrowed to transfer pricing practice. To 
further explore this issue, a request was made to the factory manager to start 
the second phase of fieldwork at their main factory in order to experience 
transfer pricing practice from a different perspective. Fortunately, much support 
and a great level of access was also given at this factory. The factory manager 
even offered to share the big office table with me, which allowed direct 
observations of his daily work, including his work routine and conversation with 
others about various issues, and we had many casual conservations during his 
break and lunch. The opportunity to observe Shareholder B in the group for two 
weeks also arose, which similarly involved sharing the office with him and 
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discussing various topics regarding his opinions on transfer pricing, management 
control and business in general. The support from this shareholder was also vital 
for access to internal meetings and subsequent individual interviews. As with my 
experience in Shanghai, lunch discussions were particularly effective in obtaining 
rich data. I also regularly had lunch with the factory manager, which involved 
discussing various issues on transfer pricing and his own reflections. Thanks to 
the factory manager granting permission, I also observed the practice of cost 
accountants for a week. As happened at place, I did additional work here such as 
occasionally helping staff translate emails from foreign customers, which 
likewise improved my personal relationship with staff. Different from the sales 
division, where most staff have a decent level of English skills, only the factory 
manager is fluent in English in the main factory, so I sometimes acted as a 
translator when foreign clients visited the factory.  
Reflecting on the ethnographical visits to both sites until end of May, I 
summarised all the data that had so far emerged and developed a story around 
transfer pricing issues at PLT. While the summary provided a good overview, it 
also opened up more questions that needed exploring. To collect richer and 
thicker data for this ethnographical study, frequent visits to both sites continued 
and through these supplementary data was collected for another two months. My 
familiarity with employees, their personalities and ways of work all helped me 
gather additional information efficiently in the final stage of fieldwork.  
 
4.5 Data collection methods 
The previous section outlined this current fieldwork at PLT. It covered the 
processes of entering the field, getting to know people there and conducting this 
ethnographical study. Data collection methods such as interviews, casual 
conversations and observations have already been mentioned in previous 
discussions, but this section elaborates on them by providing detailed 
information on how different methods have been used and how they interrelate. 
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4.5.1 Interviews and informal conversations 
Interview is one of the key data collection methods for this fieldwork, so for this 
work an interview plan and rationale (Appendix 1) was prepared prior to 
departure to the field. This provided initial guidelines to clarify the themes for 
discussion and the participants sought for interviews. Since broad themes were 
selected based on initial readings and reviews on various social theories, the 
initial design of questions was about exploring how people understand the 
management control system differently, their daily lives and how they 
themselves influence management accounting practices. This interview plan 
helped identify interesting issues based on participants’ understanding on similar 
subjects during the first round of interviews, which helped the development of 
questions for further rounds of interviews and observations. For instance, the 
initial round of interviews identified that participants had different views on 
transfer pricing. Different sides of the argument were presented when different 
staff were asked similar questions about transfer pricing. This motivated a focus 
on transfer pricing, including its structure and participants’ understanding of the 
system, their daily practice and their comments on current practice. 
 
Interviews were primarily used to identify potentially interesting themes and 
issues. In addition, it is usually conducted with participants with less availability. 
Thus, it usually conducted with participants with a managerial role in the 
organisation including the CFO, two shareholders, the sale manager, the 
operational manager and factory managers. For interviews, appointments were 
booked with particular participants in advance and the face-to-face interviews 
took place in a private environment – usually their offices. Although interviews 
were conducted based on pre-determined questions, the interviews were 
actually rather semi-structured. This allowed the general theme (i.e. around 
transfer pricing) to generally be followed while maintaining flexibility to also get 
more open-ended responses from interviewees, which is important when 
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observing their unique social and cultural realities. A total of approximately 10 
hours of interviews were recorded, as itemised in table 4-2.  
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Table 4-2: Summary of interview details 
Interviewee(s) Issues discussed Time spent 
CFO · About the company and his role as CFO 
· Operation of transfer pricing practices 
and its history 
· His opinion on transfer pricing issues 
· His experience in the organisation 
4 hours 
 
Shareholder A · Opinion on transfer pricing issues 
· His role as a shareholder/owner 
· His logic of internal management 
· His future vision of the organisation 
1.5 hours 
Shareholder B · Opinion on transfer pricing issues 
· His role as a shareholder/owner 
· His logic of internal management 
· Evolution and future vision of the 
company 
4 hours 
 
Sale manager · Transfer pricing procedure 
· Negotiation methods 
· Performance measurement 
2 hours 
Factory manager · Transfer pricing procedure 
· Negotiation methods 
· Performance measurement 
· His experience in the organisation 
2 hours 
Operational 
manager 
· Organisational structure 
· Her experience in the organisation 
· Operation process 
1 hour 
Human Resource 
manager 
· Employment preference 
· Duties of each staff member 
· History of the organisation 
1 hour 
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Interviews provided much insight into the transfer pricing issues at PLT, but I 
observed that the interviewees tended to be very nervous during the interviews. 
In addition, I discovered some inconsistency between interviewees' ‘formal 
answers’ and their actual practices. To explore the transfer pricing issues in its 
natural form, informal conversations were employed to discuss the issues in a 
more relaxing and open manner. This method was used to improve the reliability 
of data and discover new information. Different from the formal interviews, 
informal conversations were usually not pre-arranged and often happened during 
the break and lunch time. The relaxing environment allowed participants to 
express themselves freely about the topics they were concerned about, which 
also helped understand their sense-making and personal concerns. This method 
proved particularly effective in the last few months of the fieldwork after I had 
developed more trusting relationships with many participants. 
 
With participants' consent, audio was sometimes recorded for both interviews 
and informal conversations. After the fieldwork commenced, diaries were also 
written to organise and document the fieldwork. It includes my daily plans, 
observations, interview information and personal reflections. Transcripts were 
produced either immediately after the interviews or at the end of the day. This 
allowed access to and analysis of the data in a timely manner, which was 
important for the development of subsequent questions for interviews. When 
audio recording was not possible, notes were taken during the interview in order 
to mark interesting points. Table 4-3 illustrates the details of informal 
conversations 
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Table 4-3: Summary of informal conversations 
Participants Issues discussed Time spent 
Sale staff, including 
manager 
· Details of working 
experience as a sale staff 
· Impression of others 
· how relationship is 
maintained 
Conversations 
spanning the entire 
duration of 
fieldwork 
Cost accountant · Working experience as a 
cost accountant 
· Her understanding of cost 
structure and transfer 
pricing 
Around 2 hours 
during two days of 
observation. 
Factory manager · How relationship is 
maintained 
· Details of working 
experience as a factory 
manager 
· his concerns, compliance 
and comments on various 
issues 
· His attitude towards his 
relationship with 
shareholder 
Conversations 
spanning the entire 
duration of 
fieldwork 
CFO · His experience to work in 
the organisation 
· How he would solve the 
problem 
· His relationship with 
different actors 
Conversations 
spanning the entire 
duration of 
fieldwork 
Shareholder B · How staff are managed 
· His personal philosophy of 
business 
Around 3 hours 
during observations 
Factory operation 
manager 
· His opinion on performance 
measurement   
· His personal experience as 
an operation manager 
Around 2 hours 
during lunches 
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Trading company 
operation manager 
· Her personal experience in 
the organisation over 10 
years 
·   Her reflection on the 
internal management 
Around 3 hours 
during lunches 
Trading company 
accountants 
· Their role in the 
organisation 
· Their attitude towards this 
job 
 Around 2 hours 
during observations 
 
4.5.2 Observations 
Observations were another core data collection approach of this fieldwork. 
General observation was especially used during the first few weeks, which 
helped familiarity with participants. Observing people’s mannerisms, 
interactions, behaviours as well as organisational procedures and occasional 
incidents gave understanding of operations and participants’ daily routines at 
work, their interactions with other employees and their reactions during the 
negotiation of transfer prices. Potential issues were also realised by listening to 
conversations, feeling the working atmosphere and observing people’s facial 
expression during conversations. 
 
General observation was followed by in-depth observation with key personnel 
associated with transfer pricing, including sale manager, factory manager, the 
CFO and Shareholder B. Such observation was undertaken by spending time with 
participants on their normal working days, observing how they proceeded with 
daily tasks and who they communicate with, and seeing how they react to 
different incidents. Several internal meetings were also attended, which 
provided opportunities to observe some face-to-face interactions between 
different divisional managers. The actual relationship between participants is 
hard to verbalise during interviews, but such observations provided a good 
source to understand people's relationship with each other. Many hours of 
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observations gave much insight into transfer pricing issues and showed the 
functioning of transfer pricing practice from different viewpoints. During the 
observation period, diary writing was maintained to note personal reflections on 
collected data. It includes impressions on certain issues, notes on my thinking 
process on developing interview questions and reflections on what was observed 
and heard.  
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Table 4-4: Summary of observations 
Location Observations made Time spent 
Sale department – 
Shanghai 
· Operation of work, particularly 
transfer pricing 
· daily conversations and 
routines 
Around 3 
weeks 
Operation department – 
Shanghai 
· Business operation mode 
· Relationship between different 
departments 
1 week 
Factory office  – 
Suzhou 
· Daily work of factory manager 
· Daily work of cost accountant 
· Dperation of transfer pricing 
Around 3 
weeks 
Shareholder office – 
Suzhou 
· Performance of power 
· Daily work of shareholder 
1 week 
Accountant office – 
Suzhou 
· Daily work of CFO 
· His involvement in transfer 
pricing 
· Performance measurement 
criteria 
1 week 
Accountant office – 
Shanghai 
·   Daily work of accountants 
·   relationship with other 
divisions 
2 days 
Meeting room – shanghai · Meeting discussing transfer 
pricing and recent status 
· Relationship between managers 
2 occasions 
Meeting room – Suzhou · Meeting discussing transfer 
pricing 
· Performance of power by 
shareholder  
2 occasions  
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4.5.3 Document analysis 
For this ethnographical study, interviews, informal conversations and 
observations were used as primary data collection methods and documents were 
analysed to substantiate relevant information. The documents studied include 
the company’s annual financial reports from 2014 to 2017, internal statistical 
records, cost documents, a managerial structure document and a human 
resource guideline. The document analysis was helpful during the initial stage of 
the fieldwork when understanding the organisation's managerial hierarchy and 
current status. In later stages, internal documents were also reviewed to 
supplement data and triangulate with the primary data gained from the 
interviews and observations, a process that gave a more comprehensive 
understanding of the issues. Copies of the documents were provided by the CFO, 
cost accountants and HR managers. These are summarised in Table 4-5 below. 
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Table 4-5: Summary of document analysis 
Documents Sources of documents Areas studied 
Annual reports of 
organisation 
The CFO To understand the 
company’s financial 
position. 
Cost reports Factory manager To understand procedure 
for calculating costs of 
the products. 
Managerial structure 
document 
Human Resource 
manager 
To understand the 
managerial hierarchy 
and the organisation's 
structure. 
Annual profit leader 
board 
The CFO To analysis the 
comparative annual 
profit data for each 
division 
Human resource 
guidelines 
Human resource 
manager 
To understand the 
employment principle of 
the organisation and the 
ethical rules applied to 
all employees. 
Manufacturing guidelines Factory manager To understand the 
manufactory procedure. 
Products information 
book 
Sale manager To get an idea of the 
products the company 
produces and the 
features of different 
products. 
 
Having discussed the ways the research was conducted and the data collection 
methods used in this study, the study will next (4.6) presents the data analysis 
process and thereby link the methods with the analysis.  
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4.6 Data analysis  
The above section shows that the data collection process was rather 
unsystematic and unstructured. An enormous amount of data being collected – 
including many hours of recorded interviews and transcripts, diaries for over 70 
days and files of company documents – meant that an efficient strategy for 
understanding the data was necessary in the sense of organising, interpreting 
and presenting the data (in a structured piece). Unlike quantitative studies, data 
analysis for qualitative studies is usually not a distinct process. Instead, it 
involves ongoing reflections on data and its positioning against different theories 
in order to further develop the chosen research question and identify potential 
theoretical contributions (Ahrens & Chapman, 2006). This study also embraces 
this ongoing process of data analysis during time in the field. 
 
The initial data collection was guided by the general reading of various social 
theories, but the initial form of analysis was shaped by the abstract theoretical 
lens based on institutional logics. This determined the themes of the initial 
round of interviews and the initial categorisation of data. Such a theoretical lens 
led to a focus on different understandings of the same subject from different 
actors. Thus, data was initially grouped in order to understand how transfer 
pricing is practised based on different ‘logics’. Data-theory reflections were 
implemented through the writing of weekly summaries that identified common 
themes, summarised theoretical reflections and constructed storylines. To do so, 
Nvivo was used as a tool to categorise data and quotes into different themes. 
Throughout the data collection period, identified themes were clustered, re-
clustered and visually displayed in diagram form to understand emergent 
patterns and linked information. These initial classifications of the data were 
discussed during regular meetings with supervisors (who were in the UK and Sri 
Lanka during the period of this fieldwork). About three months into the field, 
data analysis led to the relevance of power relations between shareholders, so 
instead of employing an ‘institutional logic’ perspective certain political theories 
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such as Bourdieu’s practice theory, Burawoy’s manufacturing of consent and 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony were widely discussed to see how different 
theoretical concepts could be used to make sense of the story. Such an ongoing 
process constantly reshaped the research questions and data collection 
approaches. 
 
The ethnographical data collected provided the picture about the management 
control practice at PLT from different perspective reflecting a complex socio-
political setting from which different theoretical themes can be derived. 
Therefore, this thesis is only a reflection of the ethnography which picked 
transfer pricing as the focus. For this, a detailed storyline in understanding the 
company’s transfer pricing practice. From this, the theme of hegemony had 
emerged because of my personal feeling on the story I was telling. The fieldwork 
had demonstrated that transfer pricing in the organisation was not efficient, 
economically speaking. Despite this, it did keep different divisions together and 
maintains a balance of power and control over people. After the fieldwork and 
with an established understanding of the stories on transfer pricing, I re-wrote 
the literature review chapter around transfer pricing to reflect the new 
empirical focus. Gramsci’s work of hegemony was studied, the theory chapter 
was also rewritten and a hegemonic theoretical framework for further data 
analysis was developed. Data was re-visited in order to theorise them 
accordingly. The research questions were also modified to reflect the empirical 
and theoretical gap identified (Chapter 2,3). 
 
4.7 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter sought to present this study's methodological position, data 
collection approaches, data analysis procedures and the ways this fieldwork was 
conducted, including issues encountered and how these were overcome. 
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Furthermore, it introduced the research site by providing an overview of the 
organisation.  
 
The chapter began by positioning myself and this research within broader 
ontological and epistemological debates. This research was deemed critical 
research in terms of my approach to research and choice of theory. The 
argument presented here is that transfer pricing is socially constructed so 
knowledge of transfer pricing should be obtained through personal experience. 
My philosophical position motivated the choice of ethnography as the 
methodological approach for exploring how transfer pricing operates and how 
hegemony is exercised in this setting. An ethnographical study was justified as it 
allows embeddedness in the daily experience of different actors within the 
organisation. 
 
Details of the fieldwork were then presented, from initial access to the field to 
the data collection methods employed, though this actually began by giving the 
rationale for selecting the case organisation, PLT, and documenting the process 
of securing ethics committee approval. The chapter next provided a brief rewind 
of my visits to two research sites and gave basic details about the case 
organisation. The process for collecting data for this ethnographical study was 
also presented, which includes interviews, informal conversations, observations 
and document analyses. Finally, the chapter shared how the data collected from 
the field has been analysed and theorised. After having clarified these, the 
thesis next moves on to the empirical analyses, the first of which provides an 
analysis on the cultural-political context in which the organisation is situated. 
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Chapter 5: Structural hegemony in the Chinese context 
 
5.1 Introduction  
The preceding chapter clarified my philosophical position on the critical 
perspective and ethnographical methodology adopted in the study. Based on 
this, I intend to analyse the transfer pricing practice at PLT guided by the 
hegemonic framework developed in Chapter 3. For this, the cultural-political 
context of organisational practices needs to be considered, since this context 
conditions and influences how hegemony is practised at PLT. Therefore, the aim 
of this chapter is to analyse this through the concept of structural hegemony. It 
presents the political and cultural development of China and considers how the 
broader context determines the organisational practices at PLT. 
 
To do so, the chapter is organised as follows. The second section discusses the 
political development after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) in 1949, which documents the development of social conditions for the 
rise of the capitalists as the dominant class in the organisation. Section three 
discusses the ideological dimension of structural hegemony. It explores the 
largely unconscious structural reproduction of Confucian values, which provides 
a philosophical basis in justifying the paternalistic form of control in Chinese 
organisations. The final section (Section 4) summarises and concludes the 
chapter. 
 
5.2. Structural condition in China 
Structural hegemony refers to the structural evolution of particular political, 
economic, and cultural conditions for certain social groups to assert themselves 
as dominant. The prevailing structural condition creates incentives for dominant 
groups to generate consent and control over others, either by maintaining 
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existing structures or bringing about minimal change to ensure that they 
maintain dominance (Ashraf and Uddin, 2015). For organisations, the power 
relations may be conditioned by the development of a structural hegemony. 
Ashraf and Uddin (2015) noted this relation between structural hegemony and 
power structure in organisations.  They found that although a Pakistan airport 
was traditionally dominated by the military, the effort toward economic reforms 
from the new Prime Minister actually influenced the power structure in the 
airport. Business managers began to have influential positions in the airport, and 
military officials had to share power with them. Similarly, the structural 
hegemony also conditions the practices of governance and control in 
organisations; Alawattage and Wickramasinghe (2008) found that the political 
development from coercive-based to consent-based leadership in the state 
provided a base line for rationalising the routine labour control in Sri Lankan tea 
plantations. Therefore, to understand the exercise of hegemony at PLT, it is 
essential to study the broader political development in order to make sense of 
the emergence of local power relations and particular control practices.  
 
Stressing the influence of structural hegemony to an organisation, this section 
analyses the political development in the PRC in order to explore how power 
relations at PLT can be explained through the broader structural conditions and 
their implications. It illustrates how the transformation of the political 
ideologies in China resulted in the change in the hegemonic relationship 
between capitalist and proletarian, which explains the structural conditions for 
capitalists being dominant at PLT. 
 
5.2.1 Socialist hegemony under Maoism (1949 to 1978) 
The rise of the private sector in China can be traced back to the legacy of the 
structural economic reform after the death of Mao and the replacement of 
Maoism with Dengism. Although the dominance of the owner-manager in Chinese 
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organisations may be taken for granted in the literature (Redding, 1990; Efferin 
and Hopper, 2007), the hegemonic position of the owner-manager actually 
experienced a drastic change as a result of the economic reform. To understand 
how owner-managers transform themselves to achieve a dominant position, the 
discussion will start with the hegemonic ideology under Maoism and how it was 
the ‘darkest age’ for private sector firms. 
 
After the Communist Party of China (CPC) won the final victory in the civil war 
with the Chinese Nationalist Party and took power in 1949, the PRC was 
established. The CPC leader Mao Zedong (referred to hereafter as Mao) took the 
national leadership and launched his political reform. Influenced by Marxism and 
Leninism, Mao held a strong socialist ideology and had the ambition of turning 
China into a communist state like the Soviet Union. Consistent with his 
communist ideology, central planning, collective ownership, and class struggle 
primacy became central to Chinese political polices (Ezzamel, Xiao and Pan, 
2007). 
 
Thus, Mao’s efforts at political reform can be understood as his attempt to 
create a communist hegemony. Associated with other organisations, such as 
trade unions, youth organisations, and academic scholars, the state diffused a 
communist ideology as the ‘correct’ way of thinking and the essential path for 
development (Laaksonen, 1988). For instance, while accounting scholars highly 
criticised double-entry bookkeeping as inappropriate for a communist society, 
they uncritically accepted Soviet accounting as the way forward (Ezzamel, Xiao 
and Pan, 2007). The infusion of political ideologies was also implemented 
violently. The Cultural Revolution was initiated by Mao in 1966 with the aim to 
eliminate any form of ideology except Maoism. In short, it can be regarded an 
ideological re-education project. During that period, the education was 
politically driven. For instance, enrolment in the university did not depend solely 
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on the student’s academic performance but also depended on recommendations 
from party members. In addition, a movement called ‘up to the mountains and 
down to the villages’ was implemented to imbue the youth with a socialist 
ideology in a coercive way. Millions of university students and graduates were 
forced to leave their hometowns and were allocated to rural areas to be 
educated by farmers, who were regarded by the state as an ideologically purer 
class (Li, 2013). 
 
The dominance of Maoist ideologies had serious implications for private business 
in the PRC. Firstly, the focus on the class struggle meant a strong rejection of 
western ideas. While western techniques such as double-entry bookkeeping were 
highly criticised, as it was considered to have been designed to mask facts in the 
interest of capitalists, organisations were also considered as mere units for 
implementing central plans with little autonomy under central planning. Human 
resource decisions were usually made directly by government officials, and the 
organisational targets were collected from the government on an annual basis 
(Ezzamel, Xiao and Pan, 2007). Under these circumstances, there was little room 
for private business. Indeed, private business was completely disallowed by 
1956. Already existing private organisations were forced to transform into SOEs 
in different ways because of private sector’s image as part of ‘evil capitalism’. 
The communist desire could even be traced back to the first Constitution of the 
CCP (‘dang zhang’) back in 1921, where it stated: ‘Abolish private ownership, 
confiscate all manufacturing material such as machine, land, workshop, semi-
product, etc; and return them to the society’2 (People’s Daily, 2012). Prior to 
1978, all enterprises were either state or collectively owned (Adhikari and Wang, 
1995).  
 
2People's Daily (2012) 'The constitution of the Communist Party of China' China Daily, Viewed 21 
November 2018, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/dfpd/18da/2012-
08/29/content_15716271.htm> 
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The strong implementation of Maoist ideologies not only influenced the status of 
private business but also resulted in the emergence of proletarian leadership in 
organisations. In 1949, when the PRC was established, managerial resources 
were usually privately formed by family members or individual labour 
administrators. Although they had experience of managerial positions, it was 
clear that they failed to meet the requirements of the socialist ideology, which 
stressed quality and worker-centred values (Laaksonen, 1988). Therefore, skilled 
and literate workers who had the blessing of the CPC were promoted to the 
leadership positions as the replacements for the ‘capitalist boss’ (Laaksonen, 
1988). In addition, the members of the CPC including political personnel and 
army officers who were trained in the political morality, such as the Marxist 
value system, were appointed as management resources to fill the ideological 
gap between former managerial morals and new communist values. Through the 
appointment of communist-inspired management, the state was able to create a 
‘power bloc’ to maintain its leadership through the constant infusion of the 
communist ideology in society.   
 
The period from 1949 to 1978 marked the emergence of a communist hegemony 
along with the birth of the PRC. The promotion of the communist ideology 
resulted in the disappearance of the private sector, which can be regarded as 
the darkest period for entrepreneurs. Instead of being assumed to be the 
dominant class in a capitalist society, they can be regarded as the dominated 
social groups in this context.  
 
5.2.2 Rise of Market Hegemony (1978 - present) 
Communism continued to dominate the Chinese form of hegemony with the 
hierarchical leadership centred on Mao. However, China witnessed the rise of a 
new form of hegemony after Mao’s death. Indeed, 1976 was a dramatic year in 
Chinese politics. During this year, several powerful Chinese leaders, including 
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Mao himself, died. This removed his steady influence on Chinese politics and 
initiated a series of political reforms. A new government established around 
Deng Xiaoping immediately started their strong criticism of Maoist ideologies. In 
the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CPC in December 
1978, the slogan ‘take class struggle as the key link’ was officially discarded, as 
it had become deemed unsuitable for a socialist society (Laaksonen, 1988). The 
aim of the new government was to transform the communist leadership into a 
leadership that focused on economic growth, the open market, and technical 
enhancement. The focus then quickly shifted to the work of ‘socialist 
modernization', which includes the modernisation of industry, agriculture, 
national defence, and science and technology (Laaksonen, 1988).  
 
Using his national influence as the new leader, Deng gradually introduced his 
market ideologies to the masses. For instance, the economic reform was framed 
in such a way that the idea of a market economy could be gradually introduced 
while maintaining the socialist identity of the CPC. Deng (1979)3 rationalised the 
introduction of market economy as follows: 
 
It is wrong to maintain that a market economy exists only in a 
capitalist society and that there is only ‘capitalist’ market economy. 
Why can’t we develop a market economy under socialism? Developing 
a market economy does not mean practising capitalism. While 
maintaining a planned economy as the mainstay of our economic 
system, we are also introducing a market economy. But it is a 
socialist market economy. Although a socialist market economy is 
similar to a capitalist one in method, there are also differences 
between them […] taking advantage of the useful aspects of capitalist 
countries, including their methods of operation and management, 
does not mean that we will adopt capitalism. 
 
3Deng, X (1979) ‘We can develop a market economy under socialism. In: The Selected Works of Deng 
Xiaoping, vol. 2’. China.org.cn Available at: 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/dengxiaoping/103388.html (accessed 14 December 2018). 
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The introduction of a ‘social market economy’ was able to produce a market-
based ideology while still maintaining the old socialist identity. Guided by this, 
various projects were undertaken to introduce the elements of capitalism into 
organisational management. State enterprises were required to be much more 
autonomous, and managers were expected to monitor their own economic 
activities rather than passively follow the instructions set out in central plans 
(Scapens and Yan, 1993). The adoption of Western management techniques was 
also encouraged by the state. Government officials and scholars started to argue 
that techniques such as accounting could be used to help develop not only 
capitalist countries but also socialist countries such as China (Ezzamel, Xiao and 
Pan, 2007). 
 
While Mao’s hegemony created the socio-political conditions for a proletarian 
leadership in organisations, the economic reform also witnessed a gradual shift 
of power in organisations. The reproduction of a market ideology supported by 
the state created the objective conditions necessary for the rise of capitalists as 
a hegemonic group despite them not being recognised as ‘capitalist’ at the state 
level. The decade of the 1980s was viewed as the entrepreneurial decade, which 
witnessed an explosion of private entrepreneurship in rural areas of China 
(Huang, 2008). In 1979, although public ownership was still the means of 
production, peasants were granted the right to be relatively independent and 
were allowed to construct basic organisational units in rural areas (Laaksonen, 
1988). This provided essential political conditions for the establishment of the 
original form of privatisation in the Chinese modern era. Following the state 
policy, ‘Town and village enterprise’ (TVE) was established by peasant 
entrepreneurs. It was framed in such a way as to compromise both socialism and 
capitalism. Although it was usually set up privately by several or individual 
households in a village, it was officially referred to as a collective enterprise (Li, 
2013). Thus, TVEs enjoyed more support from the state than did other private 
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businesses at the time, which is known as ‘getihu’ (individual businesses). While 
individual businesses had an employment restriction of fewer than eight 
employees, TVEs were excluded from this. The promotion of TVEs suggests that 
entrepreneurs were becoming an important bloc in the market-based hegemony 
by serving an essential role of contributing to economic growth. From 1978 to 
1981 alone, the number of TVEs grew by over 200% as a result. Huang (2008 
p.51), when discussing the development of entrepreneurship in China, related 
the story of Mr Nian, who utilised sunflower seeds to establish one of the most 
profitable enterprises in the country: 
 
The scale of Mr. Nian’s operations was phenomenal. He hired 
hundreds of workers at a time when private-sector employment was 
supposedly capped at seven workers per firm. In 1981, he started 
with four employees, and in 1983, he had 103. By 1986, his business 
was netting 1 million yuan in profits. To put this number into 
perspective, in 1985, the average profit per SOE – the largest of the 
businesses in the country at the time - was only 1.1 million yuan. 
 
The success of TVEs was crucial for the reform of the state hegemony. Rural 
economic growth accelerated the transition from a socialist ideology to a 
market-driven ideology. In addition, the growth of personal wealth in rural areas 
was able to generate consent for the market ideology while the socialist 
ideology was still partly recognised in order to maintain the sustainability. This, 
then, set the foundation of its diffusion into urban areas of China. 
 
The origin of private business in urban areas can be understood as another 
political project developed by the state to sustain social stability and further 
diffuse the market ideology. As I discussed before, millions of young people and 
graduates were sent to rural areas for re-education during the Cultural 
Revolution. Shortly after the economic reform, these young people were free to 
go back to their home cities. However, this created a huge unemployment issue, 
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which was viewed as a serious crisis threatening national stability and 
leadership. Therefore, youths were encouraged to undertake an ‘individual 
business’ in the repairing, service, and handicraft industries (Li, 2013). This, 
then, marks the first step of opening up the private sector. 
 
However, the relaxing of constraints on private business was not a one-step 
process. Similar to the process of developing TVEs, the gradual development of 
private enterprise was initiated with a careful balance between developing a 
market ideology and maintaining political correctness as a socialist nation (Li, 
2013). In the beginning, the operation of private business was restricted; only 
private businesses in certain industries were approved, and hiring labour was not 
allowed except for family members. Even then, the business owners, who were 
known as ‘getihu’, had to have fewer than seven employees. However, such an 
ambiguous attitude toward private enterprise was replaced by a friendlier 
posture in 1987 when the CPC acknowledged the important role of private 
enterprise in developing the national economy and improving life quality in their 
13th Party Congress (Li, 2013). The year 1989 witnessed the registration of the 
first groups of private enterprise of 0.09 million. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping further 
showed the full political acceptance of developing privately owned organisations 
during his famous ‘South tour’ inspecting Wuchang, Shenzhen, Zhuhai, and 
Shanghai, where he made the famous statements: ‘The market economy does 
not equal capitalism, socialism also has market’ and ‘More central planning or 
more market is not the fundamental difference between capitalism and 
socialism’. As a result, private enterprise grew by 70% in 1993 and by 81% in 
1994 (Li, 2013). To support the market ideology, political societies such as tax 
and law regulations were reformed to provide the necessary foundations for the 
development of modern private firms. The economic activities in private 
enterprise then become an important part of the state hegemony because of 
their ability to contribute to economic growth and maintain social sustainability.  
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The story of the political transformation after the establishment of the PRC 
demonstrated a dramatic reform of the state hegemony in China. It can be seen 
that the broader political transformation had a serious impact on the power 
relations in Chinese organisations. The political era of Maoism provided the 
socio-political conditions necessary for the proletariat to be the power players 
because of their political superiority in a communist society. In contrast, 
capitalists were powerless and invisible in the organisational hierarchy because 
of the state’s disregard of capitalism. However, a political transformation from 
Maoism to Dengism dramatically reversed the power structure in organisations. 
After the death of Mao, Deng took over the leadership and heavily promoted 
marketisation as the key political ideology. As a result, private entrepreneurs 
started to emerge and played an essential role in sustaining the state hegemony. 
This created the political conditions necessary for entrepreneurs to regain power 
in organisations while the proletariat started to lose their voice in those same 
organisations.  
 
The entrepreneurs at PLT, namely, shareholders A and B, also started their 
private business in this social context. With the boost of private sector in 1990s, 
shareholder A, an ordinary citizen without political background, initiated his real 
estate business in Qingdao. After earning his ‘first bucket of gold’, he travelled 
to the US to discover the market and particularly look for the products which 
can be exported there. He identified that the bandage can be a promising 
product and therefore returned to China to look for business partners in 2000s. 
He found shareholder B, who at the time just established a small factory 
producing medical material in Suzhou. The emergence of the political 
environment allowed them to initiate their business and transform themselves 
from proletarians to capitalists. Following the merger of their individual business 
in the 2000s, their power had remained apparent. As mentioned in section 4.4.2, 
the managerial hierarchy at PLT is quite centralised. The owner-managers are at 
the top of the hierarchy with immense power over the decision making. 
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Therefore, the trace of structural hegemony in China is able to provide 
explanations of how the shareholders at PLT gained their dominant hegemonic 
position in the organisation. 
 
This section shows the need for structural hegemony in understanding the 
emergence of a particular dominant group in an organisation. It was found that 
state hegemony provided the essential objective conditions for entrepreneurs to 
win consent and control over others. Therefore, this section has provided a 
structural explanation of the hegemonic relations at PLT. However, one can argue 
that, although capitalists’ activity in private enterprise plays an important part 
in maintaining the state hegemony, it does not lead to the conclusion that 
private enterprise is under the hegemony led by business owners, as the 
managers were usually regarded as capitalists themselves as well, as shown in 
labour control studies (Burawoy, 1979; Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2005; 
Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2008). Therefore, the political context cannot 
explain why owners have more power than managers. To answer this question, 
the next section will discuss another aspect of the structural hegemony which 
determines the particular forms of control constructed at PLT. 
 
5.3 Confucianism as a prevailing ideology 
The previous section discussed how the historical political context of China 
provided the structural conditions for the rise of a capitalist leadership. 
However, the state’s politics and its interaction with the economy cannot explain 
the entire hegemonic arrangement in the local context. Although the influence 
of the political force was obvious, this explanation on its own is not convincing 
when explaining the emergence of owner-manager leadership in Chinese 
organisations. As demonstrated in Alawattage and Wickramasinghe (2008) and 
Efferin and Hopper (2007), cultural tradition can also be hegemonic by providing 
an ideological rationality for consent (and control). Therefore, this section 
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discusses Confucianism as a hegemonic ideology securing the unity of social 
formation in China. I argue that the ideology of Confucianism provides the 
essential cultural conditions for the infusion of a paternalistic and harmonic 
management in Chinese organisation. To do so, I will firstly provide an overview 
of Confucianism. Then, I discuss how Confucianism was utilised as a hegemonic 
ideology in Chinese society, which is followed by the discussion of those aspects 
of Confucian values which influence management control in Chinese 
organisations and PLT in particular.  
 
5.3.1 Confucianism – an overview 
The philosophy of Confucianism and its doctrine has been a prevailing ideology 
influencing Chinese society for most of its recorded history (Redding, 1990). It 
was developed by the ancient Chinese philosopher and educator, Kong Confucius 
(551 – 479 BC). His ideology was established and then evolved as both informal 
and unofficial, but it became one of the most powerful religions based on moral, 
political, and social principles influencing everyday life of the Chinese people on 
the mainland, as well as those Chinese who had migrated to other countries, 
such as Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia (Wang et al., 2005).  
 
While Confucianism is concerned with all aspects of life, it is impossible to 
discuss it fully in a limited space. Therefore, the discussion will focus on its 
relational aspect, which can be understood from two perspectives. One is 
concerned with the human relationships while the other focuses on the 
development of the inner characteristics of an individual. Firstly, Confucianism 
affirms the accepted values and norms of behaviour in human relationships 
through the principle of ‘wu lun’ (Wang et al., 2005; Berling, 1982). It describes 
five basic ethical role relations, that is, between emperor-subject, father-son, 
husband-wife, elder-younger brothers, and friend-friend (Wang et al., 2005). 
This includes defined roles and obligations for different sets of relationships. For 
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instance, the son should listen to advice from his father and must accept the 
father’s precept. It can be seen from the example that ‘wu lun’ promotes a 
dominant-subservient relationship. In the father-son relationship, the father is in 
the dominant position where the son has to obey his advice. Similar to the 
dominant position of the father, the Emperor, husband, and elder brother are 
also granted a naturalised dominant position in their respective relationships. 
However, this does not mean that the dominant party in each relationship can 
abuse his power. Rather, ‘wu lun’ also includes obligations for dominant parties 
in the relationship. For example, the father should use his wisdom to educate his 
son and understand how to love. Thus, ‘wu lun’ offers pre-assigned social roles 
and relevant obligations to guide appropriate human interactions for all 
individuals in society and expects everyone to conform to their role in the 
relationship and act properly to match their identity. 
 
While the doctrine of ‘wu lun’ determines the social orders for different social 
identities, another aspect of Confucianism nurtures the internal virtue of an 
individual through the notion of ‘five virtues’: ‘ren’ [humanity-benevolence], ‘yi’ 
[righteousness], ‘li’ [propriety], ‘zhi’ [wisdom] and ‘xin’ [trustworthiness] (Wang 
et al., 2005). Among them, ‘ren’ is regarded as the core and as the source of all 
the other virtues (Berling, 1982); it provides the idealistic spiritual characteristic 
which acts as a moral guidance for Confucianism’s believers.  
 
Although ‘ren’ describes the ideal virtual as an individual, this concept closely 
links individuals with the broader community they live in: 
 
The ideogram for ‘jen’ (as their term for Ren) represents a human 
being: ‘jen’ is humaneness – what makes us human. We are not fully 
human simply by receiving life in a human form. Rather, our 
humanity depends upon community, human reciprocity. […] It 
connected with the Confucian golden rule of not doing to others what 
you would not want them to do to you. Against individualism, it 
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implied that people have to live together hopefully, even lovingly. 
People have to cultivate their instinctive benevolence, their 
instinctive ability to put themselves in anther’s shoe. That cultivation 
was the primary educational task of Confucius and Mencius. (Carmody 
& Carmody, 1983, p.135 cited from Redding, 1990). 
 
Therefore, to be ‘ren’, the individual should treat others with love and respect 
and should consider the needs of others just as they consider their own needs. 
This generates an emphasis on community and harmony because an individual is 
not considered an individual unless they show consideration for others in the 
community. The cultivation of this virtue involves constant education and self-
reflection with a lifetime commitment to inner character building and ethical 
maturity. Confucius himself describes his own life-time character building as 
follows: ‘At fifteen, I set my heart on learning. At thirty, I was firmly 
established. At forty, I had no more doubts. At fifty, I knew the will of heaven. At 
sixty, I was ready to listen to it. At seventy, I could follow my heart's desire 
without transgressing what was right’. (Analects, 2:4 cited from Berling, 1982). 
Therefore, the path of character building was provided by Confucius himself to 
guide people in being ‘ren’. 
 
These two perspectives of Confucianism set the ideological principles that define 
appropriate individual behaviours in relation to social harmony (Wang et al., 
2005). It also promoted a hierarchical social order that defines the obligations of 
different identities in different relationships. Thus, it provides a deep structural 
ideology which secures the unity of social formations in an unconscious manner 
and contributes to the reproduction of social structures. In addition, the 
ideologies of Confucianism carry a religious character. Its ideologies are 
transcendent, not in the sense that they are otherworldly but in the sense of 
aiming for perfection (Berling, 1982). On the one hand, Confucian values are 
closely related to daily life to the point that people may not take Confucianism 
seriously. On the other hand, it constantly reminds people about the familiar 
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ideals of friendship, parenthood, and themselves. Although it does not have any 
physical institutional structure like Islam or Christianity, its philosophical thought 
has evolved to be a matter of how people act, just like the influence of 
capitalism (Redding, 1990). Consequently, people who follow the Confucian 
doctrine in daily life may not consider themselves as followers of Confucianism 
(Redding, 1990). Thus, it becomes deep and unconscious and is hard to 
delineate.  
 
5.3.2 Confucianism – a hegemonic ideology 
The previous section illustrated Confucianism’s principle in managing people’s 
relations and their ideologies. This cultural ideology has been prevailing for most 
of Chinese recorded history. The Confucian philosophy became dominant due to 
its function of securing the unity of the social formation in ancient China, 
especially in the Han dynasty. In ancient China, the civil laws were not well 
developed. Thus, the state was not maintained based on the jurisdiction that 
can be usually found in Western societies. Instead, Confucianism was utilised to 
provide the philosophical basis for the filial piety which supported the family 
structure and, in turn, the state itself. It also established a highly integrated 
society where the dominant class and dominated class shared the same world 
view via a common literary ideology (Redding, 1990).  
 
Under the influence of Confucian ideology, the state was understood differently 
by its members compared to their counterparts in the Western world. While the 
distinction between the state and the individual was clear in the West, the 
Chinese state was usually understood as a super-family for its members 
(Redding, 1990). The maintenance of order was based on the morally enriched 
prescriptions guided by the Confucian discipline of the family, such as ‘wu lun’. 
In this context, an individual was no longer a ‘free’ individual with private 
thoughts but rather was one party in a relationship or connection. Influenced by 
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the Confucian value of ‘wu lun’ and the five virtues, members were able to 
identify their own roles as the parents, children, friends, and partners of others 
and to follow their obligation to maintain the harmony in their own social 
context. The society, then, is constructed of morally binding relationships 
connecting all while the state is naturally at the top of the hierarchy as the 
father of the family (Redding, 1990).  
 
The intensiveness of social interactions leads to the establishment of a 
collectivist society. While people in an individualist society tend to have only 
loose ties between each other, in contrast, a collectivist society is one in which 
people are integrated into strong, cohesive groups throughout their lifetime 
(Hofstede, 2001). Consequently, open confrontation is considered as being rude, 
and direct refusal is usually replaced by a delay or an agreement everyone 
knows would never be acted upon (Tang and Ward, 2003). People who 
continually disagree with others are regarded as being at fault. While much can 
be left unsaid, people rely on the common sense and shared opinions guided by 
Confucianism to fill the knowledge gap (Tang and Ward, 2003). Another 
important implication of a collectivist view of life is the distinction between 
people who belong to the group and those who do not (Tang and Ward, 2003). 
While people naturally trust other people who are in the same group, the claims 
by outsiders are usually viewed with suspicion. This has important implications 
for the state hegemony. While the ruling classes were regarded as the ‘parent’ in 
the ‘super-family’ in ancient China, their ideologies and policies can be easily 
legitimised and trusted as common opinions. In contrast, the recognition of the 
‘super-family’ prevented the diffusion of alternative opinions as anyone offering 
such opinions was regarded as outsider and their opinions were suspect. Thus, it 
can be argued that the consent of subordinated groups was manufactured by the 
prestige given to dominant groups because of their naturalised superior identity 
as described in Confucianism. 
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However, the justification of the hierarchical relationship does not mean the 
exercise of a dictatorship. The Confucian system of values not only contributes 
to the sustainability of the hierarchy; it also imposes rules and obligations on the 
authoritarians. Just like a father has certain obligations in the father-son 
relationship, the Emperor was expected to have certain virtues and obligations 
as well. For instance, a good emperor should respect and show care to his 
subordinates. The abuse of power is constricted by the morality of righteousness 
and compassion. The restrictions on dominant class can be seen as a compromise 
from dominant groups, which further contributes to the generation of consent in 
ancient China. With the influence of Confucianism, people respected the moral 
leadership of their leader if he strictly followed Confucianism (Redding, 1990). 
Combined with previous discussion, the practice of following Confucian 
principles can be regarded as the main source of legitimacy for effective 
leadership in ancient China. 
 
While in ancient China, leadership was largely justified by Confucian principles, 
the appearance of Confucianism can still be observed in modern China. Despite 
Confucianism being heavily attacked by the CPC because it represents of the 
values of Chinese imperialism, the sense of Confucianism remained embedded in 
the attempt of the CPC to justify itself as the new leader. For instance, the CPC 
promoted the description of the state as a ‘big family’, which can be seen from 
many forms of artworks including posters, poems, and songs. When advocating 
the ethnicities of China, a song with lyrics ‘56 ethnicities are 56 flowers, 
brothers and sisters of 56 ethnicities are one family’ is still widely heard in 
China. In fact, during my childhood, similar phrases could be easily heard or 
seen on the streets. This represents the CPC’s attempt to present the state as a 
family. The hierarchical family structure then could be transferred to the 
governance of the state. The CPC, which described itself as ‘parents’, was able 
to justify the power and privileges it had over others. For other social groups, 
who acted as ‘sons and daughters’ in this family relationship, the recognition of 
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the party as ‘parents’ made it easier for them to accept the social order. 
Therefore, although the members of the society shared the same power in the 
principle of the CPC, it was organised in a hierarchical way through Confucian 
ideology, despite the CPC denying support for any religion. 
 
The Confucian concept of harmony was also emphasised when the CPC framed 
its leadership during the market economy era. In September 2004, The Fourth 
Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee of the CPC proposed the 
development of a ‘socialist harmonious society’ as one of the top agendas for 
central government. According to the report4:  
 
The general requirements for building a harmonious socialist society 
are: democracy and law; fairness and justice; integrity and friendship; 
vigour and vitality; stability and order; and the harmonious 
coexistence of man and nature. … In a harmonious society people at 
all levels respect each other. Labour, knowledge, technology and 
capital are all factors of wealth creation, which can make profits and 
should be respected so long as they have made contributions to 
society. A harmonious society should see honest, friendly and 
harmonious relationships and just, fair and open competition between 
social members, regions and departments. In such a society, 
competition will optimise the distribution of resources, foster 
technological progress, develop social productivity and raise overall 
national strength. 
 
The pursuit of a ‘socialist harmonious society’ was constantly re-addressed and 
emphasised and still is, even in the present day. By framing the goal of central 
government with the Confucian ideology, the government was able to reinforce 
its moral leadership. In addition, the government justified the development of 
 
4 China Daily (2004) Harmonious society. Available on: http://cpcchina.chinadaily.com.cn/2010-
09/16/content_13918117.html (Accessed 19/12/2018) 
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market competition, which was not in accordance with socialist ideology, by 
claiming it to be the essential step for creating a harmonious society. 
 
To get people to understand their prescribed roles in the state, interpretations 
of Confucianism were embedded in education and family socialisation (Redding, 
1990). Through the teaching of Confucianism, different social groups were 
identified, and the prevailing social structures were able to be stabilised through 
the reproduction of Confucian ideologies. The Confucian education can still be 
observed in modern Chinese education based on my own experience of the 
education system in China. Despite school education not being based on 
Confucianism as in ancient China, the original writings of Confucianism are 
commonly discussed as part of the Chinese curricula in primary and secondary 
schools. Children are encouraged to understand the original texts, memorise the 
classical phrases, and apply the Confucian principles when building their own 
relationships in their daily lives. In contrast to the emphasis on the 
independence and creativity encouraged in individualistic societies, children are 
educated to be obedient and responsible to their peers. Considering this, I recall 
a vivid example of my own experience. Throughout my primary and secondary 
education in China, we always had a class-based moral performance system 
across the school. When someone in the class broke the school rules, the marks 
of the whole class would be reduced. As a result, the bad behaviour of an 
individual became the shame of the whole class. Thus, a collectivist thinking was 
created in order to achieve the common good for the class. In addition, in line 
with the principle of ‘wu lun’, teachers are always respected and are held in a 
dominant position. The teacher-centred learning experience is prevalent; for 
example, students are not allowed to speak in class unless the teacher asks them 
to answer questions (Tang and Ward, 2003), and students have to greet the 
teacher before and after the class to show their respect to their teachers. 
Confucian principles are also circulated in family education as well. Parents 
educate their children to respect their elders, follow their advice, and 
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understand the importance of the family as a close unit. The marriage of young 
couples is treated as the uniting of two families while parents’ opinions are 
usually very important. In return, parents have the obligation to support young 
people financially and provide life advice to them. 
 
Based on the above discussion, it can be argued that Confucianism serves as a 
structural hegemonic ideology in Chinese society. In ancient China, it was the 
core ideological base for the state hegemony and social stability. It established a 
stable social hierarchy which helps emperor gaining consent among subordinated 
groups. In modern China, it provides ideologic support for the emergence of 
moral leadership by the CPC. The CPC’s effort on relating education and state 
policies to Confucian principles showed that Confucianism still influences 
people’s sense-making in the present day. Thus, it is a long-standing structural 
hegemonic ideology which works as a social cement to connect members of the 
society together in an unconscious way. Thus, the next section presents the 
appearance of Confucianism in Chinese enterprises and at PLT, showing how the 
ideological influence of Confucianism at a structural level is able to influence 
the organisational practices in China. 
 
5.3.3 Appearance of Confucianism in organisations 
The previous section argued that Confucianism works as a hegemonic ideology to 
maintain the moral leadership in both ancient and modern China. With the 
influence of broader Confucian ideologies, the unique tradition of management 
control in Chinese organisations emerged and developed. This is what this 
section aims to analyse. Two dimensions of the Chinese management tradition 
derived from the influence of Confucian ideology are discussed. The first 
dimension shows the vertical order in Chinese organisations where a 
paternalistic governance promoting hierarchy and authority is prevalent; the 
132 
 
second dimension shows the horizontal relations in organisations where 
hegemony is the foundation for maintaining relationships between colleagues. 
 
Paternalistic governance 
The social orders cultivated by the notion of ‘wu lun’ and the virtue of ‘ren’ 
initiated the paternalistic mode of control (Wang et al., 2005). As discussed in 
the previous section, the principle of ‘wu lun’ provides defined roles for each 
member in society and encourages individuals to conform to their social role in 
different relationships and to fulfil their individual responsibilities. The 
dominant-subservient relationship described in ‘wu lun’ leads to the respect of 
hierarchy and authority. In the state, the power and authority of the ruling 
classes, such as emperors and the CPC, were justified and naturalised because 
they linked their moral leadership to Confucian principles and concepts. For 
instance, the state is commonly described as a ‘big family’ while the state acts 
as the ‘parent’. Through this, the social hierarchy between superior and 
subordinates became acceptable as long as the superior appeared to obey 
Confucian principles (Wang et al., 2005).  
 
Conditioned by this broader structural ideology, Chinese organisations are usually 
managed in a similar way. An organisation is usually treated as a family where 
the business owners are usually regarded as the superior in the Chinese context. 
Because of the hierarchical order of the family, the decision-making authority is 
typically regarded as the natural right for the business owners or managers in 
control (Laaksonen, 1988). Owners tend to believe that their authority and 
power are given as a natural right rather than being based on their defined 
contractual managerial role or their professional skills (Laaksonen, 1988). On the 
other hand, the moral principle described in the virtue of ‘ren’ requires the 
owner to behave and think like the parent in the family and to provide 
acceptable leadership in the organisation. This ideological influence results in 
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the dominance of paternalistic governance as a widely accepted governance 
approach in Chinese business (Pun, Chin, & Lau, 2000; Dong & Liu, 2010; Wang et 
al., 2005; Hempel & Chang, 2002; Lau & Young, 2013). Influenced by hierarchical 
interpersonal relationships in the Confucian value system, paternalistic 
governance is characterised by centralised authority by owner-managers and the 
hierarchical organisational structure (Dong & Liu, 2010; Pun et al., 2000). 
Owners tend to be at the top of the managerial hierarchy and exercise tight 
direct control over the organisation unless the manager wins the personal trust 
of the employees. Therefore, critical managerial positions in the organisation 
tend to be assigned to family members of the owner or trusted managers 
(Redding & Witt, 2011 p,7). Staff usually have little influence on the operation 
of control system, and have little involvement in standard setting and monitoring 
(Whitley, 1999).  
 
With the influence of the ideology of Confucianism, the PLT is also managed 
through a paternalistic way. A centralised managerial hierarchy and authority 
can be observed from its managerial structure (Figure 4-2). It is apparent that 
the managerial hierarchy was centralised toward the business owner. The two 
business owners (acting as shareholders) enjoyed naturalised power in the 
decision making in the organisation. Such naturalised power is legitimised by 
Confucian ideology and the managers tend to respect the arrangement. At PLT, it 
seems like every member has their own social role in their relationship and try 
to fulfil their own responsibilities. The business owners act like ‘parents’ in the 
relationship and usually have the responsibility to make critical decisions for the 
organisation. The senior level managers did not have control over the decisions. 
Instead, their job was to execute the decisions and respect the authority: 
 
For me, I am just the executor of the owner’s decisions. If he 
[Shareholder B] wants more sales, I will try to achieve that; if he 
doesn’t want me to do that, I am also ok with it. We are just 
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executors; they [owners] need to have a clear target. The problem is 
that his target is changing, which makes it hard for me hard to get 
the point. (FM)  
 
Bottom level staff had less information and did not have any decision-making 
responsibility. For example, for cost accountants, they followed only the 
calculation formula designed by senior management when calculating the 
manufactory cost and did not make any contribution to the design of the system. 
Instead, they have the responsibility to calculate the cost using the formula: 
 
Manufactory cost includes the costs incurred during the manufactory 
processes. I am not sure what is inside this cost. The numbers are 
decided by managers [factory manager and shareholder B] and the 
cost per unit is based on the width of the bandage. This is their 
formula, and I don't really know the principle behind it. Managers 
decide this, and we have to follow the formula. (CA-1) 
 
In addition to the centralised decision-making arrangement, it was observed that 
the appointment of management teams was based on the owners’ personal 
relationship and trust. While the two business owners were at the top of the 
managerial hierarchy as shareholders and executive directors in the different 
divisions, only their family relatives and loyal employees were assigned to 
critical managerial positions at PLT. In Factory A, the head accountant was 
shareholder B’s uncle, the production manager was his childhood friend, and 
factory manager had been promoted after several years of working as the 
shareholder’s secretary. In the Shanghai sales division, shareholder A’s wife was 
appointed as the COO of the company while all the middle-level managers 
including the sales manager, operational manager, and HR manager were 
promoted to their positions after more than 5 years of working in the 
organisation as their first jobs since graduation. In addition, the CFO of the 
group had at least 8 years of experience working in both organisations as a group 
accountant before finally being promoted to the position. The construction of 
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the management team in the organisation showed a clear preference toward 
individuals who had already established an informal or family relationship with 
the business owners. 
 
Members of the owners’ families shared similar levels of authority and power in 
the organisation. The COO can be regarded as a good example. In the Shanghai 
sales division, the COO was responsible for most of the major financial decision-
making while exercising direct control over the employees. Although there was 
some degree of autonomy for middle-level managers, paternalism still shaped 
how the employees interacted with the owners: 
 
[When facing problems] middle-level managers will try to solve the 
problems by themselves first; however, if the issues are big or 
managers are not sure about the solution, the COO will be asked to 
provide a valid decision. The decision related to fund raising and 
money transfers have to be reported to the COO so she can monitor 
the financial circumstances of the whole group. Although she is in the 
US for most of the year, I don't feel any difference; some issues still 
need to be reported to her through Wechat. (OM)  
 
The above excerpt illustrates the authority of the COO in the sales division. 
Although she was not always physically in the office, her power was still visible 
in the organisation. However, when she did come to the office, her supervision 
approach demonstrated her paternalistic way of governance: 
 
When the COO was here, she always asked us some random things 
when we had something on hand. For example, when I was typing, she 
would walk behind me and ask me something about the customer, the 
status of a certain contract, and the customer she had previously 
introduced to me. I had to answer her questions, and after that, I had 
to switch my mind back to the task I was doing, which is a bit 
annoying. (SS-1)  
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Apart from centralised control practice, paternalistic governance is also 
characterised by personal and informal relations between the controllers and the 
controlled. Instead of following the rules and formal procedures, owners prefer 
direct supervision and personal contact when monitoring organisational activities 
in order to retain considerable personal discretion in the decision-making 
process (Whitley, 1999). Performance indicators usually involve judgements 
based on personal feelings instead of calculative figures. For example, decisions 
such as firing, hiring, promotion, and evaluation in a Chinese Indonesian 
company were found to be based on friendship, trust, and loyalty instead of 
results and efficiency (Efferin & Hopper, 2007).  
 
At PLT, the performance measurement system was also quite informal and 
personal. Apart from the sales division, which had a clear performance indicator 
based on profit, other departments did not have any formal performance 
measurement system. Middle level managers tended to negotiate the salary and 
bonus directly with the owners. During my time at PLT, many managers 
mentioned to me that they would negotiate their salary on an annual basis with 
the two owners. Managers valued employees’ performance in a rather personal 
way. As a result, a good informal relationship between managers and staff had 
become increasingly important: 
 
The performance indicator here is based on if the bosses like you. If 
they like you, you are doing everything right. If they don't like you, 
they will nit-pick some problems even if you were doing a fairly good 
job. So there is no objectivity here. In my previous organisation [a US 
organisation], different departments rate each other along with self-
assessment. Both financial and non-financial categories are developed 
to assess how well and hard you worked. (PS) 
 
It can be said that a leadership based on paternalism is similar to an autocratic 
leadership. Owners take decisions on behalf of the company while few inputs are 
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taken from the group members. The owners dictate all the tasks to employees 
and evaluate the performance based on their own judgements. However, it 
differs from autocratic leadership because of the owners’ obligations as derived 
from Confucianism. A paternalistic leader is regarded as the father of the 
organisation (Lau & Young, 2013). Therefore, they have to take care of the 
employees like a parent would do. For instance, owners are responsible for 
employee welfare and job promotion and even provide help in difficult personal 
situations. In return, employees show obedience to the leaders and respect to 
centralised authorities from owners (Efferin and Hopper, 2007). The promotion 
of loyal staff at PLT provides a good example of how owners take care of loyal 
employees as part of their obligations. Therefore, the collectivism and 
relationship-centralisation described in Confucianism results in paternalistic 
governance in Chinese organisations.    
 
The above discussion shows that the management practice at PLT was based on a 
paternalistic ideology, which is a hegemonic ideology rooted in Confucianism. It 
influenced both the business owners (the controller) and employees (the 
controlled). Paternalism enabled the business owners to accumulate power and 
consequently exercise centralised control and direct supervision. On the other 
hand, these practices were accepted by employees because they were in line 
with their Confucian ideology. More importantly, Confucianism had infused 
people’s way of thinking in an unconscious manner. Although participants never 
explicitly discussed the impact of Confucianism on them, Confucian values could 
be observed through the way they did things and the norms they took for 
granted. The discussion on paternalistic governance also shows the importance 
of informal relationships at PLT. While performance measurements, promotions, 
and even salaries were based on the personal relationship with managers or 
owners, the building of personal relationships had become essential for people 
to live in the organisation. Realising this, the next section discusses how actors 
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deal with relations in an organisation where the concept of ‘harmony’ is 
elaborated. 
 
Concern of Harmony 
While paternalistic governance is mainly concerned about the vertical order in 
Chinese organisations, the maintenance of harmony sets an ideological 
foundation which governs interpersonal relations in Chinese organisations 
(Westwood, 1997; Hempel & Chang, 2002). As previously discussed, the 
Confucian principle of ‘wu lun’ stresses the importance of harmony in the same 
group. ‘Trustworthiness’ is highlighted as the core principle in friend-friend 
relationships, which means that friends should always trust and help each other. 
The notion of ‘ren’ also educates people to respect others and consider others’ 
needs. This all signifies the emphasis of harmony in Confucianism. In the 
organisational context, while a harmonic relationship between leader and 
subordinate can be achieved through the naturalisation of the paternalistic 
management tradition, the harmonic relations between people with similar 
social identities are governed by the notions of ‘guanxi’ and ‘renqing’ in the 
workplace. 
 
The notion of ‘guanxi’ is common in China. It is derived from the Confucian 
teaching of ‘wu lun’ on commonality and harmony in family relations, which also 
provided a benchmark for the maintenance of non-family relationships (Chen, 
Chen, & Huang, 2013). Chen, Chen, and Huang's (2013) review on over 200 
articles in the management literature discussing ‘guanxi’ demonstrates the 
complexity of ‘guanxi’ in Chinese society. The direction translation of ‘guanxi’ 
can be ‘relation’ or ‘connection’. However, there is no universal definition of 
‘guanxi’, as different researchers interpret the concept rather differently. It can 
be generally interpreted from two perspectives. For the individual, it can be 
understood as a social practice of building and using personal relationships in life 
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and work. For organisations, it can be understood as a strategy for a business to 
gain competitive advantages and as a way of establishing contracts and 
transactions between organisations (Chen, Chen, & Huang, 2013). Despite 
various interpretations in different contexts, the notion of ‘guanxi’ generally 
describes a set of informal connections between people within the same 
network, which leads to agreements and personal benefits given in an informal 
manner.  
 
However, Chen, Chen, and Huang (2013) highlighted the distinction between 
family and non-family ‘guanxi’. They argued that, while ‘family guanxi’ carries 
the characteristics of affect, obligation, and informality, ‘non-family guanxi’ is 
instrumental, which means that non-family relationships are motivated by the 
objective of obtaining benefits and rewards. Therefore, the relationship is built 
because of the benefits one is expected to get from others. While ‘family 
guanxi’ is usually maintained in an informal or personal form, some ‘non-family 
guanxi’ is contractual. This form of ‘guanxi’ usually refers to the interpersonal or 
inter-firm relationships, which are characterised by formality. This form of 
‘guanxi’ is initialised for business and work requirements and therefore is not as 
close as ‘family guanxi’. On the other hand, Chen, Chen, and Huang (2013) still 
recognised that ‘guanxi’ in the workplace can be a mixture of the personal and 
the impersonal, the expressive and the instrumental. The workplaces and 
contractual connections provide social spaces for people to initiate an ongoing 
‘guanxi’. Over time, people involved in contractual ‘guanxi’ tend to become 
‘shouren’ (acquaintance), and their shared social identities (such as employees) 
tend to establish a horizontal relationship. Their ‘guanxi’ can be less 
instrumental and more affective, and the harmony is valued more than before.  
 
The harmony in the ‘guanxi’ relation was highly valued at PLT, especially 
between employees. The building of harmonic ‘guanxi’ was important for staff 
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to feel comfortable in the organisation. As the HR manager commented 
regarding her feeling about the maintenance of good ‘guanxi’ with colleagues: 
 
The evaluation system is useful when adjusting the annual salary for 
staff. However, the social relationship in the organisation is also 
important; you spend more time a day in the company than at your 
home. You will feel uncomfortable if you don't have good social 
relationships in the organisation unless you are a very competitive 
person. As you can see in our organisation, the sales manager and her 
staff have good match of their character. No-one is overhanging. 
(HRM) 
 
The managers at PLT also tended to prevent conflicts between others especially 
in the case of contradiction. An incident was observed between the operational 
manager and the graphic designer in the sales division regarding the designer’s 
late arrival time. The company implemented a sign-up system where each 
employee has to sign in for attendance when they arrive at the company to 
monitor their arrival times. However, the operational manager discovered that 
the designer usually did not sign in. When the operational manager asked the 
designer about this, designer did not provide any valid reason and simply said: 
‘You can do whatever you want and follow the rule’. However, the operational 
manager clearly regarded that as the last option and kept talking about how he 
should have followed others’ routine and done the same. After two weeks, they 
made an agreement. The designer’s salary was cut by 20%. In return, he would 
enjoy the free attendance schedule as he wanted. This incident shows the 
concern for harmony as an important criterion when the operational manager 
handled conflict with staff. Although she could have simply applied the rule and 
punished the designer for his behaviour, she tried to convince him by talking 
about how others all follow the routines and negotiated an acceptable solution 
for both parties in order to maintain the harmonic ‘guanxi’ in the workplace. 
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On the other hand, ‘guanxi’ also contains obligations to the others in the 
relationship (Hempel and Chang, 2002). A social rule is implemented to govern 
the social and business interactions in the exercise of a ‘guanxi’ network to 
maintain harmony. Such a social rule is known as ‘renqing’. In brief, it means a 
favour someone owes to others. For example, if an individual has received some 
help/benefit from others, he owes a ‘renqing’ to those others. This means that 
should the others encounter trouble later on, the individual is obligated to repay 
the favour as far as possible. Therefore, any conflict that appears can be 
avoided and harmony maintained by offering a ‘renqing’ to the other party 
rather than having to resolve the conflict. The benefit and the obligation in the 
‘guanxi’ network, then, provide an effective social mechanism to prevent direct 
interpersonal conflicts and preserve the social harmony in the field (Hempel and 
Chang, 2002).  
 
Negotiations are usually a mixture of conflict and cooperation because of the 
different interests and expectations between parties. Tang and Ward's (2003) 
research on management practices in Chinese joint-venture projects shows how 
the negotiation process between Chinese managers is characterised by the sense 
of harmony and hierarchy. They argued that, due to the concern of harmony, 
honest confrontation will be regarded as aggressive and therefore is seen as 
unacceptable behaviour. Instead, disagreement will be skirted through non-
committal responses to maintain the harmony of the relationship in the 
workplace. Similarly, refusal is sometimes difficult without harming the ‘guanxi’ 
between parties. This is where ‘renqing’ comes into play. If a known 
disagreement occurs during the negotiation, there is a possibility that one party 
may accept the deal even if it harms their self-interest. However, once it is 
accepted, a ‘renqing’ is incurred. The one who received the favour has the 
obligation to make an unspecified future repayment to another party.  
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The sense of harmony could be observed during the observation at PLT. Staff 
recognised the importance of harmony in ‘guanxi’ and sometimes used ‘renqing’ 
as the ultimate solution. For instance, when discussing negotiation approaches in 
the sales division, Sales staff 1 told me: 
 
Normally, I usually negotiate with Nina [cost accountant in the 
factory A], but we usually cannot reach an agreement. In the end, I 
have to find their manager. In most of the cases, the manager will 
accept our request but normally he complains. For example, he would 
say: ‘You are sales staff, and you should negotiate a better price with 
clients. (SS-1) 
 
I don't have regular communication with the production manager. I 
am afraid of talking to him because I will be pushed back within 
three sentences. Only the operations manager can have any 
communication with him because she sometimes speaks for him, and 
he may remember the ‘renqing’. (SS-1)  
 
This example illustrates the typical negotiation result at PLT. When the price 
requested by sales staff was not favourable to the factory, the cost accountant 
avoided the conflict by forwarding the negotiation to her manager. The factory 
manager also tended to accept the request in order to prevent any direct 
conflict. In addition, the informal relationship between staff seems important. 
While the operations manager had better personal ‘guanxi’ with the production 
manager, it became easier for them to communicate. Therefore, the desire to 
maintain harmonic ‘guanxi’ during transfer pricing could be observed. This had 
serious implications on the transfer pricing negotiations and hegemonic relations 
at PLT. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 7 where I discuss how the 
Confucian value of ‘harmony’ influences the sense-making process of transfer 
pricing for staff. 
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5.4 Summary and conclusion 
Joseph (2002) argued that hegemony is not only an agential process, but also the 
relationship between agents and the social structures in which they are living. 
Thus, the exploration of hegemony in an organisation needs to be based on an 
understanding of the structural hegemony that shapes the current hegemonic 
status in the organisation (Alawattage and Wickramasinghe, 2008). Based on 
this, this chapter has focused on exploring the relationship between the broader 
Chinese cultural-political conditions and the establishment of power relations 
and control ideologies in organisations. Firstly, it was discovered that the power 
relations in conventional Chinese enterprises are not static. Instead, the 
development of entrepreneurial leadership should be understood by tracing the 
development of structural hegemony in Chinese context. The establishment of 
the PRC carried the mission to create a socialist-based hegemony where a 
planned economy and the centralised leadership centred on Mao Zedong was 
prevalent. In this political context, the communists, usually workers and party 
members, were empowered to control production and organisation. As a result, 
capitalists, who represented ‘evil capitalism’, were punished, and the private 
sector was eliminated. However, the political reform from Maoism to Dengism 
witnessed a change in the political conditions for capitalists. The introduction of 
a market economy as a key hegemonic ideology provided objective conditions 
for the re-emergence of the capitalist class. Due to their contribution to the 
economic growth and development of the private sector, business owners 
became key players in the ‘power bloc’ in the newly formed state hegemony. 
Therefore, the reform of the structural hegemony allowed the transformation of 
the capitalist from the controlled to the controller in Chinese organisations. This 
provided an essential explanation for the current dominant position of business 
owners at PLT. These findings can be linked to prior management control 
research which have highlighted the significance of intervention of state politics 
for management control practices and how accounting techniques are replaced 
or influenced by traditional political control practices (e.g. Uddin & Hopper 
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2001; Wickramasinghe et al., 2004; Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2005; Ashraf & 
Uddin 2015). Compare to the previous study, the influence of state hegemony 
can also be observed in the case of PLT. However, it only provided a foundation 
for the establishment of hegemonic relations in the organisation and does not 
necessarily influenced the internal dynamic of its local circumstance.  
 
On the other hand, the hegemonic ideology of Confucianism explains the power 
of business owners and their unique control tradition in organisations. It is 
argued that Confucianism is a structural hegemonic ideology contributing to the 
justification of the hierarchical social order in both ancient China and the PRC. 
It determines acceptable values and behaviours in human relationships. It also 
provided the ideal inner character of an individual in relation to the society. The 
reproduction of such an ideology through school and family education serves as 
the function of structural hegemony by securing the unity of the social formation 
and moral leadership of the state in an unconscious manner (Joseph, 2002).  
 
Organisations operating under the ideology of Confucianism form a unique 
practice. I found that the principles in Confucianism such as ‘wu lun’ and ‘ren’ 
promoted paternalistic governance in Chinese organisation including PLT. The 
business owners enjoyed naturalised decision-making power and act like a 
‘parent’ in the organisation. This leads to the prevailing of informal relations 
between owners and staff in organisation. The business owners prefer direction 
supervision of staff and performance measurement is usually based on owners’ 
personal judgement. While Confucianism developed such vertical relations in the 
organisation, it also influenced horizontal relations in organisation through the 
concern for harmony. I found that the harmony in ‘guanxi’ is important for all 
staff in organisation, which eventually influences their negotiation behaviours. 
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Overall, the notion of a structural hegemony has provided a lens through which 
to understand the embedded context of organisational control at PLT. It 
facilitated the analysis of how the political and cultural context affects the 
power of the controller, the controlled, and their interrelationship. The transfer 
pricing practice at PLT operated in this structural hegemonic context. The 
transformation of state hegemony established the fundamental power relation in 
transfer pricing practice. The business owners enjoy biggest power while 
managers share similar power because of their roles in the organisation. In 
addition, the Confucianism ideology helped developing an understanding of 
transfer pricing as a social practice. The analysis of Confucianism demonstrated 
how its ideology determined relationships in Chinese organisation and facilitated 
a unique control tradition. The evidence of unique vertical and horizontal 
relations in Chinese organisation showed how performance measurement and 
negotiation is conditioned by the hegemony of Confucian ideology. This has 
influenced how transfer pricing is understood and how negotiation is done, 
which helped me to understand transfer pricing as a social practice. 
 
This chapter sets the necessary scene for how the structural hegemony 
conditioned the power relations and certain control practices at PLT and 
answered the first research question. However, Joseph (2002) highlighted that a 
surface hegemony also has its own internal dynamic. To explore the internal 
dynamic of the surface hegemony, the next chapter focuses on analysing the 
internal dynamic hegemonic relations at PLT and the role of transfer pricing 
within it. 
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Chapter 6˖Hegemonic transfer pricing practice 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter analysed the broad context in which transfer pricing 
practices are embedded and showed how ideologies under the Chinese cultural-
political context permeated management control traditions in the private sector. 
While the state hegemony sets essential conditions for the emergence of 
business owners as a hegemonic class in the organisation, the ideological 
influence of Confucianism also resulted in a paternalistic governance approach in 
Chinese organisation. Based on this macro analysis, this chapter explores the 
micro level and analyses the hegemonic framing of transfer pricing practice 
focusing on the dynamic hegemonic relations at PLT. In particular, it answers how 
the transfer pricing system has emerged out of the continuous dynamic 
relationship between dominant groups and dominated groups.  
 
Chapter 3 conceptualised ‘surface hegemony’ as the continuous organisational 
activities maintaining the moral and intellectual leadership of the dominant 
class. In the meantime, it also shows its own dynamic as associated with 
different social groups, within which the dynamic hegemonic relations play 
important roles (see section 3.4.5). In the context of PLT, the operation of a 
transfer pricing system is conceptualised as one of the hegemonic projects 
(instead of economic projects) in order to highlight how dynamic hegemonic 
relations drive the practice of transfer pricing.  
 
Therefore, this chapter addresses the second research question. To do so, it is 
organised as follows. Section two discusses the original design of the transfer 
pricing system by PLT and its motivation and analyses the way in which transfer 
pricing appears in the hegemony formed by the CEO and shareholders. It is 
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followed by section three, which provides an analysis on structural change in the 
organisation after 2013 and reveals how the reformation of hegemony influences 
transfer pricing. Section four then analyses the current transfer pricing system 
that emerged from the reformation, which reveals how dynamic hegemonic 
relations in the organisation influenced the construction of the transfer pricing 
system and resulted in a fragile arrangement. Section five then summarises and 
concludes the chapter. 
 
6.2 Original form of transfer pricing 
My interviews with the HR manager revealed that PLT is an organisation with 
three layers of management hierarchy, with the shareholders at the top, then 
middle-level management for daily operations, and low-level staff at the bottom 
(see section 4.4.2). However, when I started exploring the development of the 
transfer pricing system at PLT, I realised that the design of the original form of 
transfer pricing was not based on such a structure. A rather different 
organisational circumstance pre-2013 means that the function of the original 
transfer pricing system may differ from the current functions. While the 
development of the accounting practice can be related to the shift of hegemonic 
ideology (Lehman and Tinker, 1987; Goddard, 2002), it is important to start my 
discussion with the original form of transfer pricing and its role under hegemony. 
 
6.2.1 Original design 
The original design of the transfer pricing system at PLT was initiated with the 
goal to design a tax avoidance system to reduce the total payable tax for the 
group. It aimed to provide a legal mechanism to transfer the profit generated 
from other divisions to a division in a low tax region and so maximise the tax 
benefit. The system was designed in such a way that most of the profits were 
transferred to the group’s agent division in Hong Kong where the organisation 
enjoyed lower company tax compared to Mainland China: 
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In the past (before 2014), we did transfer pricing for tax purposes as 
well. We (internally) sold the products at a very low price. For 
example, for each 1 USD of the cost, we added only 0.5 RMB. 
Therefore, profit in the Shanghai sales division was very low. As long 
as we did the sales through HK, most of the profit would go to the HK 
division … every order had to go through me so that I could adjust the 
internal price to balance the profit for each division. However, they 
(sales and factory managers) don't care about this nowadays. (CFO)  
 
Therefore, the original transfer pricing system was a simple tax avoidance 
mechanism that involved few actors. The sales division was ordered to transfer 
their products to their HK division at a pre-determined low price in order to 
transfer their profit to the HK division. The CFO was responsible for adjusting 
and balancing the profit figure for each division. It seems that he can be 
regarded as the only decision-maker in this transfer pricing system because 
other staff members were simply providing him with the price information.  
 
Because internal prices and profit margins were carefully monitored and 
determined, the system was rather irrelevant to management control 
mechanisms. Instead, it seems that it served other strategic purposes. Further 
interviews revealed that the negotiation of transfer pricing still existed in the 
system although it was not accessible to low-level employees. When asked for 
details about the transfer pricing mechanism between the factory and the sales 
division, the CFO said: 
 
At that time, factory would sign a contract with the Shanghai sales 
division with 80% of the actual agreed price. At the time, I was 
working mainly in the Shanghai division; all orders were monitored by 
me. Our ‘true price’ concerns everybody’s benefit, including the 
profitability of the factory. However, if the factory earned too much 
profit, they had to pay tax, and they could not afford that. In the 
past, the factory was profitable even after reducing 20% of the price 
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from their actual negotiated price. The Shanghai sales division 
usually added a negotiated 5% profit and internally sold the products 
to the HK company at basically the same price. In the end, the 
products were sold under the name of the HK division. (CFO) 
 
This revealed an important hidden mechanism in the transfer pricing system. 
Although the transfer pricing between the trading divisions in Shanghai and HK 
was motivated by tax implications, the negotiation of the ‘actual’ transfer price 
happened between the sales division and the factory, in particular, between two 
dominant individuals in the group - the CEO and Shareholder B. They determined 
what was the ‘actual transfer price’ under the table. In this sense, we can 
realise that the CFO was not the actual decision-maker in the system; he was 
just the operator of the ‘surface transfer pricing system’ for tax avoidance. In 
contrast, the CEO and shareholder B were the actual decision-makers, as they 
determined the profit allocation. Therefore, it became important to examine 
the interplay between these two actors. 
 
As was shown in Chapter 5, the power of the business owners (shareholders) was 
taken for granted at PLT. The political development of China and the doctrine of 
Confucianism provided the necessary conditions for the naturalisation of the 
owner’s authority. Thus, it is understandable that shareholder B participated in 
the negotiations of the ‘true’ transfer pricing. However, the participation of the 
CEO needs further discussion, as the structural analysis in chapter 5 cannot 
explain the presentation of his power. Therefore, the next section aims to 
provide an investigation on the moral leadership of the CEO. 
 
6.2.2 Moral leadership of the CEO 
The hierarchical structure of PLT before 2013 was quite different from its 
current form. In general, an extreme top-down management system was 
established. While the factory division was directly managed by shareholder B 
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with the assistance of his secretary, the CEO was initially hired by shareholder A 
to develop the trading division while the shareholder himself focused on 
establishing their US division. In both divisions, there was no visible middle-level 
management, and low-level staff generally did not participate in the decision-
making process. 
 
Owning some shares in the sales division, The CEO was regarded as an owner-like 
person in the sales division. According to the interview of HR manager, the CEO 
took charge of most of the decision-making in the sales division, including 
product development, customer development and internal operational 
management: 
 
When I first joined the organisation (six years ago), there was a CEO 
in the organisation – Steven. The operational mode at that time was 
different from the current form. The CEO mostly dealt with the 
customer/production development, and he was the leader. Most of 
the current stable long-term suppliers and customers were found and 
secured by him. (HRM) 
 
As a result, he was regarded as a leader by the staff. As the CEO took all the 
decision-making responsibilities, all other staff in the sales division were under 
the administrative control of the CEO. An extreme top-down organisational 
structure emerged. Under this structure, all staff were obliged to perform their 
assigned duties without question. Given the power of the CEO, the managerial 
hierarchy was solidified and there was little potential to climb up the hierarchy 
from the position of an ordinary member of staff. In fact, no middle-level 
management existed during that period. The pay grade was also similar across 
the company while the bonuses were usually fixed. The CEO had higher authority 
than the COO at the time. While the COO was the wife of shareholder A, the 
expectation was that the COO held the power in the division. However, the 
151 
 
interviews revealed that the CEO was the actual controller of the division due to 
his influence on the business and management control: 
 
The management control was very detailed, and it was monitored by 
the CEO. The COO did not manage anything at that time. She was 
only responsible for signing things. All the operational ideas were 
produced by the CEO and shareholder A. … As a professional manager, 
he (the CEO) has control over almost everything. (HRM) 
 
While the organisational structure was characterised by the centralised authority 
of the CEO, the only other managerial position was assigned to a member of his 
family. Although there was an HR manager in the division at that time, it was 
discovered that the CEO was the real controller due to his personal status with 
the HR manager. I discussed with the current HR manager about her predecessor: 
 
She [the previous HR manager] is the CEO’s wife, she had good 
relationship with the CFO. Although she was the HR manager. I think 
that the related decisions were still made by the CEO. Because of 
their relationship, they just discuss the issues with each other 
(privately) and inform the COO their decision. So the ideas may came 
from the CEO, but it was the usually the HR manager who report to 
the COO as part of the procedure. (HRM) 
 
With such an arrangement, the CEO can be regarded as the dominant individual 
in the division. He had control over almost all aspects of the division and had full 
decision-making authority. The power distance between the CEO and other staff 
means that there was a clear distinction between the leader and the dominated 
groups. Subordinates had little influence on decision-making. However, staff in 
the sales division still recognised him as their leader due to the responsibilities 
he took. The CEO acted as a ‘father’ and took care of his followers. Staff 
enjoyed the straightforward tasks and less complicated working environment 
because the CEO was able to take care of employees’ welfare and provide a 
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stable working environment by securing and developing customers for the 
organisation. In return, the inequality in status was taken for granted, and staff 
showed obedience to the CEO. Therefore, despite the centralised management, 
the CEO was well respected and appreciated, and the consent for the CEO’s 
leadership was commonly generated among staff.  
 
6.2.3 Implication on transfer pricing 
The above discussion on the moral leadership of the CEO illustrates his dominant 
role in the sales division, which provided explanations of the function of transfer 
pricing at that time. In the sales division, the CEO exercised a paternalistic form 
of hegemony which emerged from the cultural ideological condition of China. 
The decision-making was centralised, and the CEO preferred direct supervision. 
At the same time, the CEO took care of all the responsibilities, which allowed 
the staff to enjoy a stable working environment. This form of management 
surprisingly replaced the management control function of transfer pricing. As a 
result, the leadership was justified based on the paternalistic ideologies, which 
contribute to the exercise of vertical hegemony. 
 
On the other hand, the original form of transfer pricing took part in the 
horizontal hegemonic process. Due to the hegemonic position of the CEO in sales 
division, it can be said that he was in the same position as the shareholders. 
Therefore, the negotiation of ‘true’ transfer pricing between the CEO and the 
shareholders can be regarded as an activity where they allocate profit for 
different divisions. Although the vertical hegemony was generally secured by the 
paternalistic mode of control, for a group to maintain dominance, they would 
need to secure the reproduction of the political, economic, and ideological 
structure (Ashraf and Uddin, 2015). This means that any change of structure may 
cause social uncertainty, which in turn may lead to a hegemonic crisis. Thus, at 
PLT, smooth negotiation of the transfer pricing between shareholders and the 
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CEO became crucial to reproduce this prevailing hegemonic structure. However, 
it seems that the negotiation of transfer pricing was not always smooth due to 
conflicting interests between the CEO and shareholders:  
 
In the past, the CEO was leading the sales division. He likes to invest 
all revenues into the operation. I used to audit the factory account 
because the shareholders want to know the financial circumstance, 
for example, how much profit the factory could make. Sometimes, 
the factory held their price (during transfer pricing negotiation) and 
shareholder A actually supported them. This is because their aims 
were the same: putting the ‘real profit’ into the factory. When the 
money was there, shareholders had the ability to distribute and use 
it because it was their ‘private land’. They could not control the 
action of CEO. He would invest all the profit he got and leave no 
dividend. In the past, the factory could have a profit up to even 1 
million while the trading company always had zero or a slight loss. 
(CFO) 
 
Conflicting interests between the CEO and shareholders can be observed. While 
the CEO preferred a higher risk by investing all revenues back into the 
operation, the shareholders were generally low risk takers with the desire to 
secure the dividend whenever they could and to have control over the cash 
allocation. Different preferences on risk management meant that different 
interests existed within the dominant groups. This made the transfer price 
negotiation a hegemonic struggle between the dominant groups, as it is an 
important system in securing their interests.  
 
However, this struggle typically ended with a cash allocation in favour of the 
shareholders. Despite the CEO being an owner-like manager in the division, the 
shareholders still saw him as an outsider instead of a business partner. They 
utilised their power in both divisions to transfer cash to the factory to limit the 
power of the CEO. By doing this, the shareholders’ personal financial interest 
was sustained. However, in such situations, satisfying the interests of one group 
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means that the interests of other are not secured. Here, transfer pricing not 
only reflects the hegemonic relationship between shareholders and the CEO, but 
also becomes a hegemonic strategy for power. It seems that the shareholders use 
transfer pricing system as a hegemonic strategy to gain power over the CEO. By 
securing more cash through transfer pricing system, the shareholders were able 
to guarantee the financial control over the group and eventually constrain the 
power of the CEO. 
 
The unstable struggle between the dominant groups at PLT eventually led to a 
collapse. In 2015, the CEO left the group. Although he might have lost the 
hegemonic battle with the shareholders, his hegemony within the sales division 
was still secured by his paternalistic control. Utilising his leadership within the 
sales division, he took the whole sales team away with him. As a result, there 
was a lack of the core element in the sales division. This led to the dramatic 
transaction of the organisational structure at PLT. 
 
6.3 Transaction of organisational structure  
Conflicting interests between the dominant groups eventually led to a 
hegemonic crisis. The loss of the entire department in the sales division meant 
that the prevailing hegemony began to disintegrate. As a result, creating a new 
balance of political forces was necessary to reshape the hegemony and form new 
ideologies (Simon, 2015). Thus, a dramatic structural change in the group was 
observed, which later led to the emergence of a new transfer pricing system. 
 
6.3.1 Shift of focus 
With the absence of key personnel, reformation of business structure was 
essential to bring the business back on track. The interviews reveal that there 
was a big shift of business focus in the sales division after the departure of the 
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CEO. This reformation can be seen as shareholder A’s attempt at reforming the 
hegemony and constructing a leadership around him. To do so, the systems 
established by the CEO were all abandoned. The cost issue was addressed as one 
of the main reasons. One senior member of the purchasing staff shared his 
understanding about the drastic change in the organisation during that period: 
 
Because of the cost issue, the system itself was fine. However, it 
cannot last very long because of the loss of staff and the conflicts 
between senior management. At that time, the organisation was 
growing up slowly. Therefore, we thought that a detailed system 
would be quite important to increase productivity. However, the 
result was that the company stopped growing anymore. This results in 
the simple system now. (PS-2) 
 
With the aim of reducing costs, the organisation started to adopt simpler 
organisational systems with fewer principles and reports, which resulted in a 
significant saving in administrative costs. In addition, it seems that the strategic 
focus was also changed by shareholder A. Although the CEO had put effort into 
expanding the domestic line, this was replaced by the close connection with the 
US division, signifying a focus on the international market. According to the HR 
manager, who experienced the change process: 
 
Steven [the name of the CEO] left the company in the end of 2013. 
Until now it has been three years and the (operational) mode has 
been changed. The mode now is more on the stable side and focus on 
the US organisation. 
 
Before the change, the US division had been just established, and the 
focus was still on the Shanghai [sales] division. Doing trade in China 
has to depend on the government policy especially the trend of 
domestic trade policies. We even did domestic business before. We 
used to rent more office spaces in this level [of the building]. We 
used to have a big demo room as well, but it was closed after the 
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leave of the CEO and his team, which means that we would not do 
domestic business anymore. 
 
Thus, the strategic focus was shifted after the CEO had left. The US division 
became the focus with the aim to further develop international opportunities 
while the domestic market was abandoned. As part of the project, the division 
also experienced a significant downsizing from the bottom level. According to 
the HR manager, the number of low-level staff was cut from over 60 to just 
under 20 in the sales division alone. The office space was also cut to one-third of 
the previous size.  
 
As will be demonstrated in section 6.5.1, such a shift in focus actually suited 
shareholder A’s personal ideology of developing the international market. Thus, 
while reconstructing the sales division, he attempted to implement his own 
ideology and interests in it and tried to establish a moral leadership based 
around himself. Thus, consent among employees in the sales division became 
essential to establish such hegemony. The next section then discusses what 
strategies shareholders used to regain consent among others. 
 
6.3.2 Rise of middle-level management 
Establishing middle-level management was another important aspect of the 
change process to appease the working class. To fill the absence of senior 
management in the sales division, the COO stepped forward to manage the 
division and adopted a rather different managerial approach. Instead of using a 
centralised management approach, the COO promoted the decentralisation of 
decision-making. As part of her efforts to rebuild the division, several loyal low-
level staff were promoted to managerial positions and granted decision-making 
responsibilities. For instance, the only remaining staff member of the sales team 
was promoted to be the sales manager. Other three staff members who had been 
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in the organisation since they had graduated were also promoted to the 
managerial position responsible for human resources, internal operations, and 
trade documenting. The promotions could be viewed as a form of compromise to 
regain consent among staff. On the one hand, it offered decision-making power 
to loyal staff while on the other hand, it offered economic compromises to these 
staff members. However, it seems that the decentralised approach suited the 
COO’s own ideology. When we discussed this topic, she commented: 
 
I have always been in the Shanghai company. At the beginning, Steven 
[the CEO] helped me to do things; when he left, I wanted to 
implement some of my ideas – I wanted to promote some people from 
the team and let them have a bigger role in the company. First, I 
thought their ability would be good enough. What was urgent was 
whether we could give them enough time, whether we were ready to 
let them make mistakes. Having the opportunity of Steven’s 
departure, I carried out this change that I had always wanted to do. 
Therefore, I picked some suitable employees to be responsible for the 
daily operational management in the organisation. After 2 to 3 years, 
I feel that this system is working fine. Therefore, I think the timing 
that I picked was appropriate. I don't really care about the 
experience. Sometimes, young people have some good ideas. 
 
Thus, the promotion of some members of staff enabled the COO to realise her 
ideology of decentralisation in the division. This means that the process of 
decentralisation was not only a mere compromise to staff but also a political act 
to reshape the organisation. Further interviews revealed that the promotion was 
also politically informed in a sense that it was based on the ‘loyalty’ of staff 
instead of their financial performance. Despite the COO’s claim that ability was 
an important criterion for the promotion, further discussion showed the 
importance of ‘loyalty’ in the process: 
 
In our organisation, I am not dealing with the daily management. For 
me, if an employee has put ten years of his life into our company, he 
should be very serious. I think he should be in the same boat as me. 
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We should have the same will to make this company better. So, I don't 
have any worries; I am ok with that. (COO) 
 
For the COO, the length of time employees had spent in the organisation was 
directly linked to the attitude of the employees toward the organisation. 
Therefore, employees should be more trustworthy and more reliable if they have 
been in the organisation for a longer period. In other words, it can be said that if 
employees were ‘in the same boat as her’, her leadership would be more easily 
sustained and stabilised. In the factory, similar action was also observed; 
shareholder B also promoted his loyal secretary to be the factory general 
manager responsible for the operation of the factory and communication with 
the sales division.  
 
As a result, the middle-level management emerged in the group. This created 
another layer of hierarchy, which was above the low-grade staff and below the 
senior management represented by shareholders. Under this new arrangement, 
middle-level managers were granted the authority to undertake daily decision-
making tasks, such as customer development, contract negotiations, and product 
developments. In association with this strategic shift, a new form of transfer 
pricing eventually emerged to reflect the broader structural changes at PLT. 
 
6.4 Emergence of profit-driven transfer pricing 
As discussed earlier, the conflict of interest that appeared in the transfer pricing 
system eventually led to the departure of the CEO in 2013. This means that the 
original transfer pricing practice became impractical because of the absence of 
key actors in the system. At the same time, the organisation also experienced a 
dramatic change in terms of its strategic focus, managerial mode, and 
operational mode. Consequently, a new form of transfer pricing started to 
emerge. Instead of being a tax-driven system where only senior management had 
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control over the price, the new form of transfer pricing system was profit-driven 
and was mainly operated by middle-level managers. It included the contribution 
from the factory and the sales division through their regular communication and 
negotiation. Therefore, transfer pricing became increasingly relevant to low-
level and middle-level managers. 
 
Despite the drastic change in the transfer pricing mechanism, there were no 
written documents stating the changing schedule or principle. Therefore, the 
construction of the newly emerged transfer pricing system was understood based 
on my continuous conservations and observations with staff from different levels 
in the sales and factory divisions. Figure 6-1 shows the relations between actors 
involved in the newly emerged transfer pricing system. 
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Figure 6-1: transfer pricing procedure 
 
Compared to the original form of the transfer pricing system, the reformed 
system involves more actors. Both low-level and middle-level employees 
participate in its daily operation. The process of transfer pricing is usually 
initiated by the sales department in the sales division. The sales team receive 
price quote enquiries from potential customers looking for certain products. 
Once they have received the customer’s enquiries, the sales team is responsible 
for preparing a report explaining the product type, customisation requirements, 
and estimated amount. The report is then sent to costing accountants in the 
factory, who assess the feature of the product and produce a draft price quote 
report for the sales team. A sample of the price report is presented in Figure 6-
2.  
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Figure 6-2: Sample of cost report 
 
The price report follows a cost-plus model, which contains information such as a 
picture of the product, types of raw material used, the amounts of raw material 
for each product consumed, its cost, the loss rate, the manufacturing costs, the 
labour costs, and the default factory profit. Therefore, the whole cost and the 
profit margin are apparent and fixed. In addition, relevant ratios, such as loss 
rate, manufactory/labour costs per unit, and default profit rate, are initially 
estimated by the senior management: 
 
Manufacturing cost includes the cost incurred during the 
manufacturing processes. I am not sure about what this cost 
comprises. The rate is determined by managers, and the unit cost is 
based on the width of the bandages. This is the formula, and I don't 
really know the logic behind it. Managers decide these issues, and we 
have to follow the formula. (CA). 
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Shareholder B was heavily involved in the design of the formula and 
determination of the rates due to his rich knowledge of the raw material and 
production procedures. He briefly expressed his opinions on how cost should be 
handled: 
 
We update the manufacturing cost per unit on an annual basis. 
However, we used the expected figures to calculate the cost instead 
of using historical data. This is a different job for an accountant. It 
will be too late if you let accountants calculate it. To make things 
efficient, we apply the formula. 
 
It is interesting to see how the shareholders understood the role of the 
accountant in the transfer pricing process. These instances suggest that cost 
accountants are powerless in the process of cost calculation. On the one hand, 
cost accountants use these figures on a daily basis; however, on the other hand, 
they do not understand the figures. Therefore, they cannot be regarded as the 
active actors in the transfer pricing system. In contrast, shareholder B, who only 
had an overview the organisation, understood the figures better than most of 
the staff in the division. Since the shareholders’ concern was work efficiency, he 
decided to provide a fixed figure for accountants when producing the price 
quotation report.  
 
Once the report has been produced, it is sent to the factory manager for 
evaluation. He can be regarded as a regular actor in transfer pricing. With some 
understanding of the price, he is able to fill the knowledge gap and provide the 
necessary adjustment to the report. My fieldnote documented the role of factory 
manager in the process: 
 
Factory manager will double check the price quotes prepared by 
costing accountants. He may adjust some material price rate 
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according to the newest update and adjust the price to their 
acceptable range. He always suggests the price he thinks is 
acceptable to costing accountant. 
 
The approved price quote report is then sent back to the sales team as the 
initial transfer price offer. The transfer price is quite sensitive for the sales 
staff. They assess the price report and evaluate the price based on several 
criteria: 1) the available target price provided by customers, 2) the target price 
by the break-even point of the sales division, and 3) their own profit margin. 
According to the sales staff, some long-term clients provide and adjust their 
target price on an annual basis while some clients provide their target price 
when sending their enquiries. In this case, the customer’s target price is 
prioritised as the reference. If such a price is not available, the sales team 
judges the price based on their break-even point, which is seven percent. The 
internal operation system is designed so that every order must meet the break-
even point to proceed further. Besides the pressure from the internal system, 
the sales staff have to consider their own profit margin because staff earn a 
bonus for every percentage of profit above the break-even point. This means 
that the greater the profit margin they have, the larger the bonus they will 
receive. Therefore, the profit margin becomes an important agenda for all sales 
staff. 
 
While this is so, negotiation of the transfer pricing becomes common. If the sales 
staff are not happy with the initial transfer price provided by the factory, they 
negotiate with the factory staff. Usually, such negotiations are initiated between 
low-grade staff – costing accountants and sales staff, for example. They highlight 
their issues and requirements to each other through email and always forward 
the conversations to their managers, making sure that middle-level managers 
are aware of the negotiation processes and outcomes. However, although low-
grade staff are the ones who initiate the negotiation process, it seems that they 
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don't have sufficient decision-making capabilities. When facing conflicts, it is a 
common practice for low-grade staff to forward the issues to management level. 
Interviews and observations revealed that they are concerned not only about the 
competitiveness of the price but also about the fair allocation of profit between 
them. Therefore, justification of the proposed price is known to be challenging 
among managers. Since the meaningful negotiation and discussion usually 
happens between middle-level managers, they became the main contributors to 
the transfer pricing process. Although they do not proceed with many of the 
price quotations directly, their negotiations can determine the final transfer 
pricing. 
 
The basic discussion on the new transfer pricing system reveals big differences 
between the current system and its original purpose. While the previous transfer 
pricing system was mainly concerned about tax avoidance and was driven by the 
senior management, the reformed system serves more purposes, including profit 
allocation, communication, and performance measurement. Based on this, it 
seems that accounting-based controls at PLT started to emerge. Thus, the 
transformation of the organisational structure reshaped the transfer pricing 
system into a totally different practice. However, as hinted in the above 
discussion, some politics were observed to play a part in the process. In 
particular, the default profit margin in the factory and the bonus system in the 
sales division caused conflicts among managers. Unfortunately, further 
investigation on transfer pricing practices revealed that it is a fragile practice 
with conflicting principles. This will be discussed in the following sections.  
 
6.4.1 Fragile arrangement for new transfer pricing 
The above discussion has provided a basic understanding of the procedure of the 
transfer pricing system at PLT. Although it could be seen as a basic full-cost 
based model with some negotiation mechanisms, further investigation revealed 
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that it is a rather fragile and self-conflicting system dominated by conflicting 
principles and system designs, which usually leads the negotiation to a dead end. 
 
Conflicted ideological principle 
Despite there being no theoretical principle guiding the whole procedure, it 
seems that the emerged transfer pricing system follows a mix of full-cost and 
market-based methods. On the one hand, the factory calculated the full cost of 
the product and added the default profit margin onto the cost, which suggests a 
full-cost method was in place. On the other hand, the market price was 
considered during the process. The sales team used the customer’s market price 
as their primary benchmark when assessing the transfer price. In addition, 
shareholders claimed that the two divisions both had a certain degree of 
autonomy in terms of their choices of suppliers and customers despite their close 
links. Thus, the internal transfer/supply was not the only source of supply for 
the sales division while the factory was also allowed to sell their products 
externally to organisations other than the sales division. In an ideal situation, 
the market price should be used as a reference point for both divisions to make 
rational decisions on internal or external trade.  
 
The ambiguity of the transfer pricing principle was caused by the different 
ideologies held by shareholders. Firstly, the ideology of a market-based 
mechanism was strongly supported by shareholder A. He provided me with an 
example of the topic when I asked him about the internal pricing issue in the 
group: 
 
If you sell a cup, the factory wants to get 15% of the profit, and the 
trading company wants to get another 15% of the profit. However, 
the market only gives you space for 10% of the profit. If you are only 
able to earn 1 yuan but you want to earn 3 yuan, then you cannot 
even earn that 1 yuan. The problem is how much the market allows 
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you to earn. For example, as a trading company, you can only earn 1 
yuan; if you want to have 3 yuan, the money will be earned by 
others. Therefore, everything is driven by the market. You have to 
follow the market trend. For example, if you want to come and work 
here now, we will give you 10,000 yuan. If you want 11,000 yuan, 
then we will not hire you. Therefore, the market decides the price, 
not us. If the factory quotes the wrong price, then they will not get 
the order, which means that you cannot even get that 10% of profit. 
(S-A) 
 
This is a fascinating and vivid example of how shareholder A understood the 
concept of ‘market’ and how he applied his ideology to the transfer pricing 
system. Shareholder A believed that the market always determines the ‘right’ 
price for them. Therefore, both divisions should understand the market price 
and accept their profit margins as given by the market. In contrast, the group 
that does not follow the market trend should be punished. Supporting his 
ideology of doing transfer pricing in the group, shareholder A also claimed that 
the two divisions were operating separately, which means that both parties had 
the right to search for alternative external suppliers/customers. However, it 
seems that the shareholder also did not have the full commitment to apply 
market-based approach: 
 
Yes, we also ask the price from other factories; if the price from 
them is lower, then our factory should follow their price. We also 
work with other factories such as [xxx]. However, if we buy from 
other factories, we have to pay first, so there is more risk. You see, 
everything has two sides, it is not only the problem of the price. 
Therefore, to be a good salesman/manager, you must think 
comprehensively. Instead of looking at the question from one point of 
view, people should examine different issues, such as information 
securities, business secrets. For example, I may have a new product 
that I don’t want others to know about; then, our own factory is the 
only place to produce it. So many factory and sales staff only 
understand the issues on a superficial level. It is not a simple issue, 
Steve. (S-A) 
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Due to the potential risks associated with other suppliers, he still viewed 
internal transfer as the safest way to produce and transfer products. It seems 
that the market ideology did not fully transfer to the transfer pricing system at 
PLT. Consequently, the ideal form of transfer pricing can be an ambiguous one. 
While market price may mainly serve as the price benchmark for the internal 
transfer price, external trade has to be carefully examined before proceeding. 
 
On the other hand, shareholder B adopted a full-cost principle as the foundation 
for the transfer pricing system in the factory side: 
 
We should just follow the current formula. It is fine that we share 
our cost information with them. They can earn 100% of profit if they 
can. If they can’t earn a profit, they should blame themselves. They 
can’t just laugh when earning money and negotiate with us when they 
are not getting a profit. They should judge for themselves. If they 
think that a certain customer is very important, then you should 
prepare to suffer some loss in the beginning. (S-B) 
 
Clearly, shareholder B did not agree with the market-based principle and 
preferred a more stable transfer pricing system. Thus, he established a cost-
based transfer pricing principle for the factory and set a default 10% profit 
margin. Normally, staff are not allowed to go under or above the margin. His 
rationale was that, by adding a fixed profit margin, transfer pricing became less 
relevant to the market price and was more consistent and stable. Such a solution 
provided a clear accountability principle in the group. While the factory was 
accountable for providing a stable price with a fixed formula, the sales division 
should be responsible for external negotiation with potential customers.  
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That said, negotiation of the transfer price from the sales division was regarded 
as a disgrace. Shareholder B believed that he had already made a compromise 
and that he had done the sales division a favour by setting a fixed profit margin: 
 
My idea is that I still want to let Shanghai gain some profit to recover 
the loss from the past [during the CEO’s era]. I have discussed the 
issue and made the decision, and you should just do your thing. 
However, they still want to negotiate the price. I have made enough 
compromise and let them gain some profit; that’s done. If they have 
time, they should negotiate the price with external parties. (S-B) 
 
This was expressed with frustration since it shows that shareholder B generally 
believed that a full-cost based principle should be ideal for efficiency. 
Therefore, negotiation of the transfer price was meaningless for the shareholder. 
Instead, he held the view that the sales division should focus on improving their 
own ability for negotiating with external parties such as customers and external 
factories instead of the internal factory. 
 
Such a contradictory observation signifies different ideologies driving the 
transfer pricing process. The market-based principle promoted by shareholder A 
drives the transfer pricing process in the sales division. While he appreciated the 
power of the market, the competitiveness of the transfer price had become 
important. Naturally, negotiations must occur in order to get the best price 
possible. On the other hand, Shareholder B established a cost-based transfer 
pricing principle for the factory. The transfer price was determined by adding a 
fixed profit margin onto the full cost. This signified the irrelevance of the 
market price and was contradictory to the market-based principle applied in the 
sales division. 
 
169 
 
The existence of different ideologies between shareholders means that neither 
transfer pricing principle would work as intended. As demonstrated by Ashraf 
and Uddin, (2015), a conflicted ideology and interests may result in a fragile 
alliance between dominant groups, which causes the implementation of rushed 
and unfair organisational systems. Similarly, the contradictory ideologies 
between shareholders later reflected in the issues of the daily transfer pricing 
practice.  
 
Conflicted compromises in practice 
Conflict between the shareholders on transfer pricing principles had a direct 
influence on the practice of transfer pricing. As both shareholders had great 
power in the group, contradictory ideologies were able to co-exist in the 
transfer pricing system. Different compromises and strategies were made by the 
shareholders in the actual practice of transfer pricing. 
 
First of all, the market-based principle and ideal autonomy was heavily 
constrained in the factory. A full-cost approach promoted by shareholder B in the 
factory constrained the benchmarking function of the market price in transfer 
pricing. Thus, although the market price may be higher than their default price, 
the factory manager has no choice but to offer a lower pre-determined price to 
the sales division. This was difficult for the manager to accept, but they had no 
alternative: 
 
We don't have a simple supplier and customer relationship because we 
are both monitored by our boss (shareholders). We are not operating 
independently. We don't have the power to decide the price. Although 
we have independent accounting systems, I only get a 10% profit from 
the internal transfer. At the same time, it is impossible for us to add 
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only a 10% profit for external customers. For example, I am able to 
gain 30% ~40% profit from our own external customer. This customer 
was originally introduced by the sales division. (Factory manager) 
 
As a result, the manager had to behave differently to the sales division and to 
external customers during price negotiations. Thus, the ideal autonomy was 
indeed nominal to them anyway. The division simply did not have the capability 
for external trade. Without a proper sales department, the factory relied solely 
on the sales division for customer development. This further discouraged the use 
of a market-based transfer pricing in the factory: 
 
We don't have the resources to find our own clients, and the board 
doesn't allow us to do so. We don't have many external clients. Some 
of them were from other contracts. In some cases, we used to 
manufacture other products for them through the sales division, but 
they want to work with us directly instead of going through a trading 
company now. (FM) 
 
On the other hand, some autonomy on sourcing was encouraged in the sales 
division. With a proper purchasing department, the division was able to search 
and negotiate with external suppliers, which was in line with the market-based 
principle promoted by Shareholder A. However, the sales division always 
purchased one of their main products – bandages from the factory. While 
bandages account for over 60% of the annual sales, this means that the factory 
was still the biggest supplier for the sales division. This came from the pressure 
given by shareholder B. While the two divisions were regarded as a family, the 
avoidance of any internal supply was seen as a disgrace. Due to the absolute 
power held by the shareholders, staff did not have the courage to alter the 
decisions: ‘It is impossible to buy (bandages) externally, the factory will be 
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ruined if we buy from other factories, their 70% ~ 80% of the orders are from 
us’ (OM). 
 
When I enquired if they asked for price quotations from other factories, the 
operations manager provided an interesting answer: 
 
We don't have the courage to do that. We will be ‘dead’ if 
shareholder B knows about it. He will be like, ‘How dare you ask for 
prices from other factories.’ This is a subtle relationship. If the lips 
are lost, the teeth will be cold. (OM) 
 
Thus, intervention from shareholders led to a nominal autonomy in the sales 
division. On the one hand, shareholder B constantly put pressure on the sales 
division to purchase products from the internal factory. On the other hand, 
shareholder A also discouraged the purchase of important products from external 
factories because of his risk preference. In an economic sense, it seems that 
market-based transfer pricing did not fit the organisational purpose. While 
market price and external sales /supply were not always encouraged, a full-cost 
approach could be appropriate for PLT to efficiently operate a transfer pricing 
system without conflict.  
 
However, the negotiation between divisions still existed. In fact, complaints 
could be heard almost every day during my field visit in both divisions. Different 
complaints and excuses can be found in the fieldnotes and interviews. For 
example, one discussion of the transfer price between the factory manager and 
the sales manager is documented in the field dairy. 
 
172 
 
Factory manager complains to sales manager that they cannot ask too 
much just because they are in the same group. Sales manager, 
however, complains about the cost calculation methods from the 
factory side. On the other hand, factory manager thinks that the 
factory is already more standardised than some of the external 
factories. Therefore, calculation should be accurate enough for them. 
 
While the sales manager always tried to negotiate the price by addressing 
different issues, the factory manager always stressed that the procedure from 
the sales division was not appropriate. He believed that the 10% default profit 
was the standard procedure for transfer pricing. Therefore, such a procedure 
should not be changed or challenged. Due to the unavailability of a market 
price, the negotiation was built on the arguments with various rationales, 
including work load, external comparison, accuracy of number, or even previous 
favours. This signifies the transfer pricing practice was a political practice for 
managers as no clear principles/patterns could be found during the negotiation. 
Managers only constructed the arguments with their favourable rationales to 
attack and counter-attack each other while neither of them was able to 
convince any others in most of the cases. 
 
The above discussion illustrates a rather fragile operation of transfer pricing at 
PLT. While different transfer pricing principles co-existed in different divisions, 
the practice was full of ambiguity and contradictions. It was observed that 
shareholders’ actions played an important part in this. While they implemented 
different principles based on their own ideas of an ideal transfer pricing 
principle, their intervention on system design and constraints on autonomic 
practice created ambiguities in daily practice. As a result, the transfer pricing 
system became inefficient and political for managers. 
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It seemed that there was no cooperation between shareholders. Instead of 
working together to improve the transfer pricing system, their intervention 
actually constrained each other’s policies. They reinforced their own ideal 
principles in their respective divisions and tried to constrain the development of 
other ideologies at the same time. This signifies a conflicting relationship 
between them. Therefore, it becomes important to examine the relationship 
between the shareholders in order to understand how this fragile arrangement of 
transfer pricing system emerged. 
 
6.5 Conflicted hegemonic arrangement 
The above discussion explored the process of the transfer pricing system at PLT. 
It also demonstrated its conflicting principles and compromises in practice. 
Mostly importantly, it raised the question of how the hegemonic relationship 
between the shareholders shaped this fragile arrangement of transfer pricing. 
While the departure of the CEO triggered the hegemonic crisis and led to the 
new hegemonic arrangement formed by the two shareholders, their actions 
became increasingly influential and had serious implications for the design of the 
transfer pricing system. 
 
On analysing the social condition of private enterprise in Chinese organisations, 
the dominance of business owners as a hegemonic social group is apparent. The 
previous discussion also shows the influence of shareholders on the operation of 
PLT. For a hegemony to prevail, the establishment of a ‘common will’ is 
essential. While it is obviously important for dominant groups to win consent 
from subordinate groups, dominant groups must reach agreement to apply 
coherent hegemonic strategies. Therefore, a shared ideology and interest 
becomes important for them. However, as with the initial transfer pricing 
system, the current transfer pricing system at PLT become another hegemonic 
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strategy for power, which is reflected by conflicted interest and compromise 
between two shareholders. 
 
6.5.1 Conflicted interest 
As discussed in the previous section, the departure of the CEO meant that a new 
hegemonic arrangement was necessary to reproduce a similar form of hegemony 
at PLT. While shareholder B continued to lead the factory division, shareholder 
A’s wife, who was the COO of the group, took over the sales division and made 
several managerial changes, which contributed to the emergence of a new 
transfer pricing system. Thus, it can be said that the shareholders formed a new 
‘power bloc’ in the group. However, the interviews and observations with both 
shareholders revealed that they had quite different interests and future plans. 
 
On the one hand, shareholder A believed that the international market was the 
future vision for the business. He originally started his business by establishing 
an international trading company and was always trying to expand his export 
business. As part of his plan to develop the organisation, he had established a US 
division in 2011, and he was still managing the division until the time of the 
interviews. After stabilising the operation of the trading division, the COO also 
moved to the US to help with the financial management, and their daughter was 
also working in the US division as an accountant. 
 
In addition, it was well-known that shareholder A had put noticeable resources 
and effort into developing the US division. As a result, the US division became 
very powerful in the whole group. During a lunch I shared with staff in the sales 
division, staff discussed their view of their US division. According to my diary for 
the lunch: 
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They think that the US division is above the Chinese divisions. The US 
company has just requested a more detailed pricing report including 
everything so that they can make sure that the Chinese divisions do 
not get any profit from them. However, staff think that these kinds of 
requests are inappropriate. If they asked external suppliers to do the 
same, nobody would do it for them. Therefore, they think that the US 
division is acting like their ‘dad’ whom they cannot ignore. 
 
The superior standing of the trading division was also felt by the factory 
manager, who commented: 
 
Shanghai and the US division do not always follow the procedure or ask 
shareholder A to give us pressure. This makes the work undoable 
because we will not know the issues they are concerned about. Once 
the shareholder knows the conflict we are having, I have to spend the 
time to explain things again, which is a waste of time. (FM) 
 
It is interesting to see that shareholder A openly put more effort into developing 
his US division and intentionally put pressure on divisions in China to cooperate 
with the requests from the US division to realise his interests. This shows his 
strong desire to develop the US market as his major ambition and interest.  
 
During the interview with shareholder A, he claimed that his business partner 
(shareholder B) shared the same ideology on how to develop the organisation 
with him. However, interviews with shareholder B revealed that he clearly had 
different business interests. During our casual conservations when I spent 2 
weeks with him, he shared a lot of his business ideas which were mostly related 
to developing the domestic market. For instance, during the first day of my 
observation, he spent a lot of time talking about his new business idea with me. 
The field summary of this one-and-a-half-hour discussion shows that he wanted 
to develop retail stores in China to push the group forward. In his opinion, the 
business model for medicine stores in China is out-dated, and a new model could 
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be applied to the market. Therefore, there was a good opportunity to promote 
their own-branded products in the domestic market. This implied a focus on 
developing the retail industry in the domestic market as shareholder B’s primary 
interest.  
 
When I asked him if he shared his plans with shareholder A, his response further 
confirmed their different interests: 
 
Our investment in the US doesn't pay for itself yet; we have invested 
over 3 million yuan. Now they are investing in the online market to see 
how it goes. I want to do ‘new retail’, and he wants to copy the success 
of the online platform in the US. However, we hold only 20% of the 
shares in that project [in the US]. We can earn only a small amount to 
cover the previous investment in the US division. Therefore, our 
directions are different, but we also acknowledge each other. I like to 
be in China. Although I got the ‘Green card’ in the US, I don't like it. 
There are more opportunities in China. It is ok if they only do the online 
market in the US. However, I have to do both online and traditional 
markets in China. (S-B) 
 
It is obvious that shareholder B did not prefer the business approach adopted by 
his partner. He thought that their US project only consumed a great amount of 
money without realising enough profit. He also acknowledged the different 
directions they were heading in.  Although both shareholders emphasised that 
they respected each other, and each acknowledged the work of the other, it 
seems that their interests and observed actions were clearly not in the same 
direction. Hence, conflicts between the shareholders became inevitable since 
they had different personal goals to achieve. While the political basis of 
hegemony is rooted in balancing compromise and maintaining the essential 
political and economic cores of hegemony and different economic interests 
indeed made it hard for the shareholders to exercise a coherent hegemony. 
While shareholder B disclosed his dislike of his partner’s business plan, it became 
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difficult to satisfy the economic interests of both shareholders. As a result, they 
may aim to create their own favourable conditions for their own maximum 
expansion with a limited concern for the interests of others. 
 
Apparently, the conflict between two shareholders was also rumoured amongst 
staff. On one occasion when I was talking about the profit arrangement with a 
sale staff member, I said: 
 
For the shareholders, it [profit arrangement] should not matter 
right? Because it is the group’s profit at the end of the day’. 
However, he responded with˖’maybe that’s not the case, shareholder 
A may have more shares in trading company and shareholder B may 
have more share in the factory. (SS-1) 
 
On another day, the same staff member commented further about his opinions of 
the relationship between the shareholders: 
 
I feel that Shareholder A and the COO must want the trading 
company to have more profits. They must; they just pretend that 
they don't care about it. I suppose that they can use the money more 
easily in Shanghai, and the group’s money is not the same thing. The 
money isn’t your money unless it gets into your pocket. But it is just 
our guess; nobody will know the details. (SS-1) 
 
The implication here is that the shareholders may try to secure their own profit 
due to their personal interest, just like how they secured the profit from the 
CEO. With the emergence of a different form of hegemony, a new hegemonic 
struggle also emerged at the same time. The hegemonic struggle between the 
dominant groups then led to the use of transfer pricing as a hegemonic strategy 
for power, instead of coherent control. As a result, conflicting compromises were 
178 
 
exercised by both shareholders with the aim of securing the consent of their 
staff.  
 
6.5.2 Conflicting compromises 
In chapter 3, I discussed how consent is not an unconscious agreement, but 
instead, it arises from a degree of conscious attachment to certain core 
elements of hegemony. Therefore, certain compromises have to be made to 
manage the unstable balance between the hegemonic group and the 
subordinated group. In the case of PLT, conflicting compromises were made in 
the two divisions by shareholders in order to sustain their own leadership and 
motivate staff to pursue each shareholder’s own interests. 
 
As I discussed in the previous section, the decentralisation of the organisation is 
one of the strategic decisions that senior management made during the change 
process in order to create a new organisational structure which suited their 
vision. This reshaped the hegemony into a new arrangement formed by the two 
shareholders. Such a hegemonic arrangement also came with implications for a 
new performance measurement system.    
 
In the sales division, the discussion with various staff members revealed that the 
organisation applied a rather simple performance measurement system. The 
salary bonus of the sales staff was directly linked to the profit they make for 
each contract. While 8% of the profit ratio was the break-even point for the 
organisation, the staff could get a direct bonus cut of 2% for any extra profit 
they made. Therefore, the system encouraged staff to maximise their profit. 
This system was also received positively among staff. As sales manager 
commented: 
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The bonus system did have some motivation effect on staff, and I am 
more sensitive to prices. Before the policy was established, everyone 
was not sensitive to the price and did not actually care much about 
the profit we got because it was kind of irrelevant to us. (SM) 
 
This bonus system had two implication for shareholder A’s hegemony. On the one 
hand, the improved financial reward was beneficial for him to gain consent and 
prestige among subordinated groups. On the other hand, it provided a ‘common 
will’ between shareholder and staff in the sales division, which maximised 
divisional profit. While staff could gain a bigger bonus with more profit, 
shareholder A was able to reach a more favourable position in the hegemonic 
struggle as he would have control over profit.  
 
On the other hand, shareholder B also counter-attacked the strategies applied 
by his counterpart. He applied a similar performance measurement system in the 
factory. The performance of middle-level managers including the factory 
manager and production manager also depended on the profit they made while 
10% profit ratio was determined as their standard profit margin. For production 
manager in the factory, this created problems. When I asked if their 
performance was based on the profit, he answered: 
 
Yes, and this is the problem. If we use the joint performance system 
to evaluate us and the Shanghai staff collectively, then we can avoid 
the problem we are having now. However, this can lead to other 
problems. For example, if two companies consume the profit 
unevenly, for example, the sales divisions had an annual dinner for 
2000 yuan, and we had an annual dinner for 1000 yuan, then it makes 
things unfair. (PM) 
 
While the manager found their performance system problematic, they could not 
propose any better alternatives because they still considered their own benefit 
over that of others. Therefore, the managers were all trapped in a vicious circle. 
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It is fascinating to realise that hegemonic conflicts between the shareholders 
actually could be passed down to the managers through the influence of the 
performance measurement system and the transfer pricing system. While the 
performance measurement system was linked to their personal livelihood, the 
transfer pricing became the only place for them to realise their interests. While 
the managers struggled to secure their individual interests, they were actually 
trying to secure the shareholders’ interests at the same time. This further 
proved the point that transfer pricing was working as a political practice for 
managers. 
 
It seems that the conflicted compromise from the shareholders influenced the 
attitude of staff towards the different divisions and generated consent for their 
representative ‘leaders’. While I was chatting with one of the sale staff, he 
expressed his position on the relationship between the two shareholders and his 
position in their relationship: 
 
Sometimes, I think about the actual relationship between these two 
divisions. I think that the sales division is led by shareholder A, and 
the factory is mainly led by shareholder B. I, who am employed by 
the sales division, must seek the benefit on behalf of the sales 
division, and this division’s benefit is also linked to my own benefit 
because my KPI is linked to it. (SS-1) 
 
On the other hand, similar comments were also made by the factory manager:  
 
If I seek help from shareholder B, he will fight for some benefit for 
us. However, shareholder A is also a big shareholder. So what 
shareholder B can do is limited. … I feel that shareholder A is in 
favour of the sales division. For example, when the sales division 
doesn't secure a customer, he won’t say much. However, if there is 
some issue in the factory, he will complain a lot. But he is not a 
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manager here, but he is just a shareholder, in principle he does not 
have the right to say anything. (FM) 
 
The above excerpts show that staff in both divisions had their own identity in 
the organisation. They both recognised that they were led by different 
shareholders and therefore must seek own benefit and not the group benefits. 
This also implies that compromises by the shareholders were able to generate 
consent among their respective staff in different divisions and create ‘common 
will’ within the division. As a result, it can be said that different forms of 
hegemonies were generated in the group as the consent of subordinate groups 
was generated toward different hegemonic individuals. Transfer pricing practice 
is then used by shareholders as a hegemonic strategy to gain power in the 
organisation. This means that a conflict in the transfer pricing system became 
inevitable. Transfer pricing system became a ‘battleground’ for the hegemonic 
struggle between the shareholders while managers acted as the agents of the 
different shareholders. This, then, explains the fragile arrangement of transfer 
pricing.  
 
6.6 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has explored the development of transfer pricing at PLT, and in 
particular, how hegemony can be seen during the process. The findings suggest 
that transfer pricing at PLT was developed in response to different form of 
hegemony. The chapter firstly looked at the original design of transfer pricing at 
PLT. On the one hand, transfer pricing was deemed a tax-driven system and so 
was irrelevant to any management control mechanism. Management control was 
achieved by the paternalistic governance exercised by senior management. On 
the other hand, transfer pricing served as a cash allocation tool for senior 
management, where tensions were created. The departure of the CEO signified 
the transformation of the organisational structure. This period witnessed 
organisational strategic change and the rise of middle-level management. This 
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led to the emergence of a new form of transfer pricing system which served 
multiple functions including communication, performance measurement, and 
profit allocation. However, interviews and observations revealed that it was 
actually a fragile system with conflicting principles, ambiguous guidelines, and 
intervention from senior management. The influence of shareholders in the 
transfer pricing process demonstrated their power, which led to a further 
investigation. Different personal interests and conflicting designs of the 
performance system were observed as a result. This finding echoes other 
historical analysis on accounting development which identified that accounting 
reflects and constitute the ideological framework of the prevailing hegemony 
(e.g. Goddard, 2002; Yee, 2009; Xu, Cortese and Zhang, 2014).  
 
However, different from the previous studies, transfer pricing not only reflected 
the prevailing hegemony, but was also actively involved in hegemonic struggles 
when competing hegemonies co-exist. The findings show that the transfer 
pricing practice at PLT was used by dominant groups as hegemonic strategy for 
the battle of power. The initial form of transfer pricing can be associated with 
the horizontal hegemonic relationship between the dominant groups formed by 
the CEO and shareholders without the participation of subordinate groups. 
Transfer pricing system under their hegemony marked the power struggle 
between the shareholders and the CEO. It is found that shareholders utilised 
transfer pricing system to secure financial recourses and restrain the power of 
the CEO. However, the departure of the CEO triggered the ‘hegemonic crisis’ 
when a reformed hegemony was needed to reshape hegemony and form new sets 
of ideologies (Simons, 2015). As a result, the shareholder formed a new power 
bloc with serious implications for a new organisational structure. However, 
different personal interests and ideologies between shareholders signified the 
emergence of new hegemonic struggles at PLT. Consequently, transfer pricing 
was again used by different dominant individuals as their hegemonic strategies 
in the battle of power. Conflicting compromises were provided by the dominant 
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groups to generate consent among the different actors in order to reshape the 
hegemony and form new sets of ideology in their own favour (Simon, 2015). The 
conflicting hegemonic strategies resulted in a fragile arrangement of transfer 
pricing. For senior management, it provided a strategy to solve the hegemonic 
struggle. However, it became a different story for the subordinate groups. 
Managers were left in an awkward position where they were motivated to seek 
the shareholder’s interests and could not escape from the ambiguous 
negotiations of transfer price because of interventions from senior management. 
 
The next chapter continues the discussion of the transfer pricing practice at PLT 
but focuses on the daily sense-making process staff adopted to understand the 
operation of transfer pricing. It also aims to discover how subordinate groups 
generated consent or resistance under the hegemony. The analysis explores how 
common-sense and good-sense were adopted by different actors during the 
transfer pricing practice. 
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Chapter 7: Sense making of hegemonic transfer pricing 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 analysed how structural hegemonic ideologies in the cultural-political 
context of China determined the power relationship between the dominant 
group (business owners) and the dominated group (staff) in a Chinese private 
organisation. Taking this macro analysis into the local context of PLT, chapter 6 
explored the development of the transfer pricing practice at PLT. It emphasised 
that the emergence of transfer pricing practice was not the outcome of the 
organisational and economical rationalities. Instead, it was constructed by 
dynamic hegemonic relationships between the dominant groups and the 
dominated groups. Based on the previous analysis, this final analysis chapter 
concludes the analysis by exploring the sense-making process of the dominated 
groups in the hegemonic context.  
 
Drawing on the concepts of ‘common sense’ and ‘good sense’ as defined by 
Gramsci (1971), this chapter depicts the daily life of a subordinated group under 
hegemony to see how hegemony is reproduced through these dual concepts. To 
do so, the chapter is organised as follows. Section two examines the 
contradictions of the common-sense views adopted by managers in different 
divisions and their influence on transfer price negotiations. Section three reports 
the self-contradictory good sense of managers and the way in which it is applied 
in transfer pricing negotiations. This is followed by section four, which analyses 
the use of dialectical senses in relation to the reproduction of hegemony. The 
final section summarises the issues addressed. 
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7.2 Common sense views 
Drawing on hegemonic ideologies of the dominant groups, common sense 
describes a widely accepted and uncritical way of understanding the world by 
subordinated groups. It explains how consent can be generated and how 
hegemony can be sustained. In a global context, the notion of marketisation, 
globalisation, and neoliberalism can be regarded as forms of ‘common sense’ for 
state hegemony (Mantzari and Georgiou, 2019). These common-sense views 
provide the ideological foundations for the diffusion of hegemonic accounting 
practices such as the adoption of IFRS in a global context. While common sense 
usually refers to wider uncritical beliefs existing in society, Gramsci (1971) also 
recognised that, in a local context (such as at PLT), the philosophical 
consciousness of dominant groups always has the potential to become a type of 
common sense if they are able to diffuse and connect it into people’s daily lives 
(see section 3.4.4).  
 
As common sense is derived from the hegemonic ideologies of dominant groups, 
it is important to examine their ideologies. The previous chapter has already 
illustrated the different ideologies adopted by different dominant individuals 
(shareholders) at PLT. While shareholder A held the ideologies of marketisation in 
designing transfer pricing, shareholder B believed in a cost-based approach 
because of its clear accountability. This pluralistic character of hegemonic 
ideologies had significant implications for the daily practice of transfer pricing. 
As I demonstrated in the previous chapter, both ideologies somehow co-existed 
in the transfer pricing practice. Thus, the important types of common-sense will 
concentrate on two main aspects: first, marketisation, and second, cost 
centralisation and clear accountability. Instances of staff meetings and daily 
discussions on transfer pricing were analysed to understand how staff made 
sense of transfer price negotiation based on these. 
 
186 
 
7.2.1 Diverse views during negotiation 
The design of the transfer pricing system at PLT was characterised by the 
hegemonic relations between two dominant individuals (see Chapter 6) and was 
used as hegemonic strategies for power by them. With the existence of 
conflicting interest, the transfer pricing system was designed to motivate 
managers to further the personal interests of the shareholders. A fragile 
arrangement of transfer pricing means that managers could not escape from the 
system. This created a social space for the uses of common sense which 
reproduced the hegemonic struggle happening in the organisation.  
 
During my time at PLT, occasional meetings were held for managers to exchange 
information and discuss issues in transfer pricing negotiation. This is one of the 
social spaces where staff use common sense to negotiate transfer price. While 
such meetings were regarded as important by staff in both divisions, they were 
quite informal and flexible, just as most of the practices in the group. The 
meetings were not regularly scheduled and were usually organised based on the 
convenience of both parties, for example, when sales team needed to go to the 
factory for a customer inspection or when the factory manager needed to go to 
the sales division for other business meetings. Due to this informal nature, the 
attendance was usually inconsistent. However, factory managers and sales 
managers would always be present to lead the meeting. I encountered two of 
those meetings during my fieldwork – one at the beginning of the fieldwork and 
one at the end of the fieldwork. To highlight the managers’ diverse views during 
transfer pricing negotiations, I am going to discuss the first meeting I 
encountered, which was held in the sales division in February 2017, just eight 
days after I had entered the field. The meeting was quite informal but with 
tensions. It was informal because people sometimes divided up into small groups 
and talked at the same time. Tensions came from the intense discussions with 
different arguments and counter-arguments about transfer pricing issues. This 
event provided me with a good opportunity to observe how the managers 
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understood transfer pricing differently and how they negotiated the transfer 
price in real time.  
 
The observation of the meeting revealed different views towards transfer pricing 
between the managers in the meeting, which indicates the existence of 
different common-sense views. For managers from the factory division, the 
rationale for negotiating a higher transfer price usually concentrated on cost-
related issues, such as higher labour costs, material costs, and administration 
costs. The selection of excerpts below provides a vivid taste of how the 
managers negotiated the transfer price: 
 
FM: ‘We are losing profit for some of the internal orders. For some 
products, we just bought from other factories and pack them. All the 
costs are transparent. If the volume is large, and it is long-term, we 
are able to organise it. However, if the volume is low, like 3000 to 
4000 units, our labour cost will increase dramatically. We have to set 
up things. We are losing money for your small contracts.’ 
 
SM: ‘However, some customers came because they visited our factory 
and liked our factory’s standardisation. We cannot find alternative 
external factories in those cases.’ 
 
FM: ‘In those cases, you have to leave enough profit for us. Your 
small orders are usually quite awkward for us. We sometimes have to 
schedule overtime work on Sunday to deal with your orders, which 
doubles the labour cost.’ 
 
FM: ‘For some customers, it may involve management costs like the 
preparation of certificates.’ 
 
OM: ‘If we can find an external factory which is cheaper, we will ask 
them to do the packaging. However, if other factories do not have the 
capabilities, we will still ask you and we can deal with the labour 
cost based on your way.’ 
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The negotiation of the transfer price in the meeting revealed the prioritisation 
of cost coverage for the factory manager. Numerous mentions of ‘labour cost’ in 
this short selection of excerpts showed how the factory manager understood 
transfer pricing from a cost perspective. When negotiating the transfer price, he 
tended to assess the price offers based on the cost structure of particular 
orders. For instance, the orders with small volume were regarded as costly and 
inefficient, and a higher transfer price became necessary. In fact, cost coverage 
was a core criterion for the factory manager in deciding whether to accept the 
transfer price or not. There was a common sentiment that the cost of the 
product provided a hard ‘benchmark’ for the transfer price. The inevitability of 
the cost meant that any price below cost was not acceptable for the factory 
manager: 
 
SS-2: ‘One order was pushed back from the system because you 
increased the transfer price after signing the internal contract, why 
is that?’ 
 
PM: ‘Because we cannot cover the cost. Now you can all calculate the 
labour cost; you can try to calculate it by yourself. It is clear that 
that price was not high enough. This is a fact. You can leave us no 
profit, but the hole will be bigger and bigger, and it is not a good 
thing.’ 
 
Cost coverage was central in legitimising transfer pricing decisions and was 
deeply embedded in the rationale of an appropriate transfer price for factory 
managers. On the other hand, managers from the sales division tended to justify 
their transfer price decision from a rather different perspective. During the 
negotiation, the sales managers usually counter-attacked the cost-based 
arguments by using arguments from market perspective. For instance, customer 
related issues had been used extensively to justify the need for a lower transfer 
price, despite the increase in cost. They argued that the transfer price should be 
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directly related to the customer’s target price. If the customer did not accept 
the price, then the increase of cost should not be justified. Following the 
arguments raised by the production manager above, the sales managers actually 
counter-attacked the cost-based argument by saying: 
 
SS-2: ‘Yes now we are absorbing this money by ourselves. Therefore, 
either you re-negotiate all the prices, telling me that you will 
increase the price from next year, listing all your items and tell me 
the price. Some customers have even placed the order for next year 
already.  
 
SM: ‘XXX [Customer name] knew that we would increase our price and 
placed big orders before that. XXX already placed order for Fed 2018’ 
 
OM: ‘But the factory has publicity for price increase now’ 
 
SS-2: ‘It is impossible for us to explain every item for the customers. 
When they placed the order, they placed it based on the price we 
offered.’ 
 
FM: ‘But we gave you our cost information, and we taught you how to 
use it. You should be able to calculate and predict the cost based on 
that.’ 
 
SS-2: ‘No we cannot do that because there will be some error 
between you and me.’ 
 
Therefore, the transfer price, for the sales staff was calculated based on its 
competitiveness in the current or future market circumstances. Competition was 
also generally used to justify the requests for a lower transfer price. Sales 
managers often made a link between market competition and the internal 
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transfer price to highlight that a lower transfer price is important to win the 
bidding held by customers: 
 
FM: ‘Actually for new customers, if we made a deal with 10% of profit 
with you and we made a deal with the customer as well, we would 
give you 10% profit for sure.’ 
 
SS-2: ‘For new customers, we will not negotiate the price with you.’ 
 
SM: ‘However, you cannot leave too much profit either. For example, 
XXX [an existing customer] is having a new round of competitive 
bidding. We have to provide a very competitive price. If we follow 
your formula and give you the profit you want, we will have a loss of 
0.6%’ 
 
FM: ‘For these customers, they are historically problematic, and it is 
hard to change, so you need to tell me your acceptable price. I 
cannot take the loss for you.’ 
 
SM: ‘But you cannot take too much profit, I am just saying. Our profit 
is already really low.’ 
 
It was interesting to see how the rhetoric adopted by the sales manager was 
similar to the rhetoric used by shareholder A when he talked about his ideology 
on transfer pricing (see section 6.4.1). The recurrent justification and 
judgement on transfer pricing was, therefore, based on the common-sense 
arguments related to the inevitability of the market price.  
 
Overall, the observation of the meeting reflected the managers’ desires to try to 
secure a transfer price in their own favour. It can be observed that managers 
from different divisions held quite different common-sense views toward 
transfer pricing. One was a cost-based view that transfer pricing should be based 
191 
 
on costing information. Interviewees from the factory often highlighted the 
inevitability of cost increase because of low volumes and raw-material market 
trends. Another was a market-based view that transfer pricing should be based 
on customer requirements and competition. Staff from sale divisions prioritised 
the customer in transfer pricing as securing and satisfying customers were their 
primary goals. Such contradictory and inconsistent common-sense views existing 
in the group had significant implication for the daily practice of transfer pricing 
negotiation. Although both sides seemed to have logical arguments, they 
somehow neglected the arguments provided by their counterparts. While others 
provided alternative arguments, the managers tended to still focus on their own 
arguments and disregard alternative views. This means that understanding of 
transfer pricing was divided and uncritical among employees in different 
divisions. 
 
In addition, it is not hard to realise that the arguments used by the managers in 
the meeting can be related to the ideologies discussed by the shareholders in 
the last chapter. Cost principles and marketisation promoted by different 
shareholders were both adopted by the respective managers. This linkage 
between hegemonic ideologies and common-sense arguments was able to 
manufacture consent between the managers and their respective leaders. As a 
result, the negotiation of the transfer price was able to contribute to the 
hegemonic struggles in the dominant level. While the observation above 
provided a taste of different types of common senses that existed in different 
divisions, my daily observations of and interviews on the topic of transfer pricing 
was able to provide further insights into how different types of common sense 
influenced the decision making on transfer pricing at PLT. 
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7.2.2 Common sense on ‘profit maximisation’ 
As shown in the previous section, the sales staff usually justified their arguments 
on transfer price from a market-based ideology This was carried over into their 
daily practice of transfer pricing. During my time in the sales division, I observed 
many instances where the sales staff talked about their struggles and opinions on 
transfer pricing in an informal manner. They made jokes during breaks and 
shared their own frustrations working with the factory staff. These were able to 
provide more insights on how they discussed the transfer price freely in a private 
environment. In particular, I was able to pick up their priorities when 
approaching the transfer pricing system. 
 
The common assumption on transfer pricing in the sales division, closely linked 
with the previous section, was related to the concept of ‘profit maximisation’. 
Many instances show that the sales staff assumed profit maximisation was their 
only goal when practising transfer pricing. Even through the profit margin for the 
whole group was getting less because of the increasing market competition, the 
sales staff still tried to secure their own profit before being concerned for 
others. For instance, when the sales manager accidently received an internal 
profit report from the factory manager and saw the low profit the factory had, 
one sales staff member joked that: ‘We cannot let them [the factory] know our 
profit or they will kill us’. Subsequently, another staff member joked: ‘What if 
they sent that to you on purpose to show that they don't have profit?’ Although 
staff were chatting about this in a joking manner, it signifies the significance of 
profit maximisation for sales division staff. This is not surprising, considering 
that the design of the profit-related reward system had been a significant 
motivation for such a view. However, why did they want to ‘hide’ the profit from 
other parties? According to the sales manager, the confidentiality of profit 
information was important for them to maintain overall profit when profit for 
different orders may vary: 
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Normally, we do not let the factory know our target price. Some new 
products may have a higher profit and some regular products may 
have less profit. However, our principle is that we cannot lose money 
from the order. (SM) 
 
Apart from the sales staff appearing to be highly sensitive over the profit, their 
market-based view on transfer pricing practice is also reflected on their daily 
negotiation practice. As the cost report from factory was available to the sales 
division, cost comparison became an important activity when judging the 
appropriateness of the transfer price offer. Despite the fact that cost can change 
due to different requirements, purchasing price, quality, and production process, 
the sales staff only focused on the cost and required further negotiation based 
on the price difference. For instance, the price difference of the ‘start-up’ cost 
in different cost reports was able to catch sales staff B’s attention when 
assessing the transfer price offer. She believed that this cost was problematic 
and needed further clarification. Despite having little understanding of the 
production procedure for different products, she focused only on the price 
difference, as she felt this cost should be static. The practice of price 
comparison was also confirmed by factory managers: 
 
They came to the factory and saw the production processes before, 
but they were not willing to know and don't care about it. They just 
use the formula and don't care about the principles behind it. 
However, they know how to compare prices; they will find out that 
some parts of the cost are increased or decreased and ask us to lower 
the price without caring why it was increased. (PM) 
 
Sometimes, price is not the only thing they need to consider, 
sometimes, reliability of the supplier is also crucial. However, trading 
company normally don't consider that. (FM) 
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In line with the market rationales of an appropriate transfer price, another 
regular element in the sales staff’s argument was concerned with the ‘poor work 
consistency’ from the factory and its influence on the overall profit for the sales 
division. The price information provided by the factory was considered to be 
rather inaccurate and inconsistent. For instance, staff often criticised the 
consistency of the product quality during the daily discussion. The sales manager 
referred to one customer’s order as an example. The customer had a high 
requirement for product quality, and initially, the factory was able to meet the 
requirements. However, after the initial purchase, the sales manager felt that 
the factory had lowered their quality standard and tried to do less work, which 
caused quality problems and led to the customer’s complaint about the current 
order. While they criticised the work consistency of their counterparts, they 
were actually criticising the potential loss that occurred because of the poor 
consistency instead of criticising the inconsistency itself. The customers’ 
complaints often resulted in a forced discount offer to customers, which 
influenced the profitability of the sales division. 
 
In addition, the sales staff were highly critical of the inconsistent transfer price 
provided by the factory. In particular, they often complained that the transfer 
prices of a product could be changed before and after a contract was signed. 
While this might be due to the change of material costs, this was sometimes 
linked to the potential loss of profit for the sales staff. It was argued that when 
factory failed to provide a consistent transfer price, the sales division would get 
pressure from customers and potentially be forced to offer a discount because of 
the ‘mistakes’ made by the factory. As a result, transfer pricing became 
uncertain for the sales staff. Knowing that the transfer price might be changed 
after the initial negotiations, the sales staff were motivated to negotiate for an 
even more favourable price during initial negotiations in order to deal with the 
uncertainties in the future. Such an incident actually happened to one sales staff 
member one time. He commented to colleagues that the factory had sent a 
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demo to the customer before mass production. The demo was received well, and 
mass production was started. However, the factory ‘changed their mind’ and said 
that the supplier thought the volume was too small and that they could not 
maintain the previous price. This made the situation very complex and created a 
financial loss for the sales staff:  
 
I asked the cost accountant to look for the production manager and 
solve the problem since the order had to be finished either way. Then 
they had found another supplier. However, the design of the product 
had to be changed, and then they needed to let the customer check 
again. This led to a tight delivery deadline for us. If we delayed the 
delivery date, the customer would ask for a further discount. (SS-1) 
 
While the predominant value of ‘profit maximisation’ saturated the daily 
practice of transfer pricing in the sales division, it also prevented the 
recognition of alternative understandings. Many of the arguments provided by 
the sales staff were uncritical and inconsistent. For example, despite knowing 
little about the production procedures for different products, sales staff B had 
an uncritical belief that ‘start-up cost’ occurs only once each day and should be 
the same figure for every order. In addition, the staff tended to ignore the issues 
raised by factory managers during inter-divisional meetings while concerning 
their own market related issues, they tended to ignore similar issues that 
occurred in the factory, such as cost increases. It seems that there was a general 
disbelief of the factory’s claim in the sales division. This was observed on 
different occasions during my fieldwork there, including staff’s conversation just 
after the inter-divisional meetings in February 2017. Apparently, members of the 
sales staff did not believe most of the claims raised by the factory manager, 
despite the fact that those claims were generally reasonable and were discussed 
internally in the factory in a daily basis.  
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7.2.3 common sense on ‘fairness’ 
In section 7.2.1, I illustrated how the factory staff members negotiated the 
transfer price utilising cost-based arguments, which indicated a cost-oriented 
view on understanding transfer pricing. Similar to what I did in the sales division, 
I also spent time in the factory division, sitting on the same table with the 
factory manager and production manager, where I observed many interesting 
conversations between staff members on topics similar to those discussed in the 
sales division. The observations, along with the interviews, were able to provide 
insight into how they viewed transfer pricing as a practice of ‘fairness’ instead 
of price competition. 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, the concept of ‘fairness’ is not new in transfer pricing 
research. Studies such as Luft and Libby (1997), Ghosh, (2000), and Chang, 
Cheng, and Trotman, (2008) discussed how ‘fairness’ can be associated with 
various social factors such as the negotiation mechanism (Kachelmeier & Towry, 
2002), social concerns (Chang, Cheng, & Trotman, 2008) and can influence the 
negotiation outcomes. Thus, the sense of ‘fairness’ often drives the transfer 
pricing negotiation processes. In the literature, ‘fairness’ in transfer pricing 
means a degree of equal profit between two parties. However, at PLT, the 
‘fairness’ issue was generated from the clash between different types of 
common sense. 
 
Firstly, ‘fairness’ is associated with the work load and attitude in the factory 
divisions. Indeed, arguments for a favourable transfer price were often linked 
with the work load. Instead of talking about financial criteria such as profit, 
cost, and price, many staff were very critical of the small work load and poor 
working attitude of the sales division. Although they did not really observe the 
daily practice of the sales staff, there was a general belief that the sales staff 
took on less work in the whole procedure. As one cost accountant put it:  
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Staff in the Shanghai division are becoming more and more lazy; they 
just screenshot the customer’s requirements and send it to us without 
any form of preparation. When I ask what that is, they just translate 
the English email for me. (CA) 
 
An argument staff often raised was that sales division acted only as a ‘translator’ 
between the customer and them. The sales staff were considered to be lazy and 
even mindless: 
 
I feel that Shanghai trading company only works as an airfone between 
factory and final customer. They take every request from the customer 
and ask us without thinking by themselves. (CA) 
 
They just find the new customer who wants particular product and ask 
us if we can make it. They just calculate the profit for their orders but 
don't think about the cost we have to put for new type of material. 
(CA)  
 
Although this argument is unilateral and does not necessarily reflect the reality, 
it may not be significant to the transfer pricing negotiation on its own. However, 
what is interesting is how the factory staff linked their unilateral belief with the 
profit allocation in transfer pricing. There was a general belief that there should 
be a connection between the work load and profit allocation in the transfer 
pricing system to ensure that a fair arrangement on work and reward can be 
achieved: 
 
Although I feel that most of the work is done by us, most of the profits 
are usually given to the customer service departments in the sales 
division. This makes us demotivated because more profit is giving to 
the people who do not work. (FM) 
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We are doing three jobs with one man, and but we still cannot get 
reward out of it, (PM)  
 
In fact, a fair arrangement on work load and responsibilities was valued more 
highly than profit maximisation in the factory. As long as ‘fairness’ was achieved, 
the factory was prepared to compromise to some extent on profit. This value of 
‘fairness’ had significant implications for the sense-making of transfer price 
negotiations. In particular, the distance between the actual work arrangement in 
transfer pricing and its ideal form imagined by the factory staff motivated the 
profit-seeking behaviour by the factory staff. The sense of fairness provided a 
rationale to criticise negotiation behaviours by the sales staff and to disregard 
opposite criticisms. For instance, the work load was reflected in the transfer 
price offer, and criticisms about their work consistency were disregarded 
because of the unclear responsibility arrangement. Consequently, the transfer 
pricing was negotiated based on the redemptions of fairness instead of economic 
considerations, which was personal rather than financial: 
 
I think they should take responsibility when they take more benefit. I 
actually don’t care about the profit rate the factory can get. I just 
care about the work arrangement. For example, we used to buy a 
product and add a 10% profit including packaging. When we don’t do 
packaging, we add only 5%; it is clear and transparent. However, they 
still think we have a problem and think that our team is not good 
enough. But the internal structure is out of my hands. Their 
complaints were not their business. If they think the price is not good 
enough, they can totally look for others. Our company’s problem is 
that, regarding benefits, everyone wants them; regarding troubles, 
no one wants to take them. (FM) 
 
The interpretation of the system design also reinforced this non-financial view 
on transfer pricing. As I discussed in the previous chapter, the factory division 
usually provided a cost report to the sales division as part of their transfer 
pricing procedure. This was linked with the ‘fairness’ value by the factory staff. 
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While the ideal profit allocation for transfer pricing was linked to the work 
arrangement, the information advantages given to the sales division were 
interpreted regarding this aspect. As the sales division was able to access more 
information, the factory staff believed that more work should be done by them 
to ‘deserve’ the profit. As the factory manager commented: 
 
The reason why we give them a detailed cost report is that we want 
them to use the report independently. We can provide all the 
information, and they can calculate the price by themselves. In this 
way, we can save some labour cost as well, just like Nanjin factory 
[group’s raw material factory] did. If we can just be a factory, I will be 
very happy. They [sales division] can build their strong team instead. 
However, they don't have the ability, and we take some of the work. 
Therefore, we must have our return. The development of our system 
and our salary needs money. Thus, we must seek more benefit and 
profit for ourselves. (FM) 
 
The information imbalance provided further justification for the profit seeking 
activities in the factory. In addition, the existence of this information imbalance 
was regarded as ‘unfair’ on its own. There was a general belief in the factory 
that the information imbalance was utilised by the sales division against them 
during the transfer price negotiation although no example was provided: 
 
The sales division is the part which always saves something for 
themselves. Our system used to be not transparent. After I came to 
the company, we started sharing our internal cost reports with them. 
However, they did not share their information with us. In the end, we 
exposed ourselves, and they could take information advantages and 
put pressure on us. (FM) 
 
The staff in the Shanghai company [sales division] always hide the 
price they give to the customer and steal the profit from the US 
division. We want to be honest, but they won't be honest to us. In the 
end, they may get all the profit, and we get zero. (PM) 
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They know the cost of our product, but we don't know their price to 
the customer. When we have to raise the cost and show it in the cost 
report, they just say, ‘I can’t sell it’, and that’s it. (CA) 
 
While the ‘fairness’ I am talking about here is the fairness of information, it can 
be related to the general belief of ‘fairness’ of the work load and responsibility. 
The existence of an unfair information advantage means that a fair price in the 
financial sense would be hard to achieve because the sales division can always 
use it for their own benefit. As a result, an alternative understanding had to be 
developed to make sense of the daily transfer pricing negotiation in the factory, 
which gave birth to the ‘fair price’ based on non-financial matters, such as fair 
responsibility and work load.  
 
The concept of ‘fairness’ was central in legitimising their decision on pricing and 
was deeply embedded in their understanding of how transfer pricing should work 
in the factory division. Ultimately, the fairness issue stemmed from a clash of 
different types of common sense. While the factory staff judged the transfer 
pricing based on non-financial criteria, such as work load, responsibility, and 
information availability, this approach contrasted with the sales staff’s focus on 
profit and marketisation. This clash of ideas created the ‘fairness’ issue in the 
factory. While interviewees often highlighted how ‘unfair’ the transfer pricing 
system was in terms of the unfair arrangement of the work load, responsibility, 
and information, it directly influenced their judgement during transfer pricing 
negotiations. Therefore, the transfer price, for factory staff, was negotiated 
based on their view on ‘fairness’, instead of purely on market or cost concerns. 
 
Analysis in this section so far has revealed the existence of contradictory types 
of common sense in the same transfer pricing system among people from the 
sales division and the factory division. Both types of common sense had ‘logic’ 
and were generally held together by different concepts. For instance, the sales 
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staff carried the logic of ‘marketisation’ which highlights the profit maximisation 
and customer prioritisation. This common sense led to their uncritical belief that 
transfer pricing should be a market-oriented system, as they were dealing with 
market competition and customers. Combining this with the motivation from 
their reward system, price became a very sensitive issue for them.  
 
On the other hand, the factory staff members made sense of their daily transfer 
pricing practice with the logic of ‘cost’ and ‘fairness’. They believed that cost 
circumstance was the essential and unnegotiable factor for them. Thus, transfer 
pricing was understood from a cost perspective, and the negotiation was based 
on how transfer price can cover the cost. In addition, the common sense on 
‘fairness’ held by many factory staff motivated them to approach transfer 
pricing from a rather non-financial perspective. The workload and 
responsibilities became the rationales behind transfer pricing decisions.  
 
Due to the uncritical belief of different common sense, staff from different 
divisions approached transfer pricing differently and the agreement on transfer 
price became sometimes difficult. The contradictory and inconsistent common-
sense views existing in different divisions therefore had a significant implication 
for transfer pricing negotiation.  
 
7.2.4 Diffusion of common sense 
It is fair to say that common sense views observed at PLT is contingent upon its 
local context. Interviewees usually make sense of transfer pricing not only based 
on their uncritical belief in something such as profit maximisation, but also 
based on their own practical experience of transfer pricing. Based on this, the 
next question is how the common sense emerged in this local context. As 
discussed in section 3.4, in a fairly limited environment, ideology and thought of 
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an individual was able to elaborate to be common sense as long as it is implicit 
in practical life of others. Thus, this section elaborates the connection between 
shareholder’s ideology and existing common sense, and how individual ideologies 
were diffused to be common sense governing daily practice of transfer pricing. 
 
During my time with the shareholders, there were many instances showing the 
similarities on the understanding of transfer pricing between the shareholders 
and their respective managers. For instance, the fairness of the current system 
was also an issue of concern for shareholder B. Similar to common sense 
observed in the factory, fairness about responsibility, working amount was 
important for shareholder B. For him, transfer pricing system should work like a 
performance measurement system measuring work amount and effort. The logic 
is that, the more work employees did, the more profit they should get from 
transfer pricing system. When shareholder B discussed profit issues with the 
CFO, he expressed his opinions on the staff in sales division; as I noted in my 
diary: 
 
During the discussion, Shareholder B found out that the profit the 
sales division make is very good at around 10% to 20% for each order. 
This makes him quite angry because he thinks that the sales division 
should not make so much profit. He makes the example that a US 
trading company he knows does lots of services for the clients and 
only gets 5% of profit. He thinks that the problem is not the profit 
they make but the work they do compared to the profit they get. He 
thinks that the company does not do enough work to be able to 
deserve the amount of profit. In his opinion, the trading company 
staff always ask the factory to do things and do not put enough effort 
into dealing with new clients. Therefore, it seems that factory 
managers’ logic of holding profit can come from the shareholder’s 
point of view of Shanghai staff. 
 
It was not hard to find similarities between the shareholder’s opinions and the 
staff’s general opinions. Both of them argued that it was unfair for the sales 
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division to earn more profit when they did ‘less’ work. This connection means 
that the ideology of shareholder B was able to be diffused into the idea of 
common sense in the factory. Then the question that is raised is ‘How did he do 
that?’.  
 
According to the observation, the ideologies of the shareholders could be 
diffused through regular interactions between the shareholders and their staff 
through meetings, phone calls and messages. As I mentioned earlier, meetings 
were occasionally held, offering opportunities for managers to discuss the 
transfer pricing issue directly. One such meeting was discussed in the previous 
section to illustrate the different views managers held during negotiations. 
However, meetings were sometimes attended by shareholders as well if they 
were available. During my fieldwork, one meeting held in the factory was 
attended by all the managers as well as by shareholder B. This provided some 
insights into how the shareholder raised issues in front of the managers in both 
divisions. 
 
The meeting was attended by all members of the sales division staff, the factory 
manager, the production manager, and shareholder B. While the factory manager 
and the shareholder sat on one side of the table, the sales staff sat on the other 
side. The meeting lasted for over two hours and was dominated by shareholder 
B. The meeting provided social spaces for the shareholder to diffuse his 
ideologies to his staff. 
 
Firstly, Shareholder B amplified the importance of the work load by 
complimenting the work provided by the factory staff. He highlighted the 
amount of work the factory staff had to do regarding the transfer pricing 
practice and beyond. In addition, he was able to link his opinions to the daily life 
of the factory staff. Many examples of the internal managerial tasks the factory 
204 
 
manager and the production manager had to do were raised, which were 
followed by high compliments given by the shareholder. For example, he said 
that the production manager had to pick up 130+ phone calls in a day to 
highlight how busy he was. Based on these statements, he argued that the 
lengthy internal price negotiation harmed the organisation and would lead to 
losses for both parties. In addition, many arguments related to the cost increase 
and inappropriate working arrangements were raised to support factory staff 
against their counterparts. For instance, he argued that the cost report should 
be efficiently utilised by sales staff members to calculate the price by 
themselves. This moral support became one of the sources which the factory 
staff relied on in understanding their daily practice of transfer pricing.  
 
In contrast with his support for the factory staff, shareholder B publicly critiqued 
the work quality and efficiency of sales staff members in front of all staff, which 
was also important when diffusing his ideology. Throughout the meeting, the 
shareholder tried to disseminate his ideologies on business and transfer pricing 
to the staff. The idea of cost centralisation and an ideal work arrangement was 
raised through different criticisms and examples. He criticised the price priority 
of the sales staff, regarding it as an outdated way of doing business. He argued 
that the narrow vision of price priority brought issues to the factory because the 
factory requires a lot of money for production-related tasks, such as regulation 
inspections, certificate applications, and production improvement. Instead of 
blindly putting pressure on the factory, he highlighted that the sales division 
should focus on improving their own service and on understanding the supply 
chain to secure ‘premium customers’. In addition, the shareholder highlighted 
that the profit itself was not important for the factory. However, the sales 
division had to be accountable for more effort in the whole sales procedure to 
‘claim’ the profit.  
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It was apparent that the moral support and ideologies on transfer pricing shared 
by shareholder B were able to influence the factory staff’s understanding of 
transfer pricing and reinforce their confidence in what they believed. After the 
‘speech’ by shareholder B, the factory manager was able to reinforce the same 
arguments given by the shareholder. He further highlighted that a 10% profit 
margin was essential for the factory to cover its increasing costs and develop 
themselves further. Therefore, he demanded that the sales division staff 
members ‘consider’ their circumstances and have fewer price negotiations, 
allowing them to do ‘real’ work, such as customer service and production 
efficiency improvement. He also reinforced the point that the factory staff did 
not get the reward they deserved compared to their abilities. This was reflected 
in the less competitive salaries the factory was giving to the staff. 
 
It can be said that this type of meeting has an ideological effect on the diffusion 
of the hegemonic ideology. It provided a social space for the shareholder to 
elaborate upon and spread his ideologies. Considering the limited access the 
factory staff have to the actual work arrangement and profit margin of the sales 
division, it is unlikely that they could construct their thought on transfer pricing 
on their own, especially regarding some comparative arguments, such as the 
unfair profit arrangement and unequal work load. However, they were able to 
construct their thoughts on the reality through the narratives given by the 
shareholder. The ideological arguments were communicated not only through 
relations of concepts and propositions but also through vivid examples which 
were close to the daily life of the factory staff. Factory staff who received the 
narratives, although lacking a theoretical consciousness, were able to develop a 
common sense view on how the transfer pricing negotiation should be. This is an 
example of where the generic ideas of a dominant individual are successfully 
diffused as the common sense of the dominated individuals. It is implicitly 
connected to the practical life of the dominated individuals and actually helped 
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them to conclude a coherent explanation of the reality. As a result, such 
common sense shaped the ways peopled conceptualise transfer pricing. 
 
Knowing this, the prevailing of ‘marketisation’ ideology in sales division becomes 
understandable as well. Although I did not have the opportunity to follow 
shareholder A very closely and observe his interactions with sales division 
members, some connections between his views on transfer pricing and the 
common sense adopted by the sales division staff members did exist. As I 
discussed in section 6.4.1, shareholder A is a strong believer of market 
economics and market-based transfer pricing. During my interview with him, I 
raised the nature of the factory’s standard profit margin and its demotivation of 
a flexible price quotation. He indirectly problematised the approaches used by 
the factory, implicitly questioning the validity of the cost-based transfer pricing 
system:  
 
This problem is shareholder B’s problem. Why our transfer pricing 
system is not sufficient enough? [This is] because none of them ask 
the market for information, and they always provide a price 
according to their own thinking, like ‘I think the price should be 
this’. (S-A) 
 
The dynamic market condition and its necessary link to the transfer pricing 
system in the organisation was highlighted. Shareholder A believed that a 
competitive price was not static and was always based on the present market 
condition. Thus, a transfer price should be based on the competitiveness of the 
final price instead of on the cost of the product itself because a cost-based price 
can be meaningless in ca hanging market: 
 
However, the market is not decided by your cost, nor by the sales men. 
It is decided by the market, its demand and supply. For example, when 
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a market is doing flash sale and a cup may be priced 1 dollar instead of 
5 dollars, at that point, this cup will only be worth 1 dollar and when 
the sell ends the market will return to normal. Therefore, the market 
controls everything. You have to be competitive under different 
contexts. (S-A) 
 
Holding this view, he argued that the factory failed to follow the market 
principles and only provided the price based on their own cost without thinking 
about its competitiveness. As discussed in previous sections, the sales team had 
a strong sense of price and profit maximisation when understanding transfer 
pricing and justifying their arguments during negotiations. To maximise the 
profit, they hid their profit figure and criticised the general work consistency as 
their rationale to maintain a high profit. When the factory manager countered 
their arguments based on increase of cost, the sales division staff chose to 
neglect the claim, as they believed that the price should be decided by the 
customer, who represents the market competition. Thus, the linkage between 
the daily practice of transfer pricing in the sales division and the shareholder’s 
focus on marketisation shows that the common sense view of practising transfer 
pricing was based upon the hegemonic ideologies prevailing in the division.  
 
Although shareholder A did not physically stay in the division most of the time, it 
seems that he was still able to influence the construction of common sense in 
the sales division. During the fieldwork, I discovered that regular 
communications between the sales staff and shareholder A were maintained 
using WeChat (a WhatsApp equivalent in China). This could provide social space 
for shareholder A to diffuse his ideologies. While staff were motivated by a 
profit-oriented performance measurement system, they also had to provide 
individual monthly reports including profit and volume figures to shareholder A. 
The design of this practice can be regarded as the material existence of a 
market ideology in the organisation, which provided people with rules which 
guided their moral and practical behaviours (Simon, 2015).  
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The above discussion showed a clear linkage between shareholders’ ideologies 
and the common sense that staff relied on for their mundane practice of transfer 
pricing. I found that shareholder B often highlighted the importance of work 
amount and responsibilities in determining profit allocation in transfer pricing 
negotiation. This can be related to the common sense views on fairness analysed 
in section 7.2.3. On the other hand, shareholder A’s ideology of market 
economics and his critique on the cost-based transfer pricing can be related to 
similar common sense observed on sale staffs in section 7.2.2. The linkage 
between dominant ideologies and common sense views is created through the 
daily interactions between shareholders and their respective staffs such as 
meetings and communications. It is found that shareholders’ ideologies were 
able to connect with the struggles staff were experiencing on a daily basis. This 
enabled the establishment of the shareholders’ ideologies as norms and beliefs 
for managers. Consequently, different forms of hegemony emerged in the two 
divisions. While two dominant individuals both had enough power to establish 
their ideologies in the divisions, the practice of transfer pricing became an 
activity to achieve the balance of the political forces.  
 
7.3 Good sense views 
The previous section discovered different types of common sense on transfer 
pricing in different divisions. The application of different types of common sense 
made it possible to maintain different forms of hegemony in the group. Common 
sense was able to affect the transfer price negotiation procedure by making 
negotiations difficult and ambiguous. As a result, the staff, as the dominated 
groups, actually contributed to the hegemonic struggle between the dominant 
groups by practising transfer pricing. Considering this, a question arises 
regarding how the overall leadership of shareholders can be maintained in this 
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context, in the other words, how and when an agreement of the transfer price 
can be reached. 
 
Common sense represents the widely accepted and prevailing values and ideas 
diffused by hegemonic social groups. At PLT, the common sense of marketisation 
and fairness shaped the ways of understanding transfer pricing. In contrast, 
Gramsci (1971) argues that actors are able to constitute views which are 
practical but not necessarily rational and that contradict dominant beliefs. This 
is conceptualised as good sense. It challenges activities that are taken for 
granted. For instance, in the case of IFRS adoption in Greece, Mantzari and 
Georgiou (2019) found that although practitioners supported common-sense 
ideas, such as the benefit of international comparability and a market approach 
to financial accounting in adopting IFRS, there were still arguments based on 
good sense ideas that challenged the appropriateness of adopting IFRS by looking 
at local circumstances. For instance, practitioners referred to the frequent 
amendment of standards and increasingly subjective judgements required as 
factors that had a negative effect on the implementation of IFRS. Good-sense 
views, in this study, are represented as challenges to the diverse, conflicting 
understanding of transfer pricing, in other words, the views which prompt 
mutual agreement on transfer price. The role of good sense in mitigating the 
conflicts created by conflicting types of common sense and its relations to the 
maintenance of the hegemony formed by the shareholders are explored. 
 
Although interviewees embraced different types of common sense regarding 
transfer pricing, they also recognised that an agreement on transfer price was 
necessary in actual practice. In particular, staff showed their concern about the 
needs of others as well as considering their own needs. Although managers highly 
criticised others from different perspectives, they were able to show 
understanding regarding the situations faced by their counterparts. For instance, 
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when talking about the conflicts on transfer pricing in the group, the factory 
manager commented: 
 
Although we have many conflicts, I also try to think of the situation 
from both sides. Shanghai staff have a hard 8% profit rate on every 
order built in the system. This is because 8% is their break-even 
point. Therefore, they will have to make the price suitable for them. 
In addition, they will not get any profit cut if they only get an 8% 
profit. Therefore, it is understandable that they would try to push 
every penny to increase their income. (FM) 
 
This can be linked to the discussion on Confucianism in section 5.3. It can be 
argued that Confucianism actually provided a theoretical foundation for the 
sense of ‘concern for others’. As I discussed before, Confucianism can be 
understood as a philosophical thought that evolved to be a guide to how people 
should act. It is deep and unconscious to the point that people who follow the 
Confucian doctrine may not realise it. The sense of ‘concern for others’ observed 
in the factory manager can be related to the concept of ‘ren’ in Confucianism 
(see 5.3.1). It highlights that an individual is not an individual without 
considering others. To be ‘ren’, an individual should have the ability to put 
themselves in another person’s shoes (Carmody & Carmody, 1983). Based on 
this, managers were able to consider the situation faced by others and put 
themselves in their ‘shoes’. By doing so, the difficulties or opportunities faced 
by others can be understood. 
 
Empowered by a broader belief of Confucianism, the sense of ‘concern for 
others’ was able to challenge the seemingly total dominance of common sense 
on transfer pricing in this organisational context. In the case of the factory 
manager, his belief on fairness and cost prioritisation was challenged by the 
sense of ‘concern for others’ and influenced his decisions on transfer pricing. 
Even though cost prioritisation was highly rated for factory staff, compromise in 
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the form of a flexible arrangement on transfer pricing became possible when a 
potential benefit for the whole group was presented, such as an important 
client. As the factory manager commented when discussing the negotiation 
process of transfer pricing with the sales manager: 
 
We [the factory] want to save labour costs as well by having less 
negotiation with you. However, if you [sales division] judge that a 
certain contract is very important and essential for the group, you 
can write an email to us providing us with the information of your 
profit margin. Then we can accept the price even with a zero profit 
rate. It is fine; it’s not impossible. We still can be very flexible. (FM) 
 
This contradictory thought of the factory manager created an interesting scene 
where both senses – common and good - were presented during negotiations. 
While he still stressed the importance of cost saving, he recognised the 
importance of benefiting the whole group. This represents the common sense 
which he largely uncritically absorbed from the shareholders, and the good sense 
which he derived from the practical experience of being ‘ren’. As a result, the 
transfer pricing decisions made by the manager was sometimes contradictory to 
his theoretical consciousness fed by common sense. As a sales staff member 
commented on how the factory manager might respond to his request: 
 
I will tell them that the clients don't respond to me anymore and ask 
if they can reduce the price. Normally, I will discuss this with costing 
accountants, and if we cannot reach an agreement, I will discuss it 
with the factory manager… Normally we [costing accountant and him] 
cannot reach an agreement, In the end, I have to look for their 
manager and almost beg him to reduce the price. In some cases, he 
will say, ‘You are the sales man and you should negotiate better with 
clients’, but he will accept my request. (SS-1) 
 
Similar to the sense of ‘concern for others’, there was a strong sense that two 
divisions should be regarded as a single community (family). Although profit 
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maximisation generally influenced the decision-making process of transfer 
pricing in the sales division, staff were still able to understand transfer pricing 
from a group perspective. They admitted that maintenance of ‘harmony’ was 
important for both divisions as a group, as the two divisions had close bonds with 
each other and may not be able to operate independently of each other: 
 
When negotiating price, we have some level of honesty. If the factory 
provides a high price and we are unable to sell the products, it is not 
good for them either. Even though it is a half-half purchase, they will 
still be influenced by it. If our sales are good, then it will benefit 
them as well. (OM) 
 
Derived from the Confucian teaching of ‘wu lun’, ‘harmony’ with fellow 
members is important to develop a good character as an individual in the 
community. At PLT, ‘guanxi’ and ‘ren qin’ are important relational concepts 
especially for harmonic relationships among employees (see section 5.3.3). The 
informal connections between people within the ‘guanxi’ network at PLT was 
able to lead to agreements on transfer pricing. The social mechanism of ‘ren 
qin’ and the relationship building of ‘guanxi’ was able to provide a basis for an 
agreement on the transfer price. For instance, while the factory manager 
sometimes chose to provide a favourable price to the sales staff, he exchanged a 
‘ren qin’ from the sales staff which would be repaid in the future. This created a 
social practice of informal benefit and obligations, which prevented direct 
conflicts between managers in the transfer pricing practice. This value of ‘ren 
qin’ is critical for many staff, as better ‘guanxi’ leads to a smoother negotiation 
process: 
 
The operations manager can sometimes have good communication 
with the production manager in the factory because the operations 
manager sometimes speaks for the production manager and he may 
remember the ‘ren qin’. (SS-1) 
 
213 
 
A harmonic relationship between staff is not only highly rated for its 
instrumental functions in the transfer pricing process; it is generally important 
for staff because of the need to maintain a good social profile in the 
organisation. Staff recognised that a good relationship with fellow workers was 
sometimes as important as a favourable transfer price because a good profile 
was necessary for them to ‘live’ in the organisation:  
 
At the end of the day, we are in the same family. Maintaining a good 
relationship is very important. This kind of company is only for a few 
people to shine and make money. People like me should just keep 
calm and maintain good relationships with others. In addition, letting 
the factory get some benefit in some orders can give us some more 
room in some big bandage orders. (PS-2) 
 
Overall, staff in both divisions showed a willingness to reach an agreement on 
the transfer price. Even though staff usually took one-sided stances towards 
transfer pricing, they were also capable of showing understanding to others and 
were willing to ‘make things work’. It was interesting to see how staff who 
highly criticised others would contradict themselves by showing concern for 
others and were willing to achieve something for the group as a whole. The 
analysis indicates that staff tried to preserve harmony in their horizontal 
relationships. The good sense constructed by Confucianism opened a narrow 
opportunity for managers to compromise and to fill the gaps between their 
differing views of common sense, which eventually enabled them to reach 
consent on the transfer price. It provided a theoretical foundation for managers 
to challenge the views of common sense prevailing in transfer pricing and resist 
the negotiation activities promoted by the fragile hegemonic form at PLT. This 
explains why the transfer pricing system at PLT had not collapsed yet. In 
practice, not all internal transfers at PLT had to go through conflicting 
negotiations. There were many cases where a contract went through smoothly 
when everyone was happy with the profit margin they received. 
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7.4 Hegemony and dialectical senses 
Previous sections have discussed how common sense governed the daily practice 
of transfer pricing, and how agreement on the transfer price could be reached 
due to the influence of good sense. Although the different senses seemed to be 
contradictory and served different purposes, the dialectical relations between 
the different senses contributed to the reproduction of hegemony. 
 
Firstly, it seems that common sense was used for dual purposes at PLT. On the 
one hand, the hegemony formed by the shareholders was sustained by the use of 
common sense. Gramsci (1971) argues that common sense derives from the 
hegemonic ideology and is essential in bolstering consent among dominated 
groups. This function of common sense is observed in the analysis in section 7.2. 
I found that the dominant individuals (shareholders) were able to act as 
articulators of the public interest in their respective divisions and established 
their own political and economic values as common sense for staff and managers 
(Gramsci, 1971). The views of common sense created consent between the 
dominant ideologies and the theoretical consciousness of the dominated groups, 
which helped to sustain different forms of hegemony in the two divisions. This 
finding echo previous accounting study drawn on the concepts of common sense. 
Mantzari and Georgiou (2019) found that common sense acts as the basis of 
consent at an ideological level. However, different from previous studies, the 
‘clash’ between different views of common sense dominated the daily practice 
of transfer pricing. Due to the acceptance of different views of common sense, 
managers in different divisions held different expectations on the transfer price. 
While the sales staff generally expected a high profit margin, factory staff 
expected the work load to be a criterion for the transfer pricing decision. This 
plurality of common sense contributed to the ongoing hegemonic struggle fought 
between the dominant groups (shareholders). While managers negotiated the 
transfer price based on their common sense, they negotiated for their own 
benefit as well as in accordance with the personal agendas of the shareholders. 
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As a result, it reproduced and reformed the hegemony by contributing to the 
emergence of a new balance of political forces. 
 
Given the continuous hegemonic struggles, the overall hegemony formed by the 
shareholders could be unstable and weak. Indeed, this ‘organic crisis’ was still 
ongoing, as both forces were strong enough to form ideologies but not strong 
enough to shift the balance of forces in their direction. Consequently, there was 
no consistent prevailing value creating consent for all the dominated groups in 
the organisation. Therefore, resistance from the dominated groups could occur 
through the sense making of good sense. It represents the thought which 
challenges the activities that are already taken-for-granted (Gramsci, 1971). 
This is evidential based on the case of Greece’s IFRS adoption (Mantzari and 
Georgiou, 2019), where practitioners constructed critical opinions on IFRS by 
referring to their local context and experience. In the case of PLT, the pluralistic 
character of common sense created conflicts in the transfer pricing. Thus, the 
wish to prevent conflict can be viewed as a way of resisting involvement in 
hegemonic struggles. The analysis in section 7.3 showed that the transfer pricing 
decisions made by managers was sometimes contradictory to their theoretical 
consciousness fed by their view of common sense. Good sense draws on the 
Confucian idea of ‘harmony’ to construct views in contradiction to the dominant 
beliefs and thus allow challenge and resistance to the conflicting negotiation.  
 
So far, the theorisation of good sense has been used to explain the possible 
resistance of dominated social groups (Mantzari and Georgiou, 2019). While the 
emancipatory potential of good sense cannot be denied, the analysis of this 
chapter revealed that there are also two levels of good sense. On the one hand, 
views of good sense were presented as a way of resistance to transfer pricing 
negotiations and show the positive effect of good sense in resisting hegemony. 
Relying on the Confucian idea of ‘concern for others’ and ‘harmony’, the 
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shareholders in the different divisions were able to make sense of the transfer 
pricing from alternative perspectives and demonstrate a willingness to 
compromise and agree. From this angle, good sense enabled managers to resist 
the hegemonic struggles. On the other hand, I argue that the good sense here 
actually contributed to the maintenance of the fragile alliance of the 
shareholders’ hegemony to some extent. Although good sense provided 
alternative thinking over the dominant views of common sense that emerged 
from the hegemonic ideologies of the shareholders, it was derived from the 
wider common sense existing in society after all. As I discussed in section 5.3.2, 
Confucianism can be regarded as a hegemonic ideology sustaining the state 
hegemony in the Chinese context. While it is deeply embedded in education and 
family socialisation, it influenced all the people at PLT, including shareholders 
and staff members. Therefore, although it can be seen as good sense in the 
organisational context, it was part of the broader common sense in society. 
Thus, the good sense of Confucianism actually provided theoretical rationales for 
the dominated groups to show a collective will to solve issues on transfer pricing 
and so unconsciously sustained the hegemony formed by the shareholders.  
 
7.5 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has explored the sense-making of the transfer pricing practice for 
dominated groups and its relation to the hegemony. The analysis firstly explored 
the diverse views that existed in the transfer price negotiations. An incident that 
occurred in a meeting was used to illustrate how staff from different divisions 
understood transfer pricing differently. While the sales division staff tended to 
justify their transfer price decisions based on a market-oriented perspective, 
such as customer requirements and market competition, the factory staff usually 
utilised cost-based arguments to counter-attack. The pluralistic character of the 
common sense on transfer pricing was reinforced when looking into the daily 
practice of transfer pricing in both divisions. In the sales division, a common 
sense of ‘profit maximisation’ constituted the understanding of transfer pricing. 
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Competitive price and profitability were highly prioritised while ‘poor work 
consistency’ in the factory was utilised to justify their demand for more profit 
during transfer price negotiations. In contrast, a common sense of ‘fairness’ was 
closely linked to the rationale of the transfer pricing decisions in the factory. A 
fair working and information arrangement was highly rated, which created a 
non-financial sense on transfer pricing. The different views of common sense 
explored in both divisions were able to explain the conflicts in the transfer 
pricing practice.  
 
A closer look at the linkage between the shareholder’s ideologies and common 
sense prevailing in the divisions revealed how different forms of hegemony were 
sustained in the two divisions. It was found that the shareholders were able to 
establish their own ideologies as norms through different social spaces, such as 
meetings and reports. For instance, by connecting his ideological belief of cost 
priority to the practical life of managers, shareholder B was able to create a 
sense of ‘fairness’ to managers as their common sense. A similar connection 
between the ideology of shareholder A and the sales division staff’s common 
sense was also discovered. While this explained how different forms of 
hegemony can be sustained in two divisions, it further demonstrated how a 
fragile alliance formed between two dominant individuals was clearly shaped by 
their respective interests and the political strategies of the two individuals vis-a-
vis each other. Therefore, common sense in this context contributed to the 
hegemonic struggle between the dominant groups. 
 
On the other hand, good sense, which emerged out of the traditional ideas of 
Confucianism, was able to provide a philosophical foundation for managers to 
contradict themselves. The sense of ‘ren’ and ‘harmony’ encouraged managers 
to show a willingness to make reach an agreement with each other on the 
transfer price. While good sense represented a way of resisting hegemony, it also 
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helped maintain the fragile hegemony at PLT. Observed good sense was derived 
from the broader common sense existing in Chinese society after all. As a result, 
it enabled the generation of consent among managers and prevented the 
collapse of organisational hegemony, which was going through a crisis. In the 
end, this presents an ironic case where the dialectical concept of common sense 
and good sense helped each other to maintain the shareholders’ hegemony. The 
significance of this finding will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
Chapter 7, together with the analysis outlined in chapters 5 and 6, was able to 
provide a complete story of transfer pricing as a hegemonic practice at PLT. It 
explained the development of hegemony formed by the shareholders and their 
influence over transfer pricing from a structural sense to an individual level. To 
make sense of the whole analysis, the next chapter discusses the empirical 
findings analysed by a comparison with the existing accounting literature.  
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Chapter 8: Discussion 
 
8.1 Introduction  
This thesis has set out to understand transfer pricing as a socio-political 
practice. In line with the hegemonic framework developed in Chapter 3, the 
study firstly emphasised the structural reasons for business owners to be 
dominant social groups at an organisational level and the emergence of a 
paternalistic mode of control (Chapter 5). Based on this macro analysis, the 
study moved to the micro setting, where I explored the development of dynamic 
hegemonic relations and their influence on transfer pricing in an organisation 
(Chapter 6). While this highlighted the relationships and strategies of dominant 
social groups vis-à-vis each other while they attempted to form their own 
hegemony, the study continued to explore the hegemonic form of transfer 
pricing from the perspective of dominated groups by looking at how managers 
and staff made sense of their mundane practice of transfer pricing (Chapter 7). 
This analysis uncovered the development of the transfer pricing system in which 
a series of issues occurred, and it showed an attempt to explain these issues 
through a hegemonic lens.  
 
Based on the empirical analysis, the purpose of this chapter is to address the 
research questions outlined in chapter one and discuss the empirical findings in 
relation to current knowledge on transfer pricing, management control, and 
hegemony. In doing so, Section 2 firstly discusses the empirical findings to 
answer the research questions. Following this, section 3 critically discusses the 
empirical analysis by engaging with the prior literature and theory. The final 
section summarises and concludes the chapter. 
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8.2 A glimpse at the story of transfer pricing 
The main purpose of this study is to explore transfer pricing as a socio-political 
practice. In chapter 2, I illustrated that transfer pricing was understood as a 
profit-making instrument while mixed results were reported on how transfer 
pricing should be designed (Kaplan & Atkinson, 1998, Göx & Schiller, 2006, Dikolli 
& Vaysman, 2006, Pfeiffer, Schiller, & Wagner, 2011 and Bouwens & Steens, 
2016). Contingency theory offered an explanation for these mixed results by 
arguing that different transfer pricing practices can be appropriate under 
different external and internal environmental circumstances such as information 
technology (Kachelmeier and Towry, 2002), culture (Hussein et al., 2017), and 
pressure for tax compliance (Cools, Emmanuel, & Jorissen, 2008; Cools & 
Slagmulder, 2009; Plesner Rossing, 2013). However, this study criticised this 
conventional understanding of transfer pricing by examining how transfer pricing 
has become a political phenomenon. To do so, this study identified three 
research questions concerning the hegemonic form of transfer pricing: 1) How 
are transfer pricing practices located in the broader cultural-political context? 2) 
How do dynamic hegemonic relations shape transfer pricing practice? 3) How do 
people make sense of the daily practice of transfer pricing in the context of such 
hegemonic relations? This section summarises the empirical findings to see how 
these have been addressed. 
 
8.2.1 Cultural-political context 
This first research question explored the creation of organisational hegemony in 
its cultural-political context. The answers are derived from Chapter 5 where I 
considered in detail the broader context of China in which PLT is located. 
Adopting the concept of ‘structural hegemony’ developed by Joseph (2002), I 
was able to focus on the relationship between agents and the social structure 
they are living in and explore how the emergence of hegemony at a local level 
relies on the reproduction of broader social and economic structures.  
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It was clear that the power relations and certain control practices in 
organisations are conditioned by the reproduction of structural hegemony in the 
Chinese context. I found that power relations in Chinese organisations are not 
static. Before 1978, a structural hegemony formed by a socialist ideal prevailed 
in the state. Because of the domination of the Maoist ideology, class struggle 
became the national focus, which came with a strong rejection of western ideas. 
This social condition resulted in the emergence of proletarian leadership in 
organisations. Due to their ‘correct’ political profile, skilled workers or CPC 
members were promoted to a managerial position in organisations. In contrast, 
capitalists had no power at all and were granted a poor social profile for being 
‘evil’. However, the power relation between workers and capitalists was 
reversed due to the change of political ideologies in China after 1978. After the 
death of Mao, China experienced a drastic political ‘earthquake’, which led to 
the rise of market-based leadership focusing on economic growth, the open 
market, and technical enhancement.  The reform of the state hegemony from a 
socialist hegemony to a market-based hegemony meant that private 
entrepreneurs became an important player in the ‘power bloc’ for economic 
development. Thus, this explained the structural reason for the emergence of 
business owners as a dominant social group at the state and case organisation 
level. 
 
In addition, the analysis illustrated how a structural hegemonic ideology formed 
the management control in Chinese organisations. This was explored in more 
detail by looking at the influence of Confucianism in maintaining state hegemony 
and shaping organisational control. It was found that Confucianism was a form of 
hegemonic ideology in maintaining state leadership in ancient and modern 
China. Widely taught in education and family socialisation, Confucianism 
disseminated a doctrine which solidified social relations and maintained social 
orders. Until now, the Chinese government still uses Confucian ideas when 
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justifying their public policies and decisions. The prevalence of this structural 
ideology had serious implications for organisational practice at PLT. Firstly, I 
found that it enabled a paternalistic mode of control. A big power distance 
between business owners and others in the organisation was discovered. Such a 
power hierarchy was also naturalised and taken for granted (Laaksonen, 1988). 
While the two business owners had the ultimate authority in decision-making, 
they appointed trusted persons (such as relatives and loyal employees) as 
managers. Furthermore, the performance measurement was rather subjective, 
as the performance was usually determined by the owner’s personal judgement 
instead of calculative indicators. For employees, their relations were governed 
by their work of ‘guanxi’ in organisation. Work relations were important for 
them, which led to the avoidance of conflict. 
 
These findings on the Chinese cultural-political context made it possible to 
answer the first research question. The understanding of power relations in the 
society helped me to understand the existing power relations in the 
organisation, which is essential when exploring transfer pricing as a management 
control practice. On the other hand, the structural ideology of Confucianism also 
provided an explanation of the prevalence of a paternalistic mode of control in 
the organisation. This also influenced transfer pricing, as some of its 
management control functions were replaced by paternalistic control.  
 
8.2.2 Transfer pricing and hegemonic relations  
Following a macro level analysis on structural hegemony in the Chinese context, 
the story continued as I turned to explore the development of local transfer 
pricing via the reproduction of hegemonic relations in the organisation in 
chapter 6. It demonstrated how the transfer pricing practice was characterised 
by dynamic hegemonic relations involving all actors.  
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The empirical findings reveal that transfer pricing was developed as a result of 
the different hegemonic relations in the organisation. The original design of 
transfer pricing as a tax avoidance system was not only motivated by the tax 
benefit but was also determined by the hegemonic relations existing in the 
organisation. Transfer pricing practice was detached from management control 
practice. Here, the macro level analysis was linked to the micro level. It was 
found that dominant groups represented by the business owners and the CEO 
adopted a paternalistic mode of control in managing the vertical hegemony. 
Thus, dominant groups generated consent over dominated groups by offering a 
stable working environment and taking care of all the decision-making 
responsibilities. Under this hegemonic relation, the management control 
function of transfer pricing has been replaced. Alternatively, it served a political 
agenda in balancing relations among the dominant groups. Through the indirect 
strategy of the transfer pricing system, dominant groups were able to allocate 
their wealth without influencing the management control practice in the 
organisation. 
 
However, the hegemonic relations between the dominant groups eventually 
broke down due to the conflict of interests. As a result, new forms of hegemonic 
relations between the two business owners (shareholders) emerged with serious 
implications for the transfer pricing practice. A decentralised transfer pricing 
system was initially established as a compromise to dominated groups in order to 
regain their consent. However, it was found that the two business owners had 
conflicting interests and ideologies toward transfer pricing. They also made 
contradictory compromises in practice. The hegemonic struggles between them 
resulted in a transfer pricing system with inconsistent principles and the co-
existence of calculation methods. Furthermore, the hegemonic relations 
between shareholders and managers were also important when making sense of 
the fragile arrangement of transfer pricing at PLT. Due to different interests and 
ideologies, the two shareholders used different hegemonic strategies to diffuse 
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their ideologies in different divisions in order to form new sets of ideology in 
favour of themselves. For instance, the profit cut offered to sales divisional staff 
was able to motivate the staff to seek more profit from the transfer pricing 
system while similar compromises were made to factory staff as well. Thus, the 
hegemonic struggles between shareholders was transferred to the daily practice 
of transfer pricing performed by managers. The analysis of hegemonic relations 
then addressed the second research question. 
 
8.2.3 Mundane practice of transfer pricing 
Empirical findings up to this point have shown the significance of hegemonic 
relations between dominant groups to the development of transfer pricing. In 
order to demonstrate the full picture of the hegemonic form of transfer pricing, 
the dominated perspective needed to be addressed. Thus, the study lastly 
emphasised the mundane practice of transfer pricing in order to understand the 
sense-making process of the dominated groups. This was analysed through the 
dialectical concepts of common sense and good sense.  
 
This study found that managers in different divisions relied on different views of 
common-sense when understanding their mundane practice of transfer pricing. 
This was apparent when looking at the transfer price negotiation instances at 
PLT. On the one hand, managers in the sales division embraced profit 
maximisation as their core principle. Thus, profitability became the central 
criterion when judging the transfer price while other factors such as cost and 
quality were less considered. On the other hand, their counterparts in the 
factory relied on costs and non-financial criteria, such as work load, as common 
sense when judging the transfer price. The appearance of different views of 
common-sense became clear when looking at the clash between them and a 
series of ‘fairness’ issues that were thus created. For instance, factory staff 
commonly believed that they were treated unfairly because the work load did 
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not relate to a favourable profit arrangement. While interviewees highlighted 
how ‘unfair’ the transfer pricing was in terms of the unfair arrangement of the 
work load, responsibility, and information, it actually reflected a mismatch of 
views of common sense in different divisions. More importantly, it was found 
that observed views of common sense represented the hegemonic ideologies of 
dominant groups. Business owners diffused their ideologies through different 
social spaces, such as meetings and daily communications as well as the design 
of bonus systems. As a result, different forms of hegemony emerged in the two 
divisions. 
 
However, this study also showed how managers were able to contradict 
themselves by showing their desire for an agreement on the transfer price. Here, 
the macro analysis discussed in section 8.2.1 is reflected. It was found that the 
different views of good sense that emerged out from broader ideology of 
Confucianism could provide the theoretical foundations for managers to resist 
the conflicts that resulted from the clash of different views of common sense. 
While still holding their common sense on transfer pricing, managers were able 
to show their concern for others and their willingness to be harmonic due to the 
influence of being ‘ren’. In practice, managers usually saw the transfer price 
compromise as a favour to others which would be paid back later. As a result, 
conflicts around transfer pricing did not happen on every occasion, and the two 
divisions were able to agree with each other most of the time. Thus, these 
findings addressed the third research question of this study. 
 
8.2.4 Transfer pricing as social-political practice  
Overall, the recap of the empirical findings of the previous chapters has 
demonstrated the socio-political nature of transfer pricing. It has provided a 
whole story on how transfer pricing was a structural condition, influenced by 
complex social relations and practised through different ideologies. Based on 
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Gramsci’s perspective, this study is able to present and explain the findings that 
highlight the problematic nature of the neo-classical economic standing of 
transfer pricing. The core assumption for conventional transfer pricing practice 
is that transfer pricing is a profit-making device for profit maximisation (Section 
2.2.2). However, this study problematised this assumption by presenting a case 
where transfer pricing is developed based on hegemonic instead of economic 
motives.  
 
As demonstrated in the previous sub-sections, the development of transfer 
pricing was always related to the hegemonic relations. The findings in section 
8.2.1 demonstrated that the broader social structure was able to influence the 
fundamental power relations in the organisation and therefore has an influence 
on the construction of transfer pricing. This showed that transfer pricing was 
influenced by the broader hegemonic conditions instead of economic needs. 
Locally, the initial tax-driven transfer pricing served a political agenda in 
distributing wealth between the dominant groups. The change of transfer pricing 
was also triggered by the collapse of hegemonic relations. The development of 
decentralised transfer pricing was not motivated by information specialisation 
(Kaplan & Atkinson, 1998) but by the need to generate consent. However, the 
hegemonic relations characterised by conflicting hegemonic interests, 
ideologies, and compromises between the business owners resulted in an 
inefficient economic transfer pricing practice (Section 8.2.2). While this will be 
problematised by conventional research due to their function desire of achieving 
an effective system (Chang, Cheng, & Trotman, 2008), it seems that this was 
never the real issue at PLT. Instead of trying to solve the issue of economic 
inefficiency, the business owners actually utilised different hegemonic strategies 
to diffuse their ideologies to their trusted managers, who later relied on these 
ideologies when practising transfer pricing. During the mundane practice of 
transfer pricing, there was an enormous issue around ‘fairness’. However, it was 
not caused by an unfair market price (Luft & Libby's 1997) but by the ‘clash’ of 
227 
 
different views of common sense existing in different divisions (Section 8.2.3). 
As a result, transfer pricing was used as a field to solve hegemonic struggles 
instead of as a tool for economic enhancement. Thus, by addressing the three 
research questions, this study has demonstrated a case of transfer pricing used 
as a socio-political practice and has provided a richer and deeper explanation of 
the development of transfer pricing than the neo-classical economic stance. 
 
8.3 Discussion of empirical analysis 
The previous section provided an overview of the main findings of this study and 
explained how the research questions were addressed. This section critically 
engages my empirical analysis with the literature on transfer pricing and 
management control in order to relate my findings to the existing research and 
theory. 
 
8.3.1 Cultural-political conditions  
The empirical findings demonstrated in chapter 5 showed how a particular 
transfer pricing practice in a Chinese organisation emerged from the 
development of a broader social context. Adopting the concept of ‘structural 
hegemony’ developed by Joseph (2002), I was able to focus on the relationship 
between agents and the social structure they are living in and to explore how 
the emergence of hegemony at a local level relies on the reproduction of 
broader social and economic structures.  
 
As discussed in section 8.2.1, the transfer pricing system at PLT was located in 
unique political-cultural circumstances. The political development of China set a 
foundation for the hegemonic relationship between business owners and staff in 
the organisation. As the business owners were part of the ‘power bloc’ for state 
hegemony and played an important role for state economic goals, they had 
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already won consent over others at the national level and naturally became 
powerful players in the organisation. Thus, the hegemonic ideology of 
Confucianism influenced the function of the transfer pricing practice. The 
management control function of transfer pricing became invisible and was 
replaced by Confucian-informed control practices. The influence of Confucianism 
promoted a paternalistic mode of control in the organisation. The business 
owners were surrounded by managers whom they trusted or who were family 
relations while they held power themselves. The absolute power of the 
entrepreneurs was naturalised because it was amply justified by the Confucian 
ideology. In addition, the entrepreneurs tended to exercise direct supervision 
and informal monitoring over the organisation.  
 
By looking at the transfer pricing practice as a management control practice, the 
findings of this research can be linked to prior management control research. 
The cultural-political implications of management control practices have been 
discussed in a different context (see section 2.4.3). Mostly located in LDC 
contexts, researchers have highlighted the significance of political intervention 
for management control practices and how conventional management 
accounting techniques are replaced or influenced by traditional political control 
practices. Therefore, these researchers have analysed the relations between 
political control and ‘new’ accounting technologies with a focus on the 
influential power of the state. Similar to this study, Alawattage and 
Wickramasinghe, (2008) used structural hegemony as part of their theoretical 
framework when understanding management control practice. They have 
analysed in detail the development of state politics and how labour control 
practices are conditioned by the reproduction of a structural hegemony.  
 
Although LDC researchers have demonstrated the significance of state politics to 
management control practices in organisations, there is an over-emphasis on the 
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transformative role of state politics. State politics usually have a direct 
influence on the power balance in an organisational context, and the hegemonic 
struggle in organisations also reflects the similar struggle at a national level 
(Ashraf and Uddin, 2015). This may be caused by the empirical focus on 
privatisation programmes in prior research. By examining the transfer pricing 
practice in a private organisation which is not historically related to the 
government, I found that the role of state politics can be conditional instead of 
transformative. In the case of PLT, state politics provided a foundation for the 
establishment of hegemonic relations in the organisation. However, it did not 
necessarily influence the internal dynamic of its local hegemony. Thus, the 
concept of ‘structural hegemony’ here helped us to understand the existing 
power relations in the organisation. Instead of being decisive elements 
influencing the hegemonic scene in the organisation, structural hegemony 
actually sets the scene for me to further analyse the evolvement of different 
forms of hegemonic relations in the PLT. 
 
On the other hand, the cultural-ideological dimension of structural hegemony 
seems have a more significant influence on the transfer pricing practice in the 
organisation. To some extent, the finding reveals that cultural ideology is able to 
provides an ideological justification for political control (Williams, 1983). Some 
Western scholars argue that accounting is actively participated in hegemonic 
purposes by generating surplus value. It provides objective measurements for 
control (Bryer, 2006) and support other forms of labour control such as physical 
control (Hopper, et al, 1986). Therefore, in the western word, hegemony is 
driven by the numerical control under capitalism. In contrast, my analysis in 
Chinese context found that Confucianism, as a structural hegemonic ideology, 
not only conditioned the basic hegemonic relations in Chinese organisation, but 
also determined the control practice exercised by dominant social groups. 
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The empirical findings suggest that the principle of ‘wu lun’ established 
solidified social relations in organisation and provided the necessary ideological 
foundation for the establishment of unique paternalistic mode of control within 
which accounting is less used for hegemonic purposes. At PLT, the main strategy 
of hegemonic control was exercised through informal relations and naturalised 
power. This echoes political studies in LDC context such as Alawattage and 
Wickramasinghe (2008), and Efferin and Hopper (2007), who show how cultural-
political hegemonic control dominated the overall control mechanism while 
accounting has minimal role in such development. However, different from these 
studies, it seems that transfer pricing has an active role in the development of 
these hegemonic relationships during hegemonic crisis when competing 
hegemonies co-exist. This will be elaborated in the next section. 
 
In addition, this study extends the previous understanding of culture by 
theorising it as a form of hegemonic ideology. By recognising Confucianism as a 
form of structural hegemony existing in the broader ideological structure, this 
research offers a broader perspective when understanding the cultural form of 
management control. While structural hegemony helps secure the social cement 
(Joseph, 2002), its ideological influence affects all actors in the society including 
the dominant groups. As a result, the hegemonic strategies exercised by 
dominant groups are conditioned by the particular structural hegemonic 
ideologies in their context. Thus, instead of using ‘culture’ as the explanation 
for different ways of control, cultural practices can be theorised as the 
structural hegemonic ideologies influencing the field. 
 
8.3.2 Hegemonic dimensions 
The previous section discussed the structural context in which Chinese 
organisations operate. These macro-level contextual observations provided 
explanations on the hegemonic relations between dominant and dominated 
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groups in Chinese organisations. From here, I explained the transfer pricing 
practices at PLT in relation to the hegemonic dimensions in the organisation. As 
discussed in section 8.1, transfer pricing at PLT was surrounded by enormous 
ambiguities, divisional conflicts, and lengthy discussions. While a conventional 
perspective would see this as a negative issue, the lens of hegemony allowed me 
to embrace this complexity and understand why such a practice continues to 
exist in the organisation. This section demonstrates how the transfer pricing 
practice at PLT was developed in response to different forms of hegemony and 
how this transfer pricing practice played a central role in the hegemonic struggle 
where competing hegemonies co-exist. 
 
Firstly, transfer pricing at PLT was developed in response to different forms of 
hegemony. The original design of the transfer pricing system was formed based 
on the hegemonic arrangements led by the business owners and the CEO. When 
this relationship collapsed, a new form of transfer pricing was also developed 
based on the newly constructed hegemony led by the business owners. This 
observation on the transfer pricing practice echoes other hegemonic studies on 
accounting development (Goddard, 2002; Yee, 2009; Xu, Cortese and Zhang, 
2014). Historical analysis on accounting development has identified that 
accounting development always reflects and constitutes the ideological 
framework of the prevailing state hegemony. Putting this into an organisational 
context, my finding identified that transfer pricing, as a form of accounting, was 
also mobilised by different forms of organisational hegemonies in different 
periods. However, previous studies have argued that the transformation of 
accounting practice becomes possible because of the new hegemonic need for 
ideological diffusion. This indicates that these studies investigated only the 
period when a certain hegemony was prevailing and was clearly identifiable. 
However, this study showed the role of transfer pricing in a situation when 
competing hegemonies co-exist. I argue that accounting is used not only to 
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reflect or construct a prevailing hegemonic ideology but also it is actively 
involved in hegemonic struggles when competing hegemonies co-exist. 
 
The reproduction of hegemony should not exclude the existence of competing 
hegemonies. Thus, the organisation is regarded as the site of hegemonic 
struggles where competing hegemonies attempt to secure greater control within 
the power bloc. Ashraf and Uddin (2015) presented an example on how 
organisations provided a field where the hegemonic struggle between dominant 
groups including the military and the corporate manager occurred, which had 
significant implications for management control practices. Similar to their study, 
the investigation on the horizontal hegemonic relations among the dominant 
groups at PLT revealed the existence of a hegemonic struggle. The competing 
hegemonies exercised by two different business owners shaped the transfer 
pricing practice. However, while management control practice was passively 
changed and did not contribute directly to the hegemonic struggle in the case of 
Ashraf and Uddin (2015), my case demonstrated the central role of transfer 
pricing in a similar situation. It was found that competing hegemonies contained 
conflicting interests, ideologies, and compromises. As both business owners 
sought control over funds, transfer pricing became a battlefield for the 
dominant groups. Vertical hegemonic strategies became important as the 
operators of the transfer pricing system were managers. As a result, the business 
owners exercised different hegemonic strategies to generate consent over their 
respective managers, which created inconsistent principles in the transfer 
pricing at PLT. Thus, the development of transfer pricing at PLT was not simply a 
reflection of the prevailing hegemonic ideologies; instead, it reflected the 
conflicting interests, ideologies, and hegemonic strategies of the dominant 
social groups within the organisation. 
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This study also looked at the different hegemonic dimensions in terms of the 
categorisation of hegemonic social groups in the organisation. When looking at 
hegemonic issues in organisations, prior studies have tended to regard managers 
as the dominant groups and to treat workers, such as daily wagers (Ashraf & 
Uddin, 2015) and tea plantation workers, (Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2008) 
as dominated groups. Although this classical categorisation of hegemonic 
relations is efficient and reasonable when exploring hegemony within their 
specific contexts, alternative classifications of hegemonic relations in 
organisations can be neglected.  
 
This empirical finding of this study demonstrates how the classic hegemonic 
relationship between manager and worker in factories and fields can also appear 
in offices. The use of Joseph’s (2002) concepts of structural hegemony and 
surface hegemony helped understand the origin of such relation from a 
structural level. The investigation on structural hegemony in the Chinese context 
found evidence of business owners acting as powerful players. This provided a 
theoretical foundation for understanding power relations in Chinese 
organisations. Through the investigation of the transfer pricing system at PLT by 
looking at the hegemonic relations embedded in the practice, I further 
confirmed that managers at PLT should be categorised as a dominated group 
while the business owners (shareholders) are the actual dominant group. I also 
found that managers were experiencing hegemonic domination, which stems 
from the cultural-political context of China. Managers at PLT were generally 
powerless against the business owners; they did not have real decision-making 
authority and were being controlled by the hegemonic ideologies formed by the 
dominant groups. While the transfer pricing system was largely characterised by 
the conflicting interests and ideologies, the fragile transfer pricing practice 
became essentially the field where organisational politics between the dominant 
groups were played out. Managers were then motivated to perform for the 
benefit of the dominant groups. They were left in an awkward position where 
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they could not escape from the ambiguous negotiation of transfer pricing 
because of the interventions from the shareholders. Thus, I argue that it would 
be essential to not only examine the hegemonic dominations exercised by 
managers but also to include the hegemonic strategies implemented by more 
powerful social groups and their domination of managers in an organisational 
context. 
 
8.3.4 Relational dimensions 
The discussion so far has illustrated that a hegemonic interpretation of transfer 
pricing can offer a deeper and richer explanation of how transfer pricing is 
developed and practised. It was found that transfer pricing played a role in 
different hegemonic dimensions. While transfer pricing reflected the 
development of hegemony in the organisation, it also played a central role in the 
hegemonic struggle. 
 
This is possible because of my focus on the relational dimensions of hegemony. 
As shown in previous sub-sections, I utilised different Gramscian concepts to 
make sense of the findings. However, the interrelations between concepts 
highlights the relational dimensions. Firstly, I discussed the relation between 
structure and the local area through the dialectical concepts of ‘structural 
hegemony’ and ‘surface hegemony’. In line with other hegemonic literature 
(Ashraf & Uddin, 2015; Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2008), this study found 
that an emphasis on the relationship between state hegemony and local context 
offered theoretical explanations for certain hegemonic practices in the 
organisation. In my case, the paternalistic mode of control and naturalised 
power of shareholders are explained through this relation. 
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Concerning the influence of structural ideology in forming hegemony, this study 
also presented a case on the relation between religion and hegemony. Discussion 
of hegemony and the role of religion is still sparse. In the accounting field, 
hegemonic studies focus more on how different forms of accounting practice are 
developed in relation to state ideologies. However, as Gramsci (1971) noted, the 
church, as a form of religion, plays an important role in diffusing hegemonic 
ideologies in the form of civil society. While this influences the society as a 
whole, this study presented a case where religious principles and ideas influence 
the development of hegemonic strategies such as accounting. For this research, 
Confucianism has been regarded as a form of religion influencing all social 
actors. For state hegemony, it has provided important hegemonic ideologies 
when rationalising state policies on marketisation and privatisation. Concepts 
that have emerged from Confucian principles can be seen in lyrics, reports, and 
the media, highlighting the importance of harmony and ‘big-family’. This 
allowed the generation of consent over political ideologies although they were 
sometimes contradictory. Based on that, this study explored how Confucianism 
formed hegemony in an organisational context. Hegemonic practices based on 
Confucianism, such as paternalistic control, were observed although the 
organisation experienced little state intervention. The hegemonic control was 
not exercised through calculative practice; instead, the naturalised power 
distance and religious relational principles were crucial there. Thus, religious 
principles actually drove the management control practices while accounting did 
not have a constructive role. To some extent, this observation is similar to 
Alawattage and Wickramasinghe's (2008) argument on the detachment of 
accounting from labour control.  
 
While this study is concerned with the structure-local relation, it also 
emphasises the internal dynamics in the organisation. This study highlights the 
dynamic hegemonic relations in the organisation, including the horizontal and 
vertical dimensions and the interplay between them. The relational aspect of 
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hegemony is usually implicitly discussed in accounting research. While studies 
tend to focus on the ideological perspective of hegemony in terms of the 
ideologies accounting reproduces and the political hegemony accounting 
represents (e.g., Richardson, 1989; Cooper, 1995; Goddard, 2002; Yee, 2009; Xu, 
et al, 2014), they essentially discuss the vertical relationship between the 
dominant and dominated groups and the role of accounting in securing moral 
leadership and consent among the masses. This is also observed in this study 
when looking at how the business owners manipulated the organisational 
structure and systems to secure consent among the managers. However, this 
study emphasises that hegemony is not only describing a top-down relation but 
also involves interplay between hegemonic relations in different dimensions. 
Although these hegemonic relationships can be discussed separately as different 
levels of hegemonic strategies, they are closely interrelated elements that 
should not be considered in isolation in reality. 
 
Ashraf and Uddin (2015) illuminated the horizontal dimension of hegemonic 
relations by discussing the hegemonic relationships between the powerful 
players in an organisation and how their conflicting interests and ideologies 
resulted in a weak vertical hegemonic strategy. Following Ashraf and Uddin's 
(2015) emphasis on the horizontal hegemony, this study has also illustrated how 
the development of horizontal hegemonic relations drove transfer pricing into 
being a fragile practice. However, different from Ashraf and Uddin (2015), the 
development of a fragile transfer pricing practice seems to be intentional and 
has contributed to the hegemonic struggle between dominant groups. In the case 
of Ashraf and Uddin (2015), two dominant groups (military officials and 
commercial managers) resolved their struggles by making several compromises 
with each other, which resulted in a weak management control practice. 
However, this study has demonstrated a case where the hegemonic struggle 
between dominant groups was able to pass down to the dominated group 
through vertical hegemonic strategies. Both business owners successfully secured 
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consent among their respective managers in order to promote their ideology as 
the prevailing one. This is evidential based on the linkage between the business 
owners’ ideologies and the managers’ common sense. This enabled the co-
existence of competing hegemonies. Here, the paralleled vertical hegemonic 
relations also triggered horizontal hegemonic relations among the managers. 
While the managers’ common sense represented the hegemonic ideologies 
promoted by different shareholders, the ‘clash’ between different views of 
common sense, manifested in the transfer price negotiations, was actually the 
‘clash’ of different hegemonic ideologies. Thus, common sense served a dual 
purpose in the hegemonic struggle. On the one hand, common sense created 
consent between shareholders and their trusted managers. On the other hand, it 
enabled managers to engage with the hegemonic struggles by practising transfer 
pricing based on their common sense. Thus, this study has shown how different 
hegemonic relations played different roles in constructing transfer pricing as a 
hegemonic practice at PLT. In particular, the interplay between different 
hegemonic relations was important. It is only through these relations that I was 
able to fully understand the unique transfer pricing practice existing at PLT. 
 
8.3.4 Imperatives of sense making  
The last part of the discussion in previous sections has illustrated how paralleled 
vertical hegemonic relations eventually led to the ‘clash’ of different views of 
common sense between managers, which played an important role in the 
hegemonic struggle. This illustrates the imperatives of sense making when 
discussing the issue of hegemony in organisations. In the language of Gramsci, 
this sense-making process involves the generation of common sense and good 
sense during daily transfer pricing practices. 
 
The literature has already discussed how hegemonic control can be exercised 
through different forms. Accounting has been used an as important ideological 
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tool in maintaining the prevailing hegemony (Goddard, 2002; Cooper 1995; Yee, 
2009; Xu et al, 2014). For different forms of hegemony, accounting has been 
framed differently to reflect its core ideologies. While accounting was able to 
provide a discourse of ‘financial consciousness’ derived from capitalist ideology 
(Cooper, 1995), it was also able to represent other political ideologies, such as 
the socialist ideology promoted by Mao (Xu et al., 2014). Thus, different forms 
of hegemonic control definitely influence the life of dominated groups. As part 
of the hegemonic relations, it is important to understand how dominated groups 
react to it. However, there is little research emphasising how dominated social 
groups either make sense and accept the ideological control, or resist it. Ashraf 
and Uddin (2015) noted that an inconsistent and coercion-based management 
control system resulting from a weak hegemonic arrangement can lead to 
resistance from dominated groups. Unfortunately, they did not have the space to 
elaborate further upon this important aspect. The finding in chapter 7 builds on 
their work and elaborates how dominated groups react to a hegemonic transfer 
pricing system through common sense and good sense. 
 
As discussed in section 8.2.2, the transfer pricing system at PLT was 
characterised by the horizontal hegemonic relation between two dominant 
individuals with conflicting interests, ideologies, and compromises. As a result, 
different hegemonic strategies were also used by them to form different 
hegemonies in organisation. In such a context, it was not easy for managers to 
make sense of the system and operate it on a daily basis. Gramscian common 
sense allows a deeper understanding of the transfer pricing practice by linking it 
with dominant beliefs in the local context. As mentioned in section 8.2.3, I 
found that managers relied on different views of common-sense when 
understanding their daily practice of transfer pricing, for example, profit 
maximisation, cost priority, and work load. These views of common-sense were 
rather inconsistent, local, and did not necessarily reflect the dominant 
ideologies on a structural level. As an individual’s philosophical consciousness 
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can elaborate as common sense in a small environment as long as it has the 
approach to diffuse (Gramsci, 1971), there was a direct linkage between the 
business owners’ ideologies and the common sense adopted by their respective 
managers. For instance, shareholder A’s ideology on marketisation was linked to 
the common sense of price priority in the sales division. In order to connect their 
ideologies to the practical life of the dominated groups (Gramsci, 1971), the 
business owners utilised different social spaces (such as meetings and daily 
communications) to support their respective managers using their ideologies. 
Thus, while common sense is an important way for dominated groups to ‘live 
their lives’ under hegemony, it is also important for dominant groups when 
manufacturing consent among dominated groups.  
 
The findings echo Mantzari and Georgiou (2019), who revealed that dominant 
neoliberal common sense drives the practitioner’s decision to accept IFRS in the 
context of Greece. For them, common sense acts as the basis of consent at an 
ideological level, which was also observed in my case. However, the hegemonic 
struggles at PLT created other dimensions which previous studies were unable to 
observe. The existence of an ongoing hegemonic struggle between the 
shareholders meant that the prevailing hegemonic ideology had not yet been 
established. While multiple hegemonic ideologies were competing with each 
other for domination, common sense contributed to this process. The findings 
exposed the diversity of rationales used by the managers when making sense of 
transfer pricing. While managers in the sales division mainly relied on concepts 
of ‘profit maximisation’ when negotiating the transfer price, their counterparts 
in the factory saw equality of work load as their priority. The attachment to 
certain ideologies means that the alternative views were neglected and difficult 
to communicate. As a result, the ‘clash’ of different types of common sense 
created a contradictory practice of transfer pricing in different divisions. 
Managers rejected alternative arguments and judged the transfer price based 
solely on their own views. While common sense did play a role in maintaining the 
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vertical hegemony by constructing taken-for-granted common values (Gramsci, 
1971), it was also important in the reproduction of horizontal hegemonic 
relations when competing hegemonies co-exist. 
 
A contradictory consciousness of the individual also enabled resistance (Gramsci, 
1971). Mantzari and Georgiou, (2019) observed that alternative views of IFRS 
based on the empirical experience of practitioners enabled some level of 
resistance although it was not strong enough to be transformed into a 
comprehensive counter-philosophy over neoliberal common sense. Similarly, I 
also found that the managers at PLT were able to contradict themselves and 
critically reflect on the situation. Good-sense ideas that emerged outside the 
local prevailing common sense provided the ideological foundation to challenge 
the activities which were taken-for-granted (Gramsci, 1971). In my case, the 
philosophy of Confucianism was able to provide such a source. The analysis in 
section 8.3.1 helped me to identify Confucianism as a structural hegemonic 
ideology which conditions the hegemonic relation and control practice at PLT. 
Here, the application of Confucianism demonstrates that the ideological 
foundation of local good sense can also emerge from broader structural context. 
The concepts of harmony and concern for others enabled resistance to the 
transfer pricing practice fed by common sense. While still recognising their type 
of common sense, the managers were able to show willingness to compromise 
and reach an agreement due to their concern for others and their desire to be 
harmonious. This further highlight how Confucianism not only determines the 
ideology of dominant social group, but also provides ideological foundation for 
dominated social groups to resist local prevailing ideologies. 
 
As noted, the theorisation of good sense has been used to explain the voice of 
resistance to hegemonic ideologies (Mantzari & Georgiou, 2019). While the 
emancipatory potential of good sense cannot be denied, I argue that the 
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dialectical relations between two different types of sense may contribute to the 
reproduction of hegemony after all. This study has presented a case where good 
sense actually secured a weak hegemonic structure. As noted, the ‘clash’ of the 
different types of common sense created conflicts simultaneously due to the role 
of common sense in the hegemonic struggle. In this context, good sense actually 
contributed to the maintenance of the shareholders’ unstable hegemony to some 
extent. Although the managers were able to resist any conflict on transfer 
pricing by reminding themselves of the Confucian doctrines such as the 
importance of harmony and concern for others, they actually stabilised the 
overall hegemony in the organisation. While Confucianism can be regarded as 
the philosophical base for good sense in the local context, it also represents the 
broader common sense that exists in the Chinese context. This is because the 
concepts of common sense and good sense are interrelated and hard to separate 
(Gramsci, 1971). This observation highlights the dialectical nature of two 
conceptual ideas. Thus, one should not simply regard common sense as a 
hegemonic ideology and view good sense as its critical counterpart. Instead, 
their dialectical nature should be examined in order to deeply understand their 
role in reproducing hegemony.  
 
8.4 Summary and conclusions 
This chapter has presented a series of interpretations regarding the practice of 
transfer pricing at PLT. Section 2 summarised and reflected on the empirical 
findings, during which the research questions were addressed. It showed the 
complexity of the transfer pricing practice as it is conditioned by the cultural-
political context, involved in hegemonic relations, and practised through 
different types of common or good sense. This showed that Gramsci’s 
interpretations were able to provide a deeper and richer understanding of the 
practice of transfer pricing at PLT compared to neo-classical economics 
standings. This addressed the overall research purpose of the cultural-political 
nature of transfer pricing. 
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Section 3 discussed the empirical analysis in relation to current cultural, 
political, and hegemonic accounting research in order to highlight the 
contributions of this study. Firstly, I discussed the conditional role of structural 
hegemony to local practice and the significance of its cultural-ideological 
dimension. In addition, I highlighted the different hegemonic dimensions in 
relation to transfer pricing and addressed managers’ dominated position under 
hegemony. Furthermore, I emphasised the relational dimension of hegemony by 
highlighting the appearance of dynamic hegemonic relations including structure-
local relations and the interplay between horizontal and vertical hegemonic 
relations in the organisation. Last but not least, I highlighted the Imperatives of 
sense by arguing how dialectical relations between common sense and good 
sense may reproduce hegemony during a hegemonic struggle. 
 
The next chapter, which is the final chapter, concludes the thesis by summarising 
the arguments, demonstrating the contributions of the research, and indicating 
possible directions for further research. 
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Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
9.1 A summing up 
The recent past has witnessed a trend in accounting research that has 
emphasised its cultural-political context. The trend, however, has neglected 
transfer pricing studies, as they have still been dominated by neo-classical 
economic traditions which focus on efficiency dimensions and technical aspects. 
Such researchers have regarded transfer pricing as a neutral and objective 
practice, thus neglecting how it operates in actual contexts. To fill this gap, my 
study took a critical approach and reported on a case study of political 
trajectory of transfer pricing.  
 
Consulting the literature on transfer pricing, management control, and 
hegemony, I identified a gap and developed three research questions. As was 
presented in chapter 2, I offered a critique of the domination of neo-classical 
economics in transfer pricing research to make the case for studying transfer 
pricing as a social practice (Mcaulay, Scrace, & Tomkins, 2001). Moreover, I 
identified the excessive focus on a top-down relationship between the dominant 
and dominated classes in management control studies with a little emphasis on 
its cultural-political influences. My data allowed me to investigate how transfer 
pricing would be implicated in the dynamic political relations in an organisation. 
The review of accounting research inspired by Gramscian ideas led me to 
identify a gap in the knowledge and to look at such political influences. I 
realised that the hegemonic relations implicated in accounting practices were 
incomplete, as the interplay between different social classes was neglected. 
Hence, I went on to address three research questions: 1) How are transfer 
pricing practices located in a broader cultural-political context? 2) Do hegemonic 
relations shape transfer pricing practice? If so, how? and 3) How do people make 
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sense of mundane practices of transfer pricing in conjunction with such 
hegemonic relations? 
 
Drawing on the theoretical framework based on the Gramscian hegemony, 
transfer pricing was conceptualised to be shaped by different dimensions of 
hegemony. First, the relation between structural and surface hegemony (Joseph, 
2002) conceptualised how transfer pricing is located in its structural hegemonic 
context. Second, instead of seeing hegemony as a top-down relation, I 
emphasised horizontal hegemonic relations (Ashraf & Uddin, 2015) along with 
the classical vertical hegemonic relations to prioritise the interplay between 
these relations in shaping a transfer pricing system. Third, I used dialectical 
concepts of common sense and good sense to theorise the sense-making process 
of dominated groups when understanding the mundane practice of transfer 
pricing. This theoretical framework then emphasised the dynamic hegemonic 
relations and their interrelations in shaping the hegemonic form of transfer 
pricing. 
 
The research questions were addressed through a 7-month ethnographical case 
study at PLT, where I conducted interviews, observations, and informal 
conversations with actors associated with the transfer pricing in the 
organisation. The empirical findings were organised into three chapters to 
answer the three research questions. The study firstly emphasised the 
implication of Chinese cultural-political conditions for the emergence of power 
relations and management control practices in the organisation (Chapter 5). We 
saw how the dominant position of the business owners in the organisation 
emerged out of the reproduction of an economics-focused state hegemony. We 
also saw how the philosophy of Confucianism provided a theoretical foundation 
for the use of a paternalistic mode of control in Chinese organisations, which 
silenced the management control function of transfer pricing. This showed how 
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transfer pricing was conditioned from a cultural-political perspective, which 
answered the first research question. Secondly, this study analysed the micro-
organisational dynamics and their influence on transfer pricing (Chapter 6). We 
saw how transfer pricing always resulted from the hegemonic relations between 
dominant groups. In particular, the development of horizontal hegemonic 
relations, characterised by conflicting interests, ideologies, and vertical 
hegemonic strategies, shaped a fragile transfer pricing system. This answered 
the second research question. Finally, this study analysed the mundane practice 
of transfer pricing to examine its sense-making process (Chapter 7). We saw how 
managers from different divisions approached transfer pricing negotiations 
differently because of their different views of common-sense. While the clash of 
different views of common-sense created conflicts, we also saw how managers 
contradicted themselves by referring to Confucian good sense, and this 
eventually led to compromise and agreement in the transfer pricing 
negotiations. We also encountered evidence that the views of common-sense 
were derived from dominant ideologies favoured by business owners, and views 
of good sense actually contributed to sustaining the hegemony after all. 
 
9.2 Contributions  
This study has provided an account of how a transfer pricing system was 
practised as a socio-political phenomenon in the context of changing hegemonic 
dynamics in a Chinese private sector organisation. Adopting the Gramscian 
hegemonic perspective, this study has deepened our understanding of the 
different dimensions of hegemony and their interrelationships in shaping transfer 
pricing practice. This section discusses several contributions made by this study. 
 
This study calls for a critical approach to transfer pricing research. It questions 
the current neo-classical economic trend in the transfer pricing literature. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the transfer pricing literature has focused on the issue of 
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financial performance (Luft & Libby 1997; Pfeiffer et al. 2011; Oyelere & 
Emmanuel 1998). Transfer pricing has ultimately been regarded as a contingent 
practice in the sense that its financial performance depends on internal and 
external contingent factors. The philosophical and methodological assumptions 
of the neo-classical economic perspective have been problematised. It was 
argued that such a perspective failed to consider the broader and social issues 
implemented in accounting (Scapens, 1994). Given that neo-classical economic 
theory cannot provide a better understanding of transfer pricing, Mcaulay, 
Scrace, and Tomkins's (2001) initial attempt at a critical approach to transfer 
pricing provided initial evidence of the social complexity of transfer pricing. 
While they offered a considerable contribution to understanding transfer pricing 
as a social practice, I highlighted that they fall short of a coherent theoretical 
framework in explaining their story. Thus, this study contributes to the transfer 
pricing literature by further emphasising the social-political complexity of 
transfer pricing through a case study of the non-technical development of 
transfer pricing in an organisation. A hegemonic analysis of transfer pricing is 
able to provide a deeper understanding of how and why different forms of 
transfer pricing have been developed and have been prevalent at different 
periods.  
 
Firstly, this study offers insights into how transfer pricing, on the one hand, is 
constrained by structural hegemonic context, and on the other hand, is 
reproduced by the agential hegemonic dimensions. This study has demonstrated 
the way in which transfer pricing practice is determined by its broader cultural-
political conditions. The case in Chinese context has shown how Chinese political 
hegemonic development conditioned the power relations in the organisation and 
how Confucianism solidified social relations in organisation and determined 
control practice influencing transfer pricing practice. This study then highlights 
the need to examine the cultural-political conditions when studying transfer 
pricing as a social practice. Secondly, this study demonstrates an example of 
247 
 
how transfer pricing can be influenced by organisational politics. It was clear 
that the nature of transfer pricing was not financial driven but was influenced by 
the hegemonic arrangement and political strategies of dominant groups in the 
organisation. In relation to this, this study also has shown how the mundane 
practice of transfer pricing is governed by the common sense derived from the 
local hegemonic ideologies instead of rational financial sense suggested by 
conventional transfer pricing literature. Through the illustration of social 
complexity of transfer pricing, this study argues that it would be useful not only 
to trace the cultural-political context but also to deeply examine the social 
relations that emerged in the organisation for better understanding of transfer 
pricing. 
 
In addition, this study contributes to the theory of hegemony by highlighting 
hegemony’s dynamic nature. Accounting research employing the theory of 
hegemony has generally focused on a single dimension of hegemony. Studies 
have explored either vertical hegemonic relations through the examination of 
political strategies exercised by dominant groups(Richardson, 1989; Cooper, 
1995; Goddard, 2002; Alawattage & Wickramasinghe's 2008) or have focused on 
horizontal hegemonic relations and explored how the relationship between 
dominant social groups has been significant for management control practices 
(Ashraf & Uddin, 2015). Recognising the importance of both dimensions, this 
study offers an initial insight into the dynamic hegemonic relations concerning 
the interplay between vertical and horizontal hegemonies. This study has 
provided strong evidence that the nature of transfer pricing was influenced by 
not only the horizontal political struggles between two dominant individuals but 
also by the paralleled political strategies exercised by the dominant groups and 
their influence on the relations between the dominated groups. Thus, the study 
highlights the necessity of examining the interplay between different hegemonic 
dimensions when studying hegemony in an organisational context.  
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Considering dynamic hegemonic relations, this study also contributes to the 
literature on hegemony by exploring the imperative of the sense-making process 
when studying hegemony. Studies of hegemony have failed to consider the 
perspective of dominated groups and how they make sense of the hegemony. The 
notion of hegemony fundamentally describes a relationship between dominant 
and dominated groups. However, most studies have not examined how the 
dominated groups make sense of the hegemony (see Mantzari & Georgiou, 2019 
for exceptions). In contrast, this study has provided an initial insight into the 
sense-making process of dominated groups in an organisational context. The 
empirical evidence has shown how the managers engaged with the transfer 
pricing practice and explained why the consensus for hegemony is maintained. I 
have shown that common sense, diffused from hegemonic ideologies, drove the 
managers’ mundane practice of transfer pricing while the attachment to certain 
hegemonic ideologies silenced the discussion of alternative views (Mantzari & 
Georgiou, 2019). Under the context of competing hegemonies, this created a 
constant ideological battle. Thus, this study argues that dominated groups are 
not merely passive in hegemonic relations; instead, common sense enables their 
participation in the hegemonic struggle between dominant classes. 
 
While this is so, this study has also revealed that the dominated groups in the 
case study were able to contradict themselves and were capable of critical 
reflection. Views of good sense that were based on Confucian principles acted as 
a source of critique to common sense, which enabled the alternative 
understandings of transfer pricing (Mantzari & Georgiou, 2019). The 
contradiction between common sense and good sense explained why, despite the 
existence of competing views of common sense, managers could reach an 
agreement and offer a compromise in the transfer pricing negotiations. While it 
is important to examine this aspect considering its emancipation potential, this 
contradiction contributed to some extent to the maintenance of an unstable 
hegemony. Although conflicting views of common sense created contradictions in 
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the organisation in the context of the hegemonic struggle, good sense essentially 
maintained the organisational hegemony after all. Thus, I argue that common 
sense and good sense are not just opposites; instead, their dialectical nature 
needs to be embraced in order to understand their role in reproducing 
hegemony. 
 
As noted in Chapter 3, the literature on hegemony has focused on the 
transformative role of state hegemony. While a macro analysis explored the 
interactive relationship between accounting and state hegemony in sustaining 
the prevailing ideology (Goddard, 2002; Lehman & Tinker, 1987), a micro analysis 
of hegemony in an organisational context also commonly emphasised the state’s 
political intervention into local accounting practices (Alawattage & 
Wickramasinghe, 2008; Ashraf & Uddin, 2015). For instance, when describing a 
scene of hegemonic struggle in organisation, Ashraf and Uddin (2015) considered 
such a hegemonic struggle as a reflection of the political struggle at the state 
level. By adopting Joseph’s (2002) concepts of structural hegemony, this study 
has improved our understanding of the role of the state in locating the local 
hegemony. The evidence has shown that political hegemonic development at the 
state level is conditional rather than transformative for the local hegemonic 
dynamic. My findings have illustrated that the political development in China 
only set a foundation for power relations in Chinese organisations instead of 
directly influencing how hegemony was exercised in these local contexts. The 
state policies did not necessarily intervene in the hegemonic scenes in the 
organisation. Thus, this study argues that local hegemonies are not simply a 
reflection of the hegemonic scene of the state. Instead, organisations have their 
local hegemonic dynamics characterised by different interests and ideologies.  
 
This also contrasts with contemporary research on hegemony, namely, the 
categorisation of hegemonic groups. The current literature on labour control 
250 
 
often examines the classic hegemonic relationship between managers and 
workers in factories and fields (Hopper & Armstrong, 1991; Ashraf & Uddin, 2015; 
Alawattage & Wickramasinghe, 2008). While such recognition was not 
problematic in their local context, this study found that the hegemonic relations 
were determined by the development of structural hegemonic condition. The 
answer to ‘Who is the dominant group?’ relies on the understanding of the 
broader social political environment. The investigation of structural hegemony in 
the Chinese context found evidence that power relations could change due to 
changes in the structural hegemonic conditions. While proletarians had a 
powerful position in organisations during the socialist hegemony, capitalists, 
represented by business owners, took over the power in organisations due to the 
change of hegemony from socialism to a market-based hegemony. Thus, it is 
unwise to assume the nature of the hegemonic relations in organisations without 
studying the structural hegemonic context. 
 
On the other hand, this study embraced the cultural-ideological dimension of 
structural hegemony, which has been largely neglected in the prior literature. 
The findings suggest that religious principles, such as Confucianism, serve as an 
important hegemonic ideology in state hegemony. This hegemonic ideology 
provided the necessary ideological foundations for the cultural form of 
hegemonic control, such as paternalistic governance (Efferin & Hopper 2007). 
While similar control mechanisms have been explained by the ‘culture values’ 
(Efferin & Hopper 2007) of business owners, the use of structural hegemony 
enhanced our understanding of ‘cultural value’ by regarding it as a form of 
hegemonic ideology. Since such ideologies influence all actors, including 
dominant groups, they influence particular ways of control practice. Thus, 
instead of using ‘culture’ as the explanation of different ways of control, one 
should consider how hegemonic ideologies influenced the choice of hegemonic 
strategies in controlling dominated social groups. 
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9.3 A personal concern 
This research provides numerous contributions to the theoretical debates on 
transfer pricing and hegemony. Meanwhile, my ethnographical experience in the 
field also raised some personal concerns, especially regarding the position of 
managers in the neoliberal organisational context.  
 
As noted in the previous section, this research found that the managers were in 
a dominant position in the organisation. They were controlled by the business 
owners and were motivated to seek the business owners’ interests. While this 
was unpacked through my adoption of the Gramscian perspective, managers who 
were actually experiencing it commonly were less aware of it, which I found 
puzzling. This study involves a willingness to encourage managers to rethink 
their own situations in their organisation.  
 
Traditionally, managers are viewed as powerful players in their organisation. 
Compared to factory workers, they usually work in a comfortable environment 
and enjoy higher and more stable salaries. However, this research provided an 
example where the managers were powerless and were forced to be involved in 
the organisational politics played by the owner-managers. This study has shown 
that the office is becoming the new form of factory. When performance 
measurement and ideological control are heavily implemented with respect to 
managers, they make no difference to blue-collar workers. It is, then, important 
for managers to critically assess the situation and challenge the common-sense 
view existing in the field. The reproduction of good sense is important here. 
Although good sense actually helped the reproduction of hegemony in the case 
of PLT, some managers who had a rich working experience utilised their previous 
practical experience as good sense and initiated the resistance to hegemony. For 
instance, based on his own observation, the factory manager was able to link 
transfer pricing issues with the organisational politics between the owner-
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managers. 6 months after the fieldwork had been completed, he actually left his 
job there and went to a rival company. Thus, the difference between managers 
and workers is that managers usually have alternative choices and therefore 
have more emancipation potential. As long as managers can construct their 
coherent thinking based on alternative ideologies, resistance can be enabled. 
Based on this, this study calls for more research concerning the dominated 
position of managers in demonstrating how they can be controlled as well as how 
they resist the hegemonic practices. 
 
9.4 Directions for future research 
The contributions of this study provide directions for future research in the field 
of transfer pricing and hegemony. As this study has argued, there is a huge gap in 
the literature regarding broader socio-political issues in transfer pricing. While 
this study has provided initial insights into how transfer pricing can be seen as a 
political phenomenon, it is located in the Chinese context. Thus, it would be 
useful to explore the social complexity of transfer pricing through case studies 
from other contexts and analyse if there are different hegemonic dynamics in 
the transfer pricing there. In addition, to enrich our understanding of the social 
meaning of transfer pricing, future studies can focus on other social aspects 
when examining transfer pricing. As Mcaulay Scrace, and Tomkins (2001) 
demonstrated, transfer pricing may be used as a tool for sustaining a habit or 
establishing identities. While this study has focused on its hegemonic aspect, 
further research can evaluate how identities (Taylor & Scapens, 2016) and 
different logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991) influence the practice of transfer 
pricing.  
 
The use of a hegemonic theoretical framework focusing on hegemonic relations 
also helps improve our understanding of hegemony in the organisational context, 
which is useful for further research in organisational studies concerning 
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hegemony. The adoption of such a theoretical focus can help us understand how 
dynamic hegemonic relations work in organisations, which includes the 
structural-local relations, and the interplay between vertical and horizontal 
hegemonic relations. Also, researchers will find how mundane hegemonic 
practice is maintained and justified. Thus, organisational studies can benefit 
from the theoretical framework developed in this study and explore how other 
organisational practices related to hegemony, such as human resource 
management and performance measurement systems. 
 
In addition, this study assessed the relevance of religious principles in forming 
hegemony. This study has shown how the principles of Confucius formed 
paternalistic control practice in the organisation. As Confucianism is only one 
form of religion, it is important to examine other religious principles and their 
roles in reproducing hegemony. Religions such as Christianity, Buddhism, and 
Islam all play a significant part in society in different contexts. Although they 
may disseminate different ideologies, they work in a similar way to Confucianism 
in reproducing hegemony. This study has presented an example of how the state 
utilises these religious ideologies for developing their own hegemonic 
arrangements and manufacturing consent among the members of a society. 
Religious influence is particularly significant to business and management in 
some countries. For instance, Islamic banking is mainly driven by the principles 
of Islam instead of economics. This can create different forms of hegemonic 
systems compared to the neoliberal hegemony. Therefore, further research that 
explores how religion shapes the diffusion of hegemonic accounting practice in 
different religious contexts could contribute to our understanding of religion and 
hegemony. 
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Appendix 1: Interview Plan and Rationale 
Questions  Rationale Participant 
How will you describe 
your job?  
Basic understanding of 
participants and what they do in 
the organisation/what their role is 
in the system. 
Shareholder, 
Manager, Staff 
What is the history of 
the organisation? 
Understand context and identify 
potential broader institutions that 
may influence organisational 
decisions. 
Shareholder 
What's your product?  
 
How would you describe 
its competitive 
advantages as the 
product? 
Examine different understandings 
towards the organisation's 
product. 
Shareholder, 
Manager, Staff 
How would you describe 
your competitive 
advantage as a 
company? 
 
How do you compete 
with others? 
Understand views of the middle or 
above management.  
 
Understand the strategy the 
company is using, for future 
comparison with local practice. 
Shareholder, 
Manager 
What is the goal of your 
organisation?  
 
Does it have any 
organisational culture?  
 
What do you think the 
organisation needs to 
achieve? 
Understand organisational value.  Shareholder, 
Manager 
What is the 
organizational 
structure? How does it 
work? 
Understand the structure of the 
organisation in order to plan 
further data collection. 
Shareholder 
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What does management 
accounting mean to 
you? 
Understand different perspectives 
of understanding of the same 
notion in the organisation. 
Shareholder, 
Manager, Staff 
What is your current 
accounting system 
especially management 
accounting system? 
Understand the current system as 
a background. 
Manager 
Did your management 
accounting system 
change?  
 
Is 'yes', why has it 
changed? 
Identify potential changes that 
can be the core issue for data 
analysis. 
Shareholder, 
Manager 
If there is some change, 
how do you feel about 
it? 
Is it good or bad? 
Understand different perspective 
on changes. 
Shareholder, 
Manager, Staff 
Do you think you work 
with staff in different 
divisions?  
 
If 'yes', in which way? If 
'no', why not?  
Understand connections in 
different divisions in the group 
and get deeper understanding of 
the system. 
Manager, Staff 
To your knowledge, 
what do you think other 
groups of accountants 
do? 
Identify people’s views to others. 
See how they critic others or 
justify themselves 
Manager, Staff 
Do you require 
information from 
another department 
(divisions)? 
Understand connections between 
groups.  
 
Identify potential issues. 
Manager, Staff 
How do you use the 
information generated 
from the system? 
Understand the process of using 
information, especially how 
managers use information 
differently. 
Shareholder, 
Manager 
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Do you think you have 
any connection with 
other subsidiaries? If 
'yes', how? If 'no', why 
not? 
 
 
Understand connections in 
different organisations in the 
group. 
 
Link with the questions with 
shareholder. 
Manager, Staff 
What do you think 
about the organisation 
now? Are there any 
issues you are 
concerned about? 
Identify different issues/concerns 
of people. Find different focuses. 
Shareholder, 
Manager, Staff 
In your opinion, what 
needs to be improved in 
the organisation? 
 
Identify people’s logics by 
identifying their needs and 
desires. 
Shareholder, 
Manager, Staff 
How do you use the 
information generated 
from the system? 
Understand the process of using 
information, especially how 
managers use information 
differently. 
Shareholder, 
Manager 
What is your experience 
prior to 
joining/establishing the 
organisation? 
Understand the habitus through 
past experience and thus the basic 
background of the shareholders. 
Shareholder 
How do you think your 
past experience 
influences your career 
in this organisation? 
 
Do you think your past 
experience influences 
your decisions when 
running the company? 
Let participants describe how 
their habitus influences them. 
Shareholder 
What you believe is 
most important for the 
organisation right now? 
Understand different focus points 
actors are having. Help with 
identifying institutional logics and 
orders of worth. 
Shareholder, 
Manager, Staff 
What do you think is 
essential for your 
Identify worthiness or, in 
Bourdieu’s terms, symbolic capital 
Shareholder, 
Manager 
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position (e.g. cars, 
planes, salaries, 
reputations, etc.) 
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